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Abstract
In this thesis I study how electoral competition shapes the public policies implemented
by democratic countries. In particular, I analyse the relationship between observable
characteristics of the population of voters, such as the distribution of income and age,
and relevant public policy outcomes of the political process. I focus on two theoretical
issues that have proved difficult to tackle with existing voting models, namely
multidimensionality of the policy space and non-convexity of voter preferences. I
propose a new theoretical framework to deal with these issues. I employ this new
framework to address three popular questions in the Political Economy literature for
which a multidimensional policy space is deemed to be a crucial element to capture the
underlying economic trade-offs. Specifically, I analyse (i) the relationship between
income inequality and size of the government, (ii) the causal link between population
ageing and the ’tightness’ of immigration policies, and (iii) the role played by the
income distribution in shaping public investment in education. I compare the predictions
derived under the new theoretical tool with those that prevail in the existing literature. I
show that the interaction among multiple endogenous policy dimensions helps to explain
why several studies in the literature - in which the analysis in restricted to a unique
endogenous policy choice - deliver empirically controversial or inconsistent predictions.
For all three questions, the approach proposed in this thesis is shown to be helpful in
reconciling the theoretical predictions with empirical evidence, and in identifying the
economic channels that underpin the patterns observed in the data.
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1 Introduction
This thesis contributes to the analysis of a questions that lies at the very core of the
disciplines of Political Economy and Positive Political Theory. Namely, I study how
electoral competition shapes the policies implemented by democratic countries, and
specifically how individual preferences are aggregated by political processes and
institutions into collective choices about public policies. This analysis is particularly
important for modern democratic societies, whose political institution are deemed to be
representative - at least to some degree - of the preferences of their citizens. The main
target of this thesis is to propose a set of theoretical tools that allows one to formulate
predictions about the relationship between observable characteristics of the population of
voters in the economy, such as the distribution of income, wealth, age, etc., and some
relevant policy outcome of such economy. To achieve this goal, I follow a main stream
of literature, that identifies the choice of political representation induced by voting in
elections as the most important political act in democratic countries (Riker, 1982). Thus,
I focus on the role played by electoral and political competition in shaping the
relationship between features of the voting population and policy outputs. The
importance of such analysis for economists and social scientists in general is vast, both
because of the large economic, fiscal and social consequences of the policies
implemented by elective bodies, and because of its implications with respect to the
design of political institutions and to the well-being of the society. Thus, it is not
surprising that the question of how to aggregate heterogeneous individual preferences
through electoral competition has been crucial in the development of Social Choice and
Positive Political Theory from their very early days. The origins of this stream of
literature can be found in the work of the French philosopher and mathematician Nicolas
de Condorcet, and in particular in his “Essai sur l’application de l’analyse a` la
probabilite´ des de´cisions rendues a` la pluralite´ des voix” (Essay on the application of
probability theory to plurality decision making, 1785). This early contribution has
identified some of the main theoretical difficulties that would affect the analysis of this
problem ever since. Specifically, he describes an issue known as Condorcet’s voting
paradox. Such result states that, for any choice over at least 3 alternatives, for a group of
at least 3 individuals, it is possible that none of the alternative is undefeated in a majority
voting contest, i.e. there is no Condorcet winner. The difficulties in aggregating
heterogeneous preferences through a voting process have been shown to be potentially
15
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dramatic in the early Social Choice literature. Specifically, Arrow’s General
Impossibility Theorem (Arrow 1950) implies that one cannot ensure the existence of a
stable social preference ordering that satisfies some minimum properties for unrestricted
individual preference orderings. Moreover, the so-called Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem
(Gibbard 1973, Satterthwaite 1975) states that any non-dictatorial deterministic voting
rule that allows all potential alternatives to be chosen is prone to tactical voting. This
means that a voter with full knowledge of how the other voters are to vote and of the rule
being used has an incentive to vote in a way that does not reflect his or her preferences.
This result implies that such voting rule is manipulable, meaning that the incentive
compatibility of a voter behavior that reflects the true voter preferences cannot be
ensured. The traditional literature - which I extensively survey in the next chapter - has
tackled these problems by imposing restrictions on voters’ preference orderings.
Specifically, the early contributions by Black (1948, 1958) and Downs (1957) have
shown that, if voters preferences over electoral outcomes satisfy some ordinal conditions
such as Single-Peakedness, then a Condorcet winner exists and corresponds to the
platform that is preferred by the median individual in the population. Thus, in a simple
deterministic model of electoral competition - usually referred as Downsian model - it is
possible to derive a simple and clear characterization of the policy outcome that prevails
in equilibrium. This result, known as Median Voter Theorem, proved extremely popular
in the Political Economy literature. The main reason is that it can be adopted to derive
testable implications about the relationship between some characteristics of the voting
population and the policy outcome, abstracting from other features of the political
process. The shortcoming of this approach is that the conditions under which the Median
Voter Theorem holds are extremely restrictive in some cases, because a Condorcet
winner may not exist. Specifically, two of these cases have been extensively studied in
the literature because of their relevance in several economic applications. This thesis
focuses primarily on these two cases. The first is the (i) analysis of electoral competition
over a multidimensional policy choice domain. A review of the literature about this topic
is provided in chapter 2. The second case concerns problems in which (ii) voter
preferences exhibit non-convexities, and it is extensively described chapter 5. In
particular, I study collective choices over policies consisting of the public provision of
certain goods and services, for which private alternatives are also available to voters on
the market. A typical example of this kind of policy is public intervention in education,
which is the object of the analysis in chapter 5. The contribution of this thesis to the
literature in Political Economy is twofold. The first contribution is methodological.
Specifically, I provide a set of theoretical tools to analyse questions in which either the
multidimensionality of the policy space, or the existence of non-convexities in voters’
preferences (or both) play a crucial role in shaping the economic trade-offs. Moreover,
the proposed theoretical tools preserve - at least to some extent - the strong predictive
power that the Downsian framework exhibits in presence of single-peaked preferences.
16
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The second contribution is the application of such theoretical tools to analyse some of
the most important policy decisions that democratic countries face in this decade, which
correspond to some of the most popular topic of research in the literature. In detail, the
thesis is structured as follows. In chapter 2 I propose a new model of electoral
competition that possesses very useful properties to tackle problems of type (i), and I
compare strength and weaknesses of this new theoretical framework with the ones that
characterize the alternatives in the literature. In the following chapters I present the
applications of the theoretical analysis. First, in chapter 3 I study the relationship
between income inequality and size of the government. Specifically, I extent the analysis
by Meltzer and Richard (1981) to the case in which more than one public spending
policy is available to voters. Second, in chapter 4 I analyse the effects of population
ageing on collective choices over immigration policies and fiscal policies. A different
approach underpins the analysis in chapter 5, in which I study the relationship between
income inequality and public investment in education. One has to tackle both issues of
type (i) and of type (ii) to analyse such relationship, which implies that the theoretical
framework proposed in chapter 2 cannot be successfully employed in this case. Thus, I
adopt a more traditional model of electoral competition, namely a Probabilistic Voting
Model. This approach proves useful to tackle this specific question, but it can only
deliver a limited set of analytical results, because of reasons that I describe in section
2.5.5. A common feature of chapters 3, 4 and 5 is to show that the extension of the
analysis proposed by existing studies to multiple endogenous policy dimensions can
radically change the trade-offs faced by voters. Such exercise allows me to identify the
relevant economic channels that drive voters’ choices and to shed light on some patterns
observed in the data regarding each specific question. Lastly, in chapter 6 I highlight
some of the achievements and of the shortcoming of the analysis presented in the
previous chapters, and I identify some directions of future research. The theoretical tools
proposed in this thesis to address an heterogeneous set of questions are examples of a
large and growing literature that explores possible alternatives to the traditional
Downsian framework. An extensive review of this literature is provided in chapter 2 of
this thesis. An important contribution of this thesis is to show that - in order to capture
the correct trade-offs that underpin several important questions in the Political Economy
literature - it is crucial to relax some of the restriction that are commonly imposed in
studies that employ the Downsian model, in particular the assumption of a
unidimensional of policy space. This is shown to be the case for the three questions that I
analyse in chapters 3, 4 and 5 of this thesis. Most papers in the literature - because of the
technical issues mentioned above - address these and other questions abstracting from
the role played by the interaction among multiple endogenous policy dimensions. As a
result, such studies often overlook some crucial trade-offs that underpin the choices
made by voters and obtain empirically controversial predictions. In this thesis I show
that, if one possesses a tool to tackle the problem of multidimensionality, then the
17
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predictions of simple Political Economy models in the literature can be often reconciled
with the empirical evidence. I prove that this is the case for some of the most important
questions that the recent literature has tried to address with limited success. Moreover,
the extension of the analysis to allow for a multidimensional policy space can help in
providing more convincing economic channels to explain the patterns observed in the
data. Lastly, the new approach proposed in this thesis can be employed to derive new
testable implications of existing economic models, and to analyse entirely new
questions. Thus, this thesis provides not only a valuable contribution to the literature, but
also a set of a promising inputs for future theoretical and empirical research.
18
2 Generalized Comparative Statics
for Voting Models
I investigate the equilibrium properties of a deterministic voting model in which the
policy space is multidimensional and politicians have limited ability to commit to
platforms. Specifically, a politician running alone can only offer his ideal policy. Voters
can form coalitions to increase the commitment ability of politicians. Coalition
structures are required to be stable in any equilibrium. This analysis is useful to answer a
large class of Political Economy questions in which the multidimensional nature of the
policy is crucial to model voters’ trade-offs. I show that, under suitable restrictions on
voter preferences, a Median Voter Theorem holds. The main result consist of two
monotone comparative statics results for the equilibrium policy outcome. Moreover, I
characterize the types of coalitions that can be stable in an equilibrium. Lastly, I show
how this model relates to popular alternatives in the literature, and that the main result is
robust to a variety of different assumptions about the notion of stability.
JEL classification: D72, C71.
Keywords: Multidimensional policy space, Coalitions, Median Voter.
2.1 Introduction
The model of electoral competition proposed by Downs (1957) is a simple and useful
tool that has proved to be extremely successful in the Political Economy literature.
Under suitable assumptions on voter preferences the model delivers a very sharp result
known as the Median Voter Theorem. Such result states that in the unique equilibrium
the median voter is a Condorcet Winner, i.e. he cannot be defeated by any other
individual candidate, and that the policy that is chosen in equilibrium is the one that is
most preferred by the median voter. The theorem implies that the levels and the
comparative statics of the equilibrium policy outcome reduces to the ones of a single
pivotal individual. As a consequence, the predictions of the model regarding the
comparative statics of the equilibrium policy outcome are typically easy to derive and
interpret. These desirable features made this framework very popular in the literature in
Political Economy, such that the median voter result has been applied to an incredible
19
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variety of questions. Examples are the analysis of the relationship between income
inequality and size of governmental intervention in redistributive policies (Meltzer and
Richard, 1981), the study of the determinants of immigration policies (Razin and Sadka,
1999), of the extent of taxation on different tyes of income (Bassetto and Benhabib,
2006), and many more. Unfortunately the conditions under which this useful result of
the Downsian model holds become extremely restrictive if the policy space is
multidimensional. Specifically, the preference restrictions required in order to ensure the
existence of a Condorcet Winner over a multidimensional choice domain are so
demanding that the adoption of such framework to any relevant economic question
becomes almost impossible (see section 2). The aim of this paper is to provide a tool that
shares the desirable features of the Downsian model regarding the characterization of the
equilibrium policy outcome, but that can be easily applied to problems in which the
policy space is multidimensional. Following a successful stream of literature (Roemer
1999, Levy 2004, 2005), the approach adopted in this paper in order to achieve the target
is to recognize that the political interaction in democratic countries involves a number of
actors (voters, politicians) and institutions (e.g. political parties) that interact
strategically, and that such interaction is affected by commitment issues. Specifically, I
assume that individual politicians have limited ability to commit to specific policy
platforms, because they cannot write binding contracts with their electors. As a result, a
single citizen-candidate can only credibly propose his own ideal policy. Nevertheless,
the ability of political agents to commit to platforms other than their own ideal points is
enhanced by the existence of institutions, such as coalitions or political parties, that can
ensure the credibility of commitment through internal self-enforcing agreements. In line
with most of the recent literature (e.g. Levy 2004, 2005, Roemer 1999), I assume that a
coalition can propose any policy in the Pareto set of its members. I do not explicitly
model the process of coalition formation, but I require coalitions to be stable in
equilibrium. The notion of stability adopted - that I define formally in section 3 - admits
a simple intuitive description. Specifically, a coalition A is stable if and only if it can
credibly commit to a policy platform x such that, given the policy proposed by other
coalitions, there is no other platform x′ in the policy space that possesses the following
features: (i) x′ makes each member of a subcoalition A ′ ⊆ A strictly better off with
respect to x; (ii) x′ is in the Pareto set of the subcoalition A ′; (iii) there is no policy x′′ in
the Pareto set of the complementary subcoalition A \A ′ that can defeat x′ by majority
voting. This informal description suggests that this is a realtively weak concept of
stability. The intuition is that a coalition is not stable if, for any policy platform that this
coalition can put forward, there is a subcoalition that can deviate and credibly propose
another platform that makes all its member strictly better off, and such that the remaining
members of the original coalition do not have access to any alternative that can
discourage such deviation. The main results of the paper are robust to stronger stability
requirements, such as coalitions being merger-proof, or less extreme assumptions about
20
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the ability of the non-deviating members of a coalition to punish the potential deviators.
In this paper I show that under this notion of stability and some specific assumptions on
individual preferences - Supermodularity and Strictly Increasing Differences - a Median
Voter Theorem holds in a multidimensional policy space. As a consequence, the
equilibrium policy outcome exhibits some monotone comparative statics properties.
These results can be used to shed light on the role played by the interaction among
mutiple policy dimensions in shaping the equilibrium outcome of some common
applications in the literature, such as the analysis of the relationship between income
inequality and size of redistribution. Moreover, it can be adopted to answer questions
that have been proved difficult to tackle because of the multidimensional nature of the
political choice faced by voters. Examples of applications of this framework are
provided in the next two chapters. The paper is structured as follows. Section 2
summarizes the existing literature about models of Political Economy in a
multidimensional policy space and highlights why none of the existing models is suitable
to analyze sufficiently complex problems of comparative statics. In section 3 I describe
the model of electoral competition and the notion of stability that I adopt in the rest of
the paper. In section 4 I present the main results of this paper: the Generalized Median
Voter Theorem and the Monotone Comparative statics of the equilibrium outcome.
Moreover, I describe some features of the coalition structures that can be sustained in an
equilibrium of the voting game, and some desirable properties of the collective choice
rule induced by the model. I also show that the main results are robust to alternative
settings. Section 5 describes similarities and differences between the model proposed in
this paper and some popular alternatives in the literature, highlighting the advantages and
disadvantages of this new framework in the study of comparative statics. Sections 6
concludes providing some comments about the strengths and the weaknesses of the
results in the paper and suggesting some promising directions for future research.
2.2 Related Literature
The seminal contributions of Hotelling (1929), Black (1948) and Downs (1957) have
introduced in the Political Economy literature the so-called Downsian models of political
competition, which has proved to be extremely successful and it is still commonly used
in recent applications. The reason for this success relies in the simple and powerful
result that this model delivers under suitable restrictions on individual preferences: the
Median Voter Theorem. The result states that, is voter preferences satisfy some ordinal
restrictions such as single peakedness, then there exists a unique platform in the policy
space that is weakly preferred to any alternative by a majority of voters in a pairwise
comparison. This imples that a candidate proposing such policy platform is a Condorcet
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Winner of the voting game. Moreover, such winning platform is the ideal policy of a
specific individual (Pivotal Voter), who is the individual that possesses median
preferences with respect to the total order induced by the preference restriction. This
implies in turn that all predictions about levels and comparative statics of the equilibrium
outcomes are very easy to derive and to interpret, because they reduce to the analysis of
the preferences of the pivotal individual. For instance, suppose that one wants to analyse
the effect on the equilibrium policy outcome of a shock on the distribution of voters,
keeping all the other features of the economy unchanged. It is sufficient to identify the
median individual before and after the shock, and compare the two ideal policies to
obtain the desired comparative statics result. Unfortunately, the class of preference
restrictions that are sufficient to ensure that the Median Voter Theorem holds, which are
relatively weak and easy to impose whenever preferences are defined over a
unidimensional choice domain, tend to be satisfied only in very extreme cases if the
policy space is multidimensional. Specifically, the early papers by Plott (1967), Tullock
(1967) and Devis et al. (1972) have established rather restrictive conditions for the
existence of a Condorcet Winner in the this case. Grandmont (1978) has elegantly
generalized these conditions with the concept of Intermediate Relations. The use of
Grandmont’s result in Political Economy applications is restricted to simple problems of
redistribution (e.g. Borge, Rattsø, 2004) because of the extreme constraints that it
imposes on preference heterogeneity. These requirements are way too restrictive for
applications in which different subgroups of the voting population have sufficiently
heterogeneous preferences over the set of available policies1. These results suggest that,
in the analysis of collective choice over multidimensional choice domains, it is necessary
to depart from the traditional framework. Alternatives to Downsian voting models are
popular in the literature, and they have been succesfully adopted to answer various
questions in the field. The downside of all these approaches is that they do not usually
deliver sharp analytical predictions about the comparative statics of the equilibrium
policy outcome, except for very specific cases. In the remaining part of this section I
review the literature about models of electoral competition over multidimensional choice
domains. A more detailed discussion about the similarities and differences between the
framework proposed in this paper and the main alternatives in the literature is provided
in Section 5. A first and popular alternative is the Citizen-Candidate model, first
proposed by Osborne and Slivinski (1996) and Besley and Coate (1997). This class of
models is based on the assumption each voter can run for elections but she cannot
commit to any platform that is not in the set of her ideal policies. Under this rather
restrictive assumption the existence of a political equilibrium is ensured, but multiplicity
1In section 5 I provide an example of why the Grandmont conditions usually fail to apply if the policy
space is multidimensional, and how the conditions in Grandmont’s paper compare with the ones
assumed here.
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of equilibria is a typical outcome2. For instance, for a given set of primitives, there may
be equilibria with only one candidate running unopposed, equilibria with two candidates
or more, and each of these cases is characterized by a different set of policies that are
implemented in equilibrium with positive probability. This implies that such a model -
without further restrictions - is not suitable to answer questions about policy outcomes
and their comparative statics, because the set of policy vectors that can be sustained in
equilibrium is usually too large to deliver any useful prediction. The problem of
multiplicity of equilibria is shared with the Party Unanimity Nash Equilibrium (PUNE)
proposed by Roemer (1999). In this case the set of equilibrium outcomes is a usually
rather large set, with a typical element being a vector containing the platform proposed
by each of the two parties that are assumed to compete in the elections. Because the
outcome of elections is uncertain, in equilibrium a very large set of policies can be
implemented with positive probability. As a consequence, for most applications this
framework does not deliver sharp comparative statics result and needs to rely on
simulations to formulate predictions about the equilibrium policy outcome. The model
developed by Levy (2004, 2005) exploits the role of institutions, such as political parties,
in shaping the political process. Her approach is the one that is the most similar to the
one proposed in this paper. The crucial assumption is that politicians running for
elections as single candidates cannot credibly commit to any platform other then their
ideal policy, but they can expand their ability to commit to policies by forming coalitions
(called political parties). She assumes that each coalition can propose any policy that is
in the Pareto set of its members. This assumption is consistent with the idea that within
parties members can achieve self-enforcing agreements. Lastly, she adopts a notion of
coalition stability borrowed from Ray and Vohra (1998). This set of assumptions ensures
the existence of an equilibrium in a multimensional policy space even if the individual
preferences are relatively complex. For instance, individuals are allowed to differ in
multiple (possibly orthogonal) dimensions. For the purposes of this paper, the downside
of Levy’s approach is that it allows for a large multiplicity of equilibria, unless voter
preferences and policy space are strongly restricted. Lastly, a relative large literature
adopts Probabilistic Voting Models (Lindbeck and Weibull 1987, Enelow and Hinich
1989, Banks and Duggan 2005). Such a framework ensure the existence and uniqueness
of a voting equilibrium under not very restrictive assumptions. These models deliver a
simple analytical characterization of the equilibrium policy outcome under specific
preference restriction, for instance if voter preferences are Euclidean. For more general
classes of preferences, this framework does not deliver an equally straightforward
characterization. The intuition is that in Probabilistic Models the equilibrium policy
outcome depends in principle on the preferences of all voters, and not only - as in
2There is a particular case, highlighted in Besley and Coate (1997) in which the Citizen-Candidate model
admits an equilibium that - under the same preference restrictions assumed in this paper - delivers sharp
predictions similar to the one I present in section 4. In section 5.2 I illustrate this case and I show that it
can be interpreted as a particular case of the more general setting proposed here.
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Downsian models - on the ones of a specific individual. Thus, the direction of any
comparative statics exercise that involves a shock on the distribution of voters typically
depends on the entire distribution. As a result, analytical predictions can be derived only
for specific kinds of shocks on the distribution of preferences. Example of this approach
are in the papers by de la Croix and Doepke (2006) and by Dotti (2014). These papers
analyse a model of public provision of a private good in which voters differ uniquely in
their income. They derive analytical results for comparative statics of the equilibrium
outcome induced by a marginal mean preserving spread in the income distribution of
voters. On the other hand, for a more general class of shocks on voters’ preference
distribution, there are no analytical comparative static results for probabilistic voting
models. Because of this unappealing feature, in this paper I assume that voting decision
are deterministic. I propose a model of electoral competition that shares the
characteristics of the one proposed by Levy (2004) in terms of the role played by
institutions, and I impose preference restrictions borrowed from the literature of
generalized comparative statics (Milgrom and Shannon 1994, Quah 2007). Namely, I
assume that preferences satisfy Supermodularity and Strictly Increasing Differences over
a choice set that is a convex sublattice. These two modeling choices together are
sufficient to deliver a pivotal voter result that resembles the one of unidimensional
Downsian models. Specifically, a multidimensional version of the Median Voter
Theorem holds, and this result eases the study of comparative statics.
2.3 The Voting Model
In this section I describe the setup of the voting model. I define the notion of coalition
stability that I am going to adopt and I provide a definition for the equilibrium concept.
Lastly, I state two crucial restrictions I need to impose on voter preferences in order to
achieve the main results of this paper, that are presented in section 4.
2.3.1 Setting
Consider a voting game with N voters3 such that each voter i ∈N is denoted by a vector
of parameters θ i ∈ Θ. Assume (Θ,6) is a totally ordered set for some transitive,
reflexive, antisymmetric order relation 6. This allows one to establish a total order in the
set of players N , such that for all i, j ∈N , one gets i ≤ j if and only if θ i 6 θ j. For
instance, suppose θ i is individual i’s income, then θ i ∈ [θ ,θ ] and Θ is a totally ordered
3In this chapter I assume that the number of voters is discrete. All the results hold if one assumes a
continuum of voters of size N.
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set under the order relation ≤. Each individual i ∈ N is endowed with a reflexive,
complete and transitive preference ordering i that can be represented by an utility
function V : X ×Θ×Φ→ R, which is jointly continuous in x and θ -concave4, where
ϕ ∈ Φ is a vector of parameters that do not differ across individuals. The policy space X
is a subset of the the d-dimensional real space Rd . In order to characterize X it is useful
to recall some definitions. Let (L,6) be a partially ordered set, with the transitive,
reflexive, antisymmetric order relation 6. For x′ and x′′ elements of L, let x′∨ x′′ denote
the least upper bound, or join, of x′ and x′′ in X , if it exists, and let x′ ∧ x′′ denote the
greatest lower bound, or meet of x′ and x′′ in L, if it exists. The set L is a lattice if for
every pair of elements x′ and x′′ in L, the join x′∨x′′ and meet x′∧x′′ do exist as elements
of L. Similarly, a subset X of L is a sublattice of L if X is closed under the operations
meet and join. A sublattice X of a lattice L is a convex sublattice of L, if x′ 6 x′′ 6 x′′′
and x′,x′′′ in X implies that x′′ belongs to X , for all elements x′,x′′,x′′′ in L. Lastly, a
sublattice X of L is complete if for every nonempty subset X ′ of X , inf(X ′) and sup(X ′)
both exist and are elements of X . Recall the d-dimensional real space Rd is a partially
ordered set under the transitive, reflexive, antisymmetric order relation ≤5. Moreover
(Rd,≤) is a lattice given the definition above. These definitions provide all the elements
that are needed in order to characterize the policy space X . Let X ⊆ Rd be a convex
sublattice of (Rd,≤), then (X ,≤) is a partially ordered set with order relation ≤. An
example of a policy space that satisfies my assumption is given by the family of sets
Y = {x ∈ Rd|xi ∈ [x j, x¯ j], j = 1,2, ...,d} where xi, x¯i ∈ R for all j. Subset of voters can
form coalitions A ⊆ N . Each voter can be member of only one coalition, i.e.
A j ∩A k = ∅ ∀A j 6= A k. The role of coalitions in this model is to increase the
commitment capacity of individuals over policies. Define
pX ,A (x′) ≡ {x ∈ X : x i x′ ∀i ∈ A ,x i x′ ∀i ∈ A } to be the set of allocation in X that
are Pareto superior to some vector x′ ∈ X for coalition A . Denote with a j the platform
proposed by coalition A j. I assume that a coalition can propose any policy in the Pareto
set of its members, i.e. a j ∈ P(A j) where P(A j) ≡ {x ∈ X : pX ,A j(x) = ∅}, or can
choose to be inactive. If a coalition is a singleton then the Pareto set reduces to the set of
ideal policies of its unique member (as in a citizen-candidate model).
2.3.2 Stability of a Coalition Structure
In order to define stability in this model I need to characterize a coalition structure and
the preferences of each coalition. A coalition structure is defined as a partition P of N ,
4For any function f defined on the convex subset X of Rd , and any (d×1) vector v 6= 0, we say that f is
concave in direction of v if, for all x ∈ X , the map from the scalar s to f (x+sv) is concave. (The domain
of this map is taken to be the largest interval such that x+ sv lies in X .) We say that f is i− concave if
it is concave in direction v for any v > 0 with the ith element of v equal to 0. See Quah (2007).
5For x′,x′′ ∈ Rd x′ ≤ x′′ if and only if x′i ≤ x′′i for all i = 1,2, ...,d.
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i.e. a set of subsets of N such that ∅ /∈ P, ∪A ∈P(N )A =N and if A , jA k ∈ P(N )
with A j 6= A k, then A j ∩A k = ∅. I define a complete social preference relation 
and , such that  is irreflexive i.e. x  x and  is reflexive i.e. x  x and the weak
and strong relations are dual, i.e. x′  x′′⇔¬(x′  x′′) ( is not necessarily transitive)6.
In particular, I am assuming Majority Voting, which is the most common and widely
used criterion in order to establish a social preference relation. Formally x′  x′′ if and
only if ∑Ni=1 1[V (x′,θ i,ϕ)≥V (x′′,θ i,ϕ)]≥ N/2, which implies that x′  x′′ if and only if
∑Ni=1 1[V (x′,θ i,ϕ)≥V (x′′,θ i,ϕ)]≥ N/2 and ∑Ni=1 1[V (x′′,θ i,ϕ)≥V (x′,θ i,ϕ)]< N/27.
Given this preference relation we can define SPA(x′) ≡ {x ∈ A : x  x′} - where A ⊆ X
- to be the strictly preferred set of x′ in A and K(A) ≡ {x ∈ A : SPA(x) = ∅} to be the
set of SP−maximal alternatives in A, or the Core. The crucial aspect of the concept
of stability relies on the idea of “deviator” or “credible threat”. Denote with ν(P) the
number of coalitions that are part of P (including singletons). Recall that a j represents
the policy platform proposed by coalition A j. If the coalition chooses to be active, such
platform must lie in the Pareto set of the coalition A j. Alternatively, the coalition may
choose to be inactive. In such case, I assume that the coalition proposes a default platform
(or neutral platform) x0, such that a j ∈ [P(A j)∪ {x0}]. The default platform satisfies
x i x0 for all i ∈N and all x ∈ X and thus x  x0 for all x ∈ X , i.e. it is worse than
any option available in the policy space for all voters. This assumption corresponds to
a strong aversion of voters to the absence of decisions. I define a policy profile as the
set containing the platforms proposed by each coalition in a given partition P, i.e. AP :=
{a1,a2, ...,a j, ...,aν(P)} with a j ∈ [P(A j)∪{x0}]). Moreover, I define a winning policy
as follows.
Definition 1. (Winning policy) A policy vector a j ∈ AP is a winning policy if and only if
it is in the Core of (N ,AP,V ), i.e. a j ∈W (AP) if and only if a j ∈ K(AP).
Given that the Social preference relation is given by Majority Voting this is equivalent to
saying that, if a j is a Condorcet Winner8 over the set of alternatives AP, then a j ∈W (AP)
implies a j ∈K(AP); if not, then a j is a “weak” form of Condorcet winner, namely a policy
vector that is weakly preferred to any alternative in AP by a majority of voters (I will call
it a weak Condorcet winner). I assume that, if no weak Condorcet winner exists over
AP, then the default (neutral) policy x0 is implemented. Lastly, define the binary relation
TA j,AP on X×X as follows.
6 Notice that the social preference relation  does not necessarily imply a tournament as defined in Dutta
(1988), i.e. it is possible that x′ 6= x′′ and x′ ∼ x′′.
7This definition of the majority rule applies to the case of a discrete number of voters. The analysis can
be easily extended to the case in which the set of voters is a continuum.
8The relationship between the concepts of (strong) Core and Condorcet Winner is described in
Ordershook, 1986, pp. 347-349.
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Definition 2. xTA j,APx
′ if and only if (i) x∈P(A ′) for someA ′⊆A ,A ′ 6=∅, (ii) xi w∗
for all i ∈ A ′, ,∀w∗ ∈W ({a1,a2, ...,x′, ...,aν(P)}) (iii) x  x′′ for all x′′ ∈ P(A \A ′)∪
(AP\{a j}). Consider the set TA j,AP(x′)≡ {x ∈ X : xTA j,APx′}. The set TA j,AP(x′) is the
set of deviators to policy x′ for a coalition A .
TA j,AP(x
′) corresponds to the set of policies in P(A ′) that are strictly preferred to x′ by
each member of any subcoalition A ′ ⊆ A and that are preferred by the society to any
policy that can be proposed by the residual coalitionA \A ′ and to any platform proposed
by other coalitions. Using this concept we can define the T -Core (T K) to be the set
of policies that do not face any “credible threat” from any subcoalition of A , or more
formally:
Definition 3. The set T K(A ,AP) = {x ∈ [P(A j)∪{xN}] : TA ,AP(x) =∅}, or T -Core, is
the set of TA ,AP−maximal alternatives in P(A ).
With this structure I can now define a concept of stability for a coalition structure in this
game:
Definition 4. A coalition A is stable if and only if T K(A ,AP) is nonempty.
Example. It is useful to give an example of why a coalition that does not satisfy the
definition above is unlikely to survive. Suppose T K(A ) =∅. Then for any x ∈ [P(A j)∪
{x0}], ∃x′ ∈ P(A ′) andA ′ ⊆A such that x′ i x ∀i ∈A ′ and x′  x′′ ∀x′′ ∈ P(A \A ′)∪
(AP\{a j}), i.e. there exists a subset of the coalition A and a policy x′ ∈ P(A ′) such that
x′ is strictly preferred to x by all members of the subcoalition A ′ and x′ is also preferred
by the society as a whole to any policy x′′ that the remaining part of the original coalition
A \A ′ can propose and to all the platforms proposed by other coalitions. It is natural to
consider this coalition structure unstable because for any policy chosen by this coalition
in its Pareto Set (e.g. through some form of bargaining), the choice of this policy would
not be self-enforcing. Specifically, a subcoalition A ′ can deviate and propose a different
policy that makes each member of the subcoalition strictly better off, that can defeat by
majority voting any platform proposed by other coalitions, and such that the remaining
part of the original coalition A \A ′ cannot prevent this deviation because there is no
feasible “punishment” policy that can prevent the deviation.
Definition 5. A stable coalition structure is a partition P ofN such that all the coalitions
A ∈ P are stable.
2.3.3 Equilibrium
Define the set of stable coalition structures: P(N ) := {P|T K(A ,AP) 6=∅∀A ∈ P} with
typical element P∗. I can now define an equilibrium for the voting game as follows.
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Definition 6. A pure strategy equilibrium is a coalition structure P, a policy profile AP
and a winning policy w∗ ∈W (AP) ⊆ AP such that: (i) P ∈ P(N ) is a stable coalition
structure; (ii) a j ∈ T K(A j) for all A j ∈ P; (iii) the set of winning policies W (AP) is
nonempty.
In other words in an equilibrium each coalition is stable and is represented by one of
the policy vectors that makes it stable, and the winning policy is a (weak) Condorcet
Winner of the reduced games in which the policy space is reduced to AP ⊆ X . As in Levy
(2005), I assume that a coalition A j in equilibrium is inactive if all its members are just
indifferent between proposing a policy platform and not running at all, i.e (P,AP,w′) is
not an equilibrium if ∃A j ∈ P and a j 6= x0 such that w′ ∈W (AP\{a j})9. This assumption
is consistent with the idea, not explicitly modelled here, of small costs of running for
elections, and implies that at any equilibrium only one policy platform is proposed, i.e.
AP = {a j} for some j ∈ {1,2, ...,ν(P)}. Notice that this is true because the equilibrium
(if it exists) is a (weak) Condorcet Winner, and this implies that W (AP) ⊆W (AP\{a j})
for all a j /∈W (AP). Lastly, I define the set that is the object of a the comparative statics
exercises of the paper.
Definition 7. The set of equilibrium policies E(N ) is the union of the sets of policies that
are chosen in any equilibrium of the voting game, i.e. E(N ) := ∪P∈P(N )W (AP).
This last definition completes the description of the voting process and of the equilibrium
concept. In the next paragraph I describe some restrictions on voter preferences that
ensure that this framework delivers sharp comparative statics results.
2.3.4 Preferences
In order to establish the result I need to restrict individual preferences. The kind of
restrictions I impose are very common in the many fields of Economic Theory.
Specifically, I assume Supermodularity (SM) and Strictly Increasing Differences (SID).
Recall that individual preferences can be represented by a function V : X ×Θ×Φ→ R.
A function V satisfies:
1. SM in x if and only if V (x′∨x′′,θ i,ϕ)−V (x′,θ i,ϕ)≥V (x′′,θ i,ϕ)−V (x′∧x′′,θ i,ϕ)
for all θ i ∈Θ, for all ϕ ∈Φ and for all x′,x′′ ∈ X .
2. SID in (x,θ i) if and only if V (x′,θ ,ϕ)−V (x′′,θ ,ϕ)>V (x′,θ ,ϕ)−V (x′′,θ ,ϕ) for
all x′ ≥ x′′ such that and x′,x′′ ∈ X , x′ 6= x′′, for all ϕ ∈Φ and for all θ ,θ ∈ Θ such
that θ > θ .
9Notice that if W (AP) is not a singleton, then this tie-break rule implies an implicit restriction on voters’
beliefs off-equilibrium. This turns out to be irrelevant for the main results whenever the voter with
median θ possesses a unique ideal policy.
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Notice that these conditions on preferences are slightly more restrictive relative to the
ones assumed in Migrom and Shannon (1994), namely Quasisupermodularity and the
Single Crossing Property. Thus, if SM and SID are satisfied, then also the conditions
for Monotone Comparative Statics in their paper hold. Moreover, SM and SID are very
general properties, but in the case of a twice differentiable objective function one can
simply use the sufficient conditions in Milgrom and Shannon (1994) in order to verify
that the function satisfies SM and SID, namely ∂
2V
∂xi∂x j
≥ 0 ∀x ∈ X , ∀i 6= j and ∂ 2V∂xi∂θ > 0
∀x ∈ X , ∀θ ∈Θ, ∀i. These sufficient conditions are usually easier to verify in comparison
with the one implied by the definitions of SM and SID.
2.4 Results
Define the set of ideal policies I(i)≡ {x|x ∈ argmaxy∈X V (y,θ i,ϕ)},10 and recall that the
set of equilibrium policies is the union of all the policies that are winning policies in some
coalitional equilibrium of the game. Notice that becauseΘ is a totally ordered set, one can
identify a median element θ v. The individual characterized by this value of the parameter
is the median voter denoted by the index11 v.
2.4.1 Main Results
The main results that are relevant for this analysis are stated in the following theorems:
Theorem 1. (Median Voter Theorem). (i) A coalitional equilibrium of the voting game
exists. (ii) In any equilibrium the set of winning policies is a subset of the set of ideal
points of the median voter v. (iii) If the median voter has a unique ideal policy, this policy
is going to be the one chosen in any equilibrium.
Proof. See Appendix 2.7.1.
Theorem 2. (Monotone Comparative Statics). The set of equilibrium policies of the
voting game is (i) a sublattice of X which is (ii) monotonic nondecreasing in θ v.
Proof. See Appendix 2.7.1.
10Notice that the completeness of X implies compactness in the order-interval topology. On bounded sets in
Rd , the order-interval topology coincides with the Euclidean topology (Birkhoff 1967). Hence I(i) 6=∅
for all i.
11In the case of a discrete even number of voters I assume that the ties are broken in favor of the individual
with the lower index. Different assumptions would not affect the results in the next paragraphs.
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Lastly, consider a totally ordered subset Φ′ ⊆ Φ and suppose that the objective function
V (x,θ ,ϕ) satisfies Increasing Differences (ID) in (x,ϕ), namely
V (x′,θ ,ϕ)−V (x′′,θ ,ϕ) ≥ V (x′,θ ,ϕ)−V (x′′,θ ,ϕ) for all x′ ≥ x′′, and for all ϕ,ϕ ∈ Φ′
such that ϕ ≥ ϕ . Then I can state the following result:
Theorem 3. (Monotone Comparative Statics 2). The set of equilibrium policies of the
voting game is monotonic nondecreasing in ϕ .
Proof. See Appendix 2.7.1.
The results in this sections provide a tool to analyze the effects of a shock on the
distribution of voters or on a preference parameter on the policy outcome that emerges in
a political equilibrium. One only has to verify that an economic model satisfies the
conditions stated in this section and then use Theorem 2-3 to formulate the predictions
about the comparative statics of the platform that is implemented in equilibrium. An
interpretation of this Median Voter Theorem is proposed in Section 4.2. The notion of
monotonicity is the same as in Milgrom and Shannon (1994) and it is related to the
Strong Set order, namely given two sets Y,Z we say that Y is grater than or equal to Z in
the Strong Set order (Y ≥s Z) if for any y ∈ Y and z ∈ Z we have y∨ z ∈ Y and y∧ z ∈ Z.
Notice that the results in Theorems 1-2-3 hold even if the individual objective function V
is not differentiable and therefore the First Order Conditions of the maximization
problem cannot be used in order to calculate the comparative statics of interest.
Moreover, in comparison with Milgrom and Shannon (1994), the only additional
restrictions on V I have imposed are joint continuity in x and θ − concavity (see section
3.1). Thus, the notion of monotonicity adopted is very general.
2.4.2 Stable Coalition Structures
In this section I provide some results about stable and unstable coalition structures in
this framework. This characterization is interesting in order to understand the political
content of the analytical results in Theorem 1, 2 and 3, and it is robust to the alternative
stability concept in section 4.1.1. Assume that individual preferences satisfy SM and SID
and recall that v is the index that denotes the median voter, i.e. the player with median
θ ∈Θ. I can state the following results.
Proposition 4. (Lateral Coalitions). Any coalition A j that includes either (a) only
individuals with index (i≤ v) or (b) only individuals with index ( j ≥ v) is always stable.
Therefore a coalition structure P is stable if each coalition A i ∈ P satisfies either (a) or
(b).
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Proof. See Appendix 2.7.2.
Proposition 5. (Central Coalitions). (i) Any coalition A j that include both (a)
individuals with index (i < v) and (b) individuals with index ( j > v) plus at least one
individual with index v is stable if at least one policy xv ∈ I(v) is in the Core of a game
(N ,P(A ′)∪ {xv},V ) for all A ′ ⊆ A . (ii) If the Core of the full game (N ,X ,V ) is
non-empty, then any “Central Coalition” is stable, including the Grand Coalition of all
voters.
Proof. See Appendix 2.7.2.
Following Levy (2004), I define a “Partisan Equilibrium” as follows.
Definition 8. A Partisan Equilibrium is an equilibrium in which all party members vote
for their party’s platform, if it offers one (party members are not restricted in their votes
if their party is inactive).
This definition implies that in a Partisan Equilibrium no voter has a strict incentive to vote
for a policy different from the one proposed by the coalition she is part of.
Proposition 6. (Ends-Against-the-Middle Coalitions). (i) Any coalition A j that includes
both (a) individuals with index (i < v) and (b) individuals with index ( j > v) but that does
not include any individual with index v is stable only if either of the following is true: (1)
a j ∈ I(v); (2) a j ≥ xv for all xv ∈ I(v); (3) a j ≤ xv for all xv ∈ I(v) (4) a j = x0. Therefore
(ii) if I(v)∩P(A j) =∅, then there is no Partisan Equilibrium in which A j is stable and
a j 6= x0.
Proof. See Appendix 2.7.2.
Results in Propositions 4-5-6 provide an intuitive understanding of why I obtain a median
voter theorem. If preferences satisfy SM and SID and if coalitions are constrained to
propose credible policies, then the only way to get any policy outcome different from
the ideal policy of the median voter is a coalition of the Ends-Against-the-Middle type.
This kind of coalition is not stable in this framework (unless a losing platform or no
platform is offered) and therefore there is no equilibrium that violates the generalized
median voter theorem. This is coherent with the idea that coalitions of individuals with
opposite political views are less likely to occur, which is further discussed in section 5.
For illustrative purposes it is useful to analyse a simple example that is graphically
represented in Fig. 2.1. In this example the policy space is two-dimensional, i.e. X ⊆ R2+,
there are 5 players, i.e. N = {1,2,3,4,5}, the median voter is individual v = 3, and each
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individual has a unique ideal point (black dots in Fig. 2.1). The black circle represents
the policy platform proposed by a given coalition (if any). Fig. 2.1 A, B, C all represent
stable coalition structures because either condition (a) or (b) in Proposition 4 is satisfied
by each coalition. On one hand some results of similar models in the literature are shown
to hold in this framework, such as the existence of a two-coalitions equilibrium (Left vs
Right configuration, Fig. 2.1 A). On the other hand some less common structures can be
stable, such as the one in Fig. 2.1 B. Notice that Fig. 2.1 C resembles the case of a
Citizen-Candidate model (Besley and Coate, 1997), in the sense that each individual can
only commit to her own ideal policy. The relationship between the model of electoral
competition proposed in this paper and the Citizen-Candidate model is further discussed
in section 5.2. Lastly, Fig. 2.1 D represents a case in which conditions (a) and (b) in
Proposition 4 are violated and one of the coalitions is in the Ends-Against-the-Middle
form. Notice that such coalition does not satisfy either of the conditions 1-2-3 in
Proposition 6, thus Fig. 2.1 D does not represent a stable coalition structure.
Figure 2.1. Stable and Unstable Coalition Structures
These examples show that, under the assumptions of SM and SID, even if the median
voter is pivotal in all equilibria of the game, the types of coalition structures that can be
stable in equilibrium are very heterogeneous. An element that characterizes the three
types of structures that are always stable in Fig. 2.1 A, B, C is that all are made of
Lateral coalitions as defined in Proposition 4. The political intuition that underpins the
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Median Voter result is that if preferences are ordered by SM and SID, then in order to
defeat the median voter it is necessarily an Ends-Against-the-Middle type of coalition,
which is intuitively less stable than a “Lateral Coalition” or a “Central Coalition”. In
particular, Proposition 6 states that Ends-Against-the-Middle coalitions are not stable
under the proposed stability concept, except in the four specific cases listed. This
represents a major difference with the similar concept proposed by Levy (2004, 2005),
which is discussed in detail in section 5.3. This feature of the coalition structures in
equilibrium is a consequence of employing a stability concept in which agents take other
coalitions’ strategies as given. Specifically, this implies that if a coalition optimally
chooses to be inactive given a certain partition, then it does not represent a threat for
potential deviators in other coalitions. The main consequence of this feature of the
model is that an Ends-Against-the-Middle coalition is unlikely to be sustained in an
equilibrium. The modeling choices are motivated by the empirical evidence provided by
the literature in Political Science. First of all, an outcome in the
Ends-Against-the-Middle form - sometimes referred as Coalition of Extremes (COFEX)
in such literature - is not commonly observed in the voting behaviour of members of
elective bodies. For instance, Poole and Rosenthal (1997) analyse the history of voting
behaviour of the members of the Congress and provide evidence that COFEX voting
“does not to appear very often”, “except in very unusual circumstances”. Their results
show little COFEX activity throughout Congress, and further reduction after 1950.
Moreover, the same literature supports the claim that the party structure of a political
system does not change very quickly. This suggests that assuming that politicians take
other parties’ strategies as given may be appropriate. In particular, there is evidence that
politically inactive factions cannot easily become active and obtain representation. For
instance, the birth of “genuine” new parties is a relatively rare event. Travits (2006)
shows that, on average, only 1.4 new parties gained some representation in elections in
22 OECD democracies surveyed in 1960-2002. Moreover, among those new parties that
have obtained some political representation, the “genuinely” new ones - i.e. the ones that
are not the outcome of the division or the merger of other pre-exisiting parties - are a
very small fraction (Krouwel, 2012). In the light of this evidence, one can conclude that
the behaviour of political agents in the model seems to match fairly well some features
of the political process in democratic countries. It also suggests that, if voters
preferences are ordered along a single dimensions, then the structure of the political
competition tends to be organized in some generalized “Left vs Right” form, even if the
policy space is multidimensional.
33
Chapter 2 Generalized Comparative Statics for Voting Models
2.4.3 Properties of the Voting Rule
It is useful to analyse the characteristics of the Social Choice rule generated by this
voting model. The theory of voting typically attempts to evaluate voting rules
systematically by examining which fundamental properties or axioms they satisfy. Even
if this paper does not propose a voting rule, but a way of modeling the political process,
such properties may still be desirable. Maskin and Dasgupta (2008) have listed as
desirable the following five properties. The first is the so-called (Weak) Pareto Property
(PP), the principle that if all voters prefer option x to option y, then y should not be
chosen over x. The second property is Anonymity (A), the notion that no voter should
have more influence on the outcome of an election than any other (anonymity is
sometimes called the “one person–one vote” principle). The third is Neutrality (N),
which requires that no candidate should get special treatment. The fourth is
Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA), which has attracted considerable attention
since its emphasis by Nash (1950) and Arrow (1951). IIA dictates that if option x is
chosen from the feasible set, and now some other option y is removed from that set, then
x is still chosen. Lastly, Decisiveness (D), which requires that a voting rule always picks
a (possibly unique) winner. It is well-known that, because of Arrow’s Impossibility
Theorem (Arrow 1950), there is no Social Preference Ordering that satisfies at the same
time all the properties listed above plus Unrestricted domain (UD), the notion that all
possible individual preference orderings should be allowed. Strictly related to Arrow’s
famous result is the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem (Gibbard 1973; Satterthwaite 1975).
Their result shows that for any deterministic voting system and for three or more
candidates, one of the following three things must hold for every voting rule: (i) the rule
is dictatorial (i.e., there is a single individual who can choose the winner), or (ii) there is
some candidate who can never win under the rule, or (iii) the rule is susceptible to
tactical voting, in the sense that there are conditions under which a voter would have an
incentive to misrepresent their true preference orderings. The approach of this paper is
the one of restricting the domain of voter preferences. Specifically, I assume that voter
preferences satisfy Supermodularity and Strictly Increasing Differences. This implies
that UD is not satisfied. Moreover, such preference restrictions are important to ensure
that the voting rule satisfies other desirable properties. For instance, if SM and/or SID are
not satisfied, then the voting process presented in this paper may imply violations of D
and IIA. A violation of D can be shown with a simple example. Suppose there are three
citizens, 1, 2, 3, with the following orderings for three policies, x1, x2 and x3:
x1 1 x2 1 x3; x2 2 x1 2 x3 and x3 3 x1 3 x2. The tie-break rule implies that, if an
equilibrium exists, it must involve only one active coalition. Because of such result, it is
easy to show that, given other coalitions’ strategies, there is always a profitable deviation
for at least one player. It is interesting to notice that under the preference restrictions of
SM and SID, no violation of D occurs. As previously stated, an equilibrium always exists
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in this case, such that a certain party wins and a certain policy x ∈ I(v) is implemented.
About possible violations of IIA, these cannot be ruled out and the reason is analogous to
the one proposed by Bergson (1976) for the class of Citizen-Candidate models. Lastly, it
is easy to verify that A,N and PP are satisfied. A and N are satisfied because all voters
have same weight in determining the outcome of elections, and because the rule to win
elections is the same for all parties, specifically the simple majority voting rule. The
weak PP is always satisfied because the outcome is the ideal policy of one individual
(Notice that the Strong PP may not be always satisfied if preferences are not strictly
convex and mergers of parties are not allowed). Summarizing, the voting process
assumed in this paper does not satisfies all desired properties in an unrestricted domain
of preferences, but it performs fairly well under the preference restrictions under which
the main results are derived.
2.4.4 Robustness
In this section I show that the main results of this paper in Theorems 1-2-3 are robust
to slightly different assumptions about coalition stability. Namely, I explore the case in
which voters and party members have preferences driven by ideological motives rather
than by a selfish interest over the policy that is implemented in equilibrium, and the case
in which deviations in the form of mergers between two or more coalitions are allowed.
2.4.4.1 Ideological Voters
If voters are purely policy motivated and sufficiently sophisticated, they evaluate the
profitability of a deviation by comparing the policies that are implemented if no
deviation occurs with the one that would be chosen by the society if the deviation occurs.
In other words, deviating players calculate their payoffs anticipating the final outcome in
terms of policy that is implemented after the elections. This may not be the case if voter
preferences over policies are driven by ideological motives. In such case, members of a
coalition may want their party to propose a policy that is close to their ideological
preferences, independently of what other coalitions are going to propose. Nevertheless,
stability of a coalition may still be an issue because a subcoalition may want to deviate in
order to be able to propose a platform that is closer to their preferred policy. In this
section I present a stability concept alternative to the one proposed in section 3.2, in
which voters are driven by ideological motives. In this alternative concept stability is
fully “internal” to coalitions, in the sense that the profitability of a deviation for a
subgroup of members of a given coalition is independent of the strategies of other
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coalitions. This assumption captures the idea that ideologically motivated party members
only care about how close a platform is to their ideology, and are not concerned about
obtaining a victory in elections. The main results in Theorem 1-2-3 and Propositions
4-5-6 are unaffected. An important simplification with respect to the stability concept
described in the previous section is that one does not need to assume that coalitions
choose to be inactive whenever it is weakly better to do so for any of its members. Given
that party members are driven by ideological motives, they optimally propose a platform
a j 6= x0 even if they expect to lose elections with probability equal to 1. In this case, I
need to propose alternative formulations of definitions 2-3-4-5-6 that describe the
stability concept. In detail, define the relation SA , as follow:
Definition 2b. xSA x′ if and only if (i) x ∈ P(A ′) for some A ′ ⊆A ,A ′ 6=∅, (ii) x i x′
for all i ∈ A ′, (iii) x  x′′ for all x′′ ∈ P(A \A ′). The set SA (x′) ≡ {x ∈ X : xSA x′} is
the set of deviators to policy x′ for a coalition A .
This means that a deviation occurs if x cannot be defeated not only by any policy x′′ that
the remaining part of the coalition can credibly commit to propose, but also by all the
policy proposed by other coalitions. Notice that under the relation SA , x is not required to
make all the deviators better off in comparison with the platform that wins if no deviation
occur (which was the case under the relation TA ,AP). This second stability concept uses a
slightly different set of supporting policies:
Definition 3b. The set SK(A ) = {x ∈ P(A ) : SA (x) = ∅}, or S-Core, is the set of
SA −maximal alternatives in P(A ).
Similarly to the first stability concept, a coalition A is stable if and only if SK(A ) is
nonempty.
Definition 4b. A coalition A is stable if and only if SK(A ) is nonempty.
The set of stable coalition structures is now defined as
P(N ) := {P|SK(A ,AP)) 6=∅∀A ∈ P}.
Definition 5.b A stable coalition structure is a partition P of N such that all the
coalitions A ∈ P are stable.
The definition of a winning policy in Definition 1 is unchanged. A pure strategy
equilibrium is defined as follows.
Definition 6b. A pure strategy equilibrium is a coalition structure P, a policy profile AP
and a winning policy w∗ ∈W (AP) ⊆ AP such that: (i) P ∈ P(N ) is a stable coalition
structure; (ii) a j ∈ SK(A j) for all A j ∈ P; (iii) the set of winning policies W (AP) is
nonempty.
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These definitions clarify why I do not need to assume that a coalition A j in equilibrium
chooses to be inactive if all its members are weakly better off with such choice. The
intuition is that the additional condition for a policy to be a deviator in the baseline setting,
namely x  ak ∀ak ∈ AP\{a j}, only matters at an equilibrium for partitions in which A
is a not winning coalition because in all other cases (in equilibrium) ak = x0 for all k 6= j.
The latter cases do not matter on the equilibrium policy outcome, unless the deviation
generates a winning coalition. Hence, even if the set of coalition structures that are stable
using T K(A ,AP) may differ from the corresponding set under the notion of stability
SK(A ), the implications about the equilibrium policy described in Theorems 1-2-3 are
unaffected (see Appendix 2.7.1).
2.4.4.2 Mergers of Coalitions
Now suppose that deviations in the form of a merger of two (or more) existing coalitions
are allowed under the same conditions under which a deviation of a subcoalition is
assumed to be successful in section 3.2. Namely, such deviation is profitable if there is a
policy vector x such that (i) x ∈ P(∪A J∈DA j) for some D ⊆ P, (ii) x i w∗ for all
i ∈A ′, ∀w∗ ∈W ({a1,a2, ...,x, ...,aν(P)}), (iii) x x′′ for all x′′ ∈ (AP\{a j}). In words, a
group of coalitions in P can merge in a new coalition ∪A J∈DA j and propose a platform
x that makes all the members of the new coalition strictly better off relative to the policy
that would be implemented in absence of such deviation, and the new proposed platform
is a Condorcet Winner of the voting game given the platform proposed by other
coalitions. The equilibrium concept induced by this new definition of deviation is a
refinement of the original one, because it implies that new types of deviations are
successful relative to the baseline. Thus, in order to show that the results in Theorems
1-2-3 holds in this new setting it is sufficient to show that an equilibrium still exists and
that the set of equilibrium policies E preserves some simple ordinal properties. About
the first part of the statement, consider any equilibrium under the original stability
concept in which there is a winning (lateral) coalition A v such that either (i) i ∈ A v if
and only if i≥ v and av = sup{I(v)} or (ii) i ∈A v if and only if i≤ v and av = inf{I(v)}.
It is easy to show that this is also an equilibrium in the case in which mergers can occur.
The intuition is that all coalitions other than A v cannot propose any platform capable of
defeating av (even if they merge), and any merger involving coalition A v cannot make
all its member strictly better off, because the median voter v is already achieving her
ideal policy under the current partition, thus she cannot get something that is strictly
better. About the second part, the set of equilibrium policies E as previously defined may
not be a convex sublattice of X , but it still contains sup{I(v)} and inf{I(v)}. Moreover,
all the other equilibrium platforms w must be such that inf{I(v)} ≤ w ≤ sup{I(v)},
because w ∈ I(v) which is a complete sublattice of X . Thus, a weaker notion of
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monotonicity over the set of equilibria holds12. Moreover, if the preferences of voter v
are strictly convex, then the set I(v) is a singleton and therefore the main results in
Theorems 1-2-3 hold in this different setting under the previously employed notion of
Strong Set Order. Lastly notice that, if on one hand the set of partitions that can be stable
in equilibrium is reduced relative to the baseline setup, on the other hand Propositions
4-5-6 hold even if mergers are allowed.
2.4.5 Extension: Constrained Problems
Several questions in Political Economy concern the analysis of voters’ choice over a set of
alternatives conditional on a costraint being satisfied. A typical example is the choice of
spending policies and tax policies, which is made under the condition that the government
has to break even. In such cases, the monotonicity results in Milgrom-Shannon (1994)
may not apply because the choice set may not be a lattice. One can adopt two strategies
to study the outcome of the voting process using an approach like the one shown in the
previous sections of this chapter. The first possibility is to assume that the constraint is
always binding at any policy that can be offered by some coalition. In most examples,
policies in which the government budget constraint is not binding are typically never in
the Pareto set of a coalition. Thus, such assumption is innocuous for the analysis because
the option ruled out cannot be proposed by any coalition. Examples of this approach
are proposed in the next two chapters of this work. Neverthless, after substituting the
constraint into the objective function of a voter, it may not be always easy to show that
SM and the SID are satisfied. In such cases, one can adopt a second approach, which
involves the use of the Comparative Statics results for constrained maximization problems
in Quah (2004, 2007). This involves a choice set X which is a convex sublattice of Rd and
voters maximizing a concave objective function V : X ×Θ→ R subject to a constraint
B(x) ≤ 0 where θ i ∈ Θ is the parameter the identifies the voter’s type and B : X → R is
a convex function of x. The downside of this second approach is that the results of the
coalitional equilibrium stated in Theorem 1, 2 and 3 may not apply for all the possible
stable coalition structures. Neverthless, it is easy to show that the corresponding results
hold for a Citizen-Candidate version of the voting model, i.e. a model in which only
coalitions that are singletons are allowed. Thus, under specific preference restrictions, the
result in Theorems 1 holds and some comparative statics result can be derived. In detail,
assume that (i) V (x,θ) = V (x)+υ(x j,θ), in which (ii) υ(x j,θ) satisfies ID in (x j,θ) on
X , and (iii) B(x) is a convex function of X . Notice that in this case there is no need to
assume that the set {x|x ∈ X ,B(x)≤ 0} is itself a lattice. The intuition that underpins this
12Specifically, one needs to adopt the following weaker concept of set order. For any two sets S,S′, S is
higher than S′ (S ≥W S′) if for any x ∈ S, ∃x′ ∈ S′ such that x≥ x′, and for any y′ ∈ S′, ∃y ∈ S such that
y′ ≤ y.
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result is simple. Proposition 8 in Quah (2004) implies that under the stated conditions the
set of optimal choices I(i) of individual with parameter θ i has the (weakly) increasing
property in θ i for policy dimension j. This means that, for any two policies xk ∈ I(k)
and xl ∈ I(θ l) for θ k > θ k, either xk ≥ j xl of there exist y′ ∈ I(k) and y′′ ∈ I(l) such that
yk ≥ j xl and yl ≤ j xk. Thus, the sets of ideal points are ordered under the relation ≤ j and
it is intuitive that a median voter result will hold. Then one can state the following.
Theorem 7. (Monotone Comparative Statics - Constraint Problems). If
(i)V (x,θ) = V (x)+υ(x j,θ), in which (ii) υ(x j,θ) satisfies ID in (x j,θ) on X, and (iii)
B(x) is a convex function of X, then the set of equilibrium policies of the voting game is
nondecreasing in θ v for policy dimension j.
Proof. See Appendix 2.7.1.
The result in Theorem 7 represents an alternative tool to study problems of comparative
statics of voting models. Unfortunately, the rather restrictive assumptions on voters’
preferences that must be satisfied in order for such result to hold make the range of its
possible applications very narrow. Thus, in all the examples proposed in the next
chapters, I am going to adopt the first approach. Namely, I will transform the voter
problem into an unconstrained maximization problem, rather than dealing directly with a
constrained one.
2.5 Discussion
In this section I discuss similarities and differences between the voting model proposed
in this paper and some alternatives that are popular in the theoretical literature. I show
that the framework proposed here is usually more flexible, in the sense that the main
comparative static results apply to a larger class of voter preferences relative to the
alternatives in the literature.
2.5.1 Grandmont Conditions for Downsian Models
In this subsection I compare the sufficient conditions for existence of a Condorcet
Winner in a multimensional choice domain with the ones that I have assumed in this
paper to derive Theorems 1-2-3. The aim is to show that the class of preferences that
admits a coalitional equilibrium is much larger than the one that ensures the existence of
a Condorcet Winner, and that the latter are excessively restrictive to be succesfully
adopted for most application in the literature. In a famous paper Grandmont (1978) has
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established sufficient conditions for the existence of a Condorcet Winner. Such
conditions apply to a specific class of individual preferences that he named Intermediate
Preferences, and that generalize previous results by Plott (1969) and by Davis et al.
(1972). A formal definition for this class of preferences and details on how one can
construct them are provided in Appendix 2.7.3. Unfortunately, the conditions for the
existence of a Condorcet Winner remain extremely restrictive. Specifically, in order to
have a transitive majority voting relation one needs that
[...] the shape of the distribution of preferences has nice symmetry
properties.
This sentence in Grandmont’s paper means that the sufficient conditions for the existence
of a Majority Voting Equilibrium are strictly related to specific restrictions on the
distribution of voter preferences. In particular, his result can be interpreted as a
generalization of the notion of “unique median in all directions” proposed by Davis et
al. (1972, see also p. 326 in Grandmont 1978) for spatial voting models in which
preferences are generalized Euclidean. The concept of unique median in all directions
requires the existence, in a subset of the d−dimensional Euclidean Space, of a platform
x∗ ∈ X , such that all the hyperplanes passing through x∗ divide the voters’ probability
distribution with respect to the preference for any two policies y,z ∈ X into two sets of
equal size. For instance, in the two-dimensional Euclidean space, if the ideal points are
unformly distributed over a rectangle, it can be shown that all the hyperplanes passing
through the centre of the rectangle divide it in two parts of equal size. Thus, in such
example, the Lebuesgue measure corresponding to the size of the voting population with
ideal point on each side of the hyperplane is always 1/2. How restrictive is this
condition? In order to answer this questions it is easy to analyze the example of
Euclidean preferences in a very simple scenario. Say there are 3 voters, 1,2,3, with ideal
points x1, x2, x3 respectively. It is easy to show that the conditions for the existence of a
Condorcet Winner are satisfied if and only if the three ideal points lie on a straight line (a
proof is provided in Appendix 2.7.3). This example also clarifies why such conditions
become severely restrictive if the choice domain has dimensionality greater than 1, and
in particular much more restrictive than the conditions assumed in this paper. For
instance, it is easy to show that, in a sublattice of the Euclidean space, Euclidean
preferences satisfy SM and SID if the set of voters’ ideal points is a chain. This is the
case if, for any two platforms xi ∈ I(i) and x j ∈ I( j) for i, j ∈N , either xi ≥ x j or xi ≤ x j
(or both). Thus, it is sufficient that the ideal points are totally ordered, but they do not
have to lie on a straight line. Another way to compare the two set of conditions is the
following. A consequence of Grandmont’s result is that a Condorcet Winner exists if
preferences admit a representation in the form (i) V (x,θ) = a(θ i)u(x), in which θ i is a
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(possibly multidimensional) parameter capturing voter i′s intensity of preferences.
Notice that V in such form always satisfies SM and SID over a covex sublattice X13. The
opposite is not true. Namely, not all functions that satisfy SM and SID over X admit a
representation like the one above. Thus, for preferences defined over sublattices, the
condition (i) is more restrictive than the one adopted in this paper. More importantly, for
most applications in Political Economy the voter preferences are unlikely to meet
condition (i), if one departs from very simple problems such as the one proposed in
Borge and Rattsø (2004). If voter preferences do not satisfy these conditions, then a
Condorcet Winner may not exist and this implies that one cannot use a Downsian model
to characterize the policy outcome of the voting process. In such cases, the framework
proposed in this paper can prove useful.
2.5.2 Citizen-Candidate Model
A class of models that allow for the existence of a political equilibrium even if the policy
space is multidimensional is the one of Citizen-Candidate models (Besley and Coate
1997; Osborne and Slivinski, 1996). The crucial assumption of this class of models is
that each voter can run for elections as a candidate, and that each candidate i can credibly
commit only to a policy that is in the set of her ideal points xi ∈ M(i). In their model a
citizen faces a cost δ to run for elections, and has preferences defined over the policy
that is implemented. The main shortcoming of this class of models if one aims to get
predictions about the policy choice of a certain group of individuals is the multiplicity of
equilibria. But notice that, if one restricts the analysis to coalition structures in which all
coalitions contain a single individual, then the model of electoral competition proposed
in this paper resembles a Citizen-Candidate model in which the cost of running for
election is zero. It is therefore intuitive that, if one imposes the same preference
restrictions, then there must be an equilibrium in which the predictions of the two
models are the same. In Corollary 2 (ii) of Besley and Coates (1997), one can find a hint
of whether this is the case. They state that:
(ii) if xi is a strict Condorcet winner in the set of alternatives {x j : j ∈
N } and if xi 6= x0, then a political equilibrium exists in which citizen i runs
unopposed for sufficiently small δ 14.
13One needs to define a transformation of the taste parameter to ensure that the ID are strict.
14They denote with x0 the deafult policy that is implemented if no candidate runs for election. This is
similar to the definition of x0 in this paper, except that they do not assume that x i x0 by all i for all
x ∈ X .
41
Chapter 2 Generalized Comparative Statics for Voting Models
Consider one particular stable coalition structure in the model presented in this paper,
namely the one in which each coalition is a singleton. In this case the Pareto set of each
coalition coincides with the set of ideal points of its single member. In this setting, the
assumptions about individual preferences (SM and SID) are sufficient to ensure that there
is at least one xv ∈ I(v) that is a Condorcet Winner over the set AP, as a consequence of
Theorem 1 and Definition 1. This implies that xv is within the set of equilibrium policies
under the notion of coalitional equilibrium. The fact that xv is a Condorcet Winner also
implies that the conditions of Corollary 2 (ii) in Besley and Coate’s paper are satisfied,
thus there is an equilibrium of the Citizen-Candidate model in which the same candidate
is elected and the same policy is implemented. Lastly, notice that in the Citizen-Candidate
model, even if preferences satisfy SM and SID and δ → 0, there may be other equilibria in
which the policy implemented is not an ideal policy of the median voter. The reason is that
in the Citizen-Candidate model, even if there is a Condorcet Winner, there are equilibria
in which two (or more) candidates run for elections and each of them wins with positive
probability. One can conclude that, if preferences satisfy SM and SID, then (i) there
is an equilibrium in Besley and Coate’s model for δ → 0 that resembles the coalitional
equilibrium proposed in this paper; (ii) if there is a Condorcet Winner in the set of voters’
ideal policies, then the Citizen-Candidate model allows for equilibria in which platforms
different from the Condorcet Winner are implemented, while the coalitional equilibrium
does not.
2.5.3 Levy’s Coalitional Equilibrium
The theoretical framework described in this paper possesses several similarities with the
one in Levy (2004, 2005). She proposes a model of political parties based on the notion
of coalition stability in Ray and Vohra (1997). The main difference relies in one aspect
of the notion of stability. That is, in Levy’s paper the equilibrium - and consequently the
political outcomes - is defined given any party structure. Given the equilibrium outcome
of each possible party structure, she analyzes which party structures are stable. A stable
party structure is an array of political parties in which no group of politicians wishes to
quit its party and form a smaller one, thus inducing a different equilibrium outcome.
Conversely, in the model I propose, the stability of the coalition structure and the
equilibrium strategies of political agents are jointly determined, because potential
deviators take strategies of other coalitions as given. The main consequence of this
different assumption when voter preferences satisfy Supermodularity and Strictly
Increasing Differences is that there is a class of coalition structures and corresponding
equilibrium outcomes that are stable if the notion of equilibrium in Levy is adopted, and
that are not stable if the equilibrium concept is the one proposed here. Specifically, in the
former case Ends-Against-the-Middle coalitions proposing a policy platform that is not
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an ideal point of the median voter may be winning coalitions in some equilibrium, while
in the latter case there is no equilibrium of this kind (see Proposition 6). The reason is
that, in both models, if there is a winning coalition in the Ends-Against-the-Middle form,
this implies that the platform proposed is a compromise between members of the two
sides of the coalition. In such case moderate voters, including the median, optimally
decide to be inactive. This implies that, given such choice, there is at least one side of the
winning coalition that has incentive to deviate, rejecting the compromise policy and
achieving an outcome that is closer to the preferences of the deviators. In the case of
Levy anyway, such kind of deviations are not optimal because the strategy of moderate
voters is not taken as given. Thus, the deviation is prevented by the threat that inactive
players may become active and compete for elections. As highlighted in section 4.2,
there is empirical evidence suggesting that the threat of inactive political agents may not
be so relevant for the choices of politicians, and that Ends-Against-the-Middle coalitions
are a very unlikely outcome on the political competition in democratic countries. One
can conclude that, if voters preferences satisfy Supermodularity and Strictly Increasing
Differences, then the equilibrium concept proposed in this paper delivers predictions
about the set of equilibrium policy outcomes that are similar to the one in Levy.
Specifically, there is a subset of equilibria under the notion of Levy that shares the same
properties described in Theorems 1-2-3. The main difference is that the coalitional
equilibrium rules out some outcomes that are stable in Levy - the ones in which an
Ends-Against-the-Middle coalition is a winning coalition15- that are deemed to be less
likely to occur by the recent empirical evidence.
2.5.4 Party Unanimity Nash Equilibrium (PUNE)
The way of modeling the political process proposed by Roemer (1999, 2001) and the
corresponding equilibrium concept represent a useful tool to analyse voting models in
which the policy space is multidimensional. The political process is modeled as a
competition between two parties. Each party proposes a platform and there is uncertainty
about the outcome of elections. The membership to each party is endogenously
determined by the choice of policy platforms made by the parties in equilibrium. The
equilibrium concept, named Party Unanimity Nash Equilibrium (PUNE), is based on the
idea that - within each party - members can agree to propose a platform that is in the
Pareto Set of its members16. The PUNE is a flexible concept and allows for voters to
differ in two or more (possibly orthogonal) characteristics (Lee and Roemer, 2006).
15Notice that, even if one restricts the analysis to the particular class of voter preferences adopted in this
paper, the equilibrium is not a refinement of the one in Levy, because the stable coalition structures that
can support a certain equilibrium outcomes may not be the same under the two notions of stability.
16Roemer classifies party members in three categories, office-motivated, policy-motivated and an
intermediate class of members that cares about both aspects. Conversely, I assume that all individuals
are solely policy-motivated. Thus the Pareto set of a coalition in Roemer’s paper does not coincide with
the one proposed in this paper, except for the case in which all party members are in the first category.
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Neverthless, such a model possesses features that makes it usually unsuitable to derive
analytical results about the comparative statics of the policy outcome. The reason is that
multiplicity of equilibria is a typical outcome of this model and the set of equilibria is a
multidimensional manifold that does not usually admit a straightforward analytical
characterization. Specifically, each equilibrium consist of a pair of policy platforms. The
consequence it that in most cases one has to rely on simulation in order to understand
how the set of equilibria move as a consequence of a shock affecting some characteristic
of the voting population, such as a a change in the distribution of voter preferences.
Because of these features this framework is not suitable to answer the specific question
of this paper. Nevertheless, Roemer’s model can prove useful to analyse voting
environments characterized by strong restrictions on the policy space and on voter
preferences (e.g. Roemer, 1999).
2.5.5 Probabilistic Voting Models
Lastly, the class of probabilistic voting models is often employed in the literature to
analyse voting behaviour over a multidimensional policy space (Lindbeck and Weibull
1987, Enelow and Hinich 1989, Banks and Duggan 2005). The reason is that this kind of
model of electoral competition dramatically eases the problems of existence of a voting
equilibrium, that are typical of the deterministic voting framework. Unfortunately, the
characterization of the equilibrium policy outcome in such class of models may not
always be suitable to answer questions regarding comparative statics. A simple and
useful characterization can be derived in the case of (i) the spatial models of elections (in
which voter preferences are generalized Euclidean), and of (ii) applications in which
voter preferences have specific features, such as symmetry conditions (Hinich, Ledyard,
and Ordeshook 1973, Banks and Duggan 2005). Notice that in these cases, if one
imposes the preference restrictions adopted in this paper, a monotone comparative static
result similar to the one in Theorems 2-3 can be shown to hold, thus the main result of
this paper is robust to this alternative setting. The reason is that under the specific
restrictions assumed in these papers, the equilibrium outcome of probabilistic voting
models reduces to a pivotal voter result (sometimes referred as Mean Voter Theorem, in
contrast with median voter result that is typical of Downsian models). Thus, in those
specific cases, the comparative statics of the equilibrium outcome is the same as the one
of the ideal policy of a pivotal voter. In all the other cases, the derivation of analytical
comparative statics results may not be straightforward. The reason is that the choice of
policy in equilibrium depends on the entire distribution of voter preferences, and not
only on a pivotal individual. In chapter 5 of this work I will show cases in which some
comparative statics results can be derived for this class of models even in cases different
from (i) and (ii) mentioned above. Neverthless, the kind of comparative static exercises
that can be performed is limited and the derivation requires specific preference
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restrictions. For instance, some papers (de la Croix and Doepke, 2009, Dotti, 2014)
study the effects on the policy outcome of a marginal mean preserving spread in the
income distribution of voters for specific classes of preferences. Conversely, the
deterministic voting model proposed in this chapter allows for a large class of voter
preferences and delivers fairly general comparative statics predictions as stated in
Theorems 2-3. This will become clear in the next two chapter, in which I show how this
framework can be adopted to provide an answer to some important questions in the
Political Economy literature. Lastly, the Probabilistic Voting framework can prove useful
to address theoretical issues other than the multidimensionality of the choice domain.
For instance, in chapter 5 I show that it can tackle questions that cannot be easily
addressed using the Downsian framework because voter preferences exhibit
non-convexities.
2.6 Concluding remarks
This paper proposes a model of electoral competition in which agents cannot credibly
commit to policy platforms before the elections take place. As a result, an individual
running for election as a single candidate can only credibly commit to implement her
own ideal policy. Moreover, in line with the literature, I assume that voters can form
coalitions in order to increase the set of policy platforms that can be proposed in a
credible way. Lastly, I require coalitions to be stable in an equilibrium, meaning that,
given a certain coalition structure and the strategies of other coalitions, there is no
subcoalition that can profitably deviate by creating a subcoalition. I show that the
assumptions of Supermodularity and Strictly Increasing Differences of voters’ objective
functions are sufficient for the existence of a political equilibrium in a multidimensional
policy space. Moreover, I show that under the same assumptions a version of the Median
Voter Theorem holds. As a consequence, a monotone comparative statics result of the
equilibrium outcomes is derived. I show that this result holds in various alternative
settings, specifically (i) a version of the model in which mergers of coalitions are
allowed, (ii) a version in which individual agents are idealogically motivated, and (iii) a
version in which coalitions are not allowed and the political process resembles the one of
a Citizen-Candidate model.
The main results stated in Theorems 2 and 3 of this paper represent a tool that can be
applied to a large number of questions in Political Economy. For instance, it can be
adopted to revisit many traditional questions in the theoretical literature. In several of
those the multidimensionality of the policy space is crucial to shape the direction of the
predictions. In most of the traditional studies, however, the policy space is restricted to a
unique dimension in order to exploit the useful properties of Downsian voting models.
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Such restriction may have profound effects on the predictions of the model. In some
cases (see for instance Haupt and Peters, 1998), the sign of the comparative statics is
entirely driven by the restrictions on the policy space. Examples are the traditional
analysis of (i) the relationship between income inequality and size of redistributive
policies (Meltzer and Richard, 1981), (ii) the study of the determinants of the degree of
restrictiveness of immigration policies (Razin and Sadka, 1999), and (iii) the question of
how the wealth distribution shapes the tax rates on labour and capital income. For
instance, in the latter example, the intrinsic bi-dimensional nature of the problem has
often constrained the analysis to a very restricted policy space (e.g. Benhabib and
Bassetto, 2006). In the next sections of this work I show how the voting model presented
in this chapter can be useful to analyse questions (i) and (ii) in a new way, and to deliver
predictions that are more empirically sound relative to the ones derived using the
traditional framework. Question (iii) represents a promising topic for future research.
Lastly, the model is characterized by a sufficient degree of flexibility and its predictions,
because of the pivotal voter result, are relatively easy to interpret. These desirable
features make this framework potentially suitable to analyse several other questions in
Political Economy. Moreover, it allows for various extensions, some of which are
presented in this paper. Many other extensions are possible, so there is large scope for
future research. Regarding this aspect, it is important to highlight that the model
proposed in this paper relies on assumptions borrowed from the literature of generalized
comparative statics (Milgrom and Shannon 1994, Quah, 2007). This literature has been
largely exploited to study the equilibrium properties of games characterized by strategic
complementarities. A typical result of this literature is that in this class of games, even if
there may be multiplicity of equilibria, some monotone comparative statics properties
are preserved. Thus, this framework represents a promising starting point for extensions
aiming to tackle a larger set of Political Economy questions. The current analysis
focuses on questions in which voters only choose a vector of policies and the outcome
for each individual only depends upon the policy that is implemented in equilibrium. A
natural extension of this framework would be the analysis of more complex voting
games, for instance the ones in which competing elective institutions decide
simultaneously their policies, and in which voters’ strategies across different institutions
are strategic complements. This may be useful, for instance, to study how policy changes
in one country propagate to the neighbors, if such policy changes affect voters’ trade-offs
in the other countries. Such extension could be applied to study various kinds of public
policies in which such interdependency may arise, such as immigration policies,
corporate tax policies, etc. In conclusion, the framework proposed in this paper
represents a useful tool, that allows one to analyse a potentially large range of
applications without imposing excessively strong restrictions on the policy space. Its
main downside is that its range of possible applications is restricted to a class of problem
in which voter preferences possess some rather restrictive ordinal properties.
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2.7.1 Proof of Main Result
Theorem 1. (Median Voter Theorem). (i) A coalitional equilibrium of the voting game
exists. (ii) In any equilibrium the set of winning policies is a subset of the set of ideal
points of the median voter v. (iii) If the median voter has a unique ideal policy, this policy
is going to be the one chosen in any equilibrium.
The proof to Theorem 1 procedes as follows. First, I am going to prove that the result
holds under the alternative stability concept (SK−Core) presented in section 4.4.1. Then
I am going to show that the result is unaffected if the baseline stability concept (T K−
Core) is adopted. In order to prove this result we need to introduce some additional
notation. Define θA := {θ i|i ∈ A } and θA ∈ ΘPS where ΘPS is the power set of Θ.
Suppose the coalitionA has k members. Consider a set of k×1 weighting vectors ΛA ≡
{λ 1A ,λ 2A λ 3A , ...,λ kA } such that ∑i∈A λ iA = 1 for each coalitionA and a function G : X×
ΛA ×ΘPS×Φ→ R defined as follows: G(x,λA ,θA ,ϕ) =∑i∈A λ iAV (x,θ i,ϕ). Lemmas
8, 9, 10 and 11 are results that will be used as part of the proofs of Lemma 12 and 13,
which constitute the main part of the proof of Theorem 1.
Lemma 8. If V is a continuous function of x and X is a convex set then any point x˜ in the
Pareto set of A is a solution to maxx∈X G(x,λ ,θA ,ϕ) for some vector λA (x˜) ∈ ΛA .
Proof. M.W.G., Proposition 16.E.2.
I need to define four additional objects. For each x˜ ∈ P(A ) define:
(i) a vector λA (x˜, j) such that λ
i
A (x˜, j) = λ iA (x˜) for all i ∈A s.t. θ i < θ j, λ iA (x˜, j) = 0
for all i ∈A s.t. θ i > θ j, λ jA (x˜, j) = ∑ i ∈A
i≥ j
λ i;
(ii) a vector λ¯A (x˜, j) such that λ¯ iA (x˜, j) = λ
i
A for all i ∈A s.t. θ i > θ j, λ¯ iA (x˜, j) = 0 for
all i ∈A s.t. θ i < θ j, λ¯ jA (x˜, j) = ∑ i ∈A
i≤ j
λ i;
(iii) the sets ΛA (x˜, j) = {λA (x˜, j),λA (x˜)}, Λ′A (x˜, j) = {λA (x˜), λ¯A (x˜, j)};
(iv) an order relation ≤λ given by: λ1 ≤λ λ2 iff λ i1 ≥ λ i2 ∀i ≤ j and λ i1 ≤ λ i2 ∀i > j. It
follows that (ΛA (x˜, j),≤λ ) and (Λ′A (x˜, j),≤λ ) are totally ordered sets.
Lemma 9. If V satisfies SM and SID then the Pareto Set P(A ) of a coalition of players
A ⊆N is such that y ∈ P(A ) only if y ≥ sup{I(l)} and y ≤ inf{I(h)} where min(A )
and h = max(A ).
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Proof. Denote x¯l = sup{I(l)} and xh = inf{I(h)}. Suppose y xl but y∈ P(A ). Because
of the optimality of xk and because X is a lattice, it must be true that V (xl,θ l) ≥ V (y∧
xl,θ l). Supermodularity implies V (y∨ xl,θ l) ≥ V (y,θ l). Notice that y  xl implies y∨
xl 6= y. Hence Strictly Increasing Differences imply V (y∨xl,θ i,ϕ)>V (y,θ i,ϕ) ∀θ i > θ l .
Given that θ i > θ l is true for all (θ ∈ A )∩ (θ 6= θ l) we have that ∃x ∈ X such that
V (x,θ ,ϕ) ≥ V (y,θ ,ϕ) ∀θ ∈ A and V (x,θ ,ϕ) > V (y,θ ,ϕ) for at least one θ ∈ A , i.e
pX ,A (y) 6= ∅. Hence y /∈ P(A ). Similarly one can show that y ∈ P(A ) only if y ≤ xh.
Q.E.D.
Lemma 10. The function G(x,λ ,θA ,ϕ) satisfies (i) SM in x and (ii) ID in (x,λ ) over
ΛA (x˜, j) (Λ′A (x˜, j)) for all x ∈ X .
Proof. (i) SM. G is the weighted sum of SM functions so it is supermodular (proof in
Milgrom, Shannon, 1994). (ii) ID. Using the definition of ID, G satisfies the ID if and
only if: G(x¯,λ ,θA ,ϕ)−G(x,λ ,θA ,ϕ) ≥ G(x¯,λ ,θA ,ϕ)−G(x,λ ,θA ,ϕ) ∀x ≥ x,λ ∈
ΛA (x˜, j). Use the definitions of G and λA (x˜)and λA (x˜, j):
[G(x¯,λA (x˜),θA ,ϕ)−G(x,λA (x˜),θA ,ϕ)]−[G(x¯,λA (x˜, j),θA ,ϕ)−G(x,λA (x˜, j),θA ,ϕ)]=
= ( ∑
i ∈A
i≥ j
λ i[V (x¯,θ i,ϕ)−V (x,θ i,ϕ)])− ( ∑
i ∈A
i≥ j
λ i)[V (x¯,θ j,ϕ)−V (x,θ j,ϕ)] =
= ∑
i ∈A
i≥ j
λ i
(
[V (x¯,θ i,ϕ)−V (x,θ i,ϕ)]− [V (x¯,θ j,ϕ)−V (x,θ j,ϕ)])
Notice that [V (x¯,θ i,ϕ)−V (x,θ i,ϕ)]− [V (x¯,θ j,ϕ)−V (x,θ j,ϕ)]≥ 0 for ∀i≥ j and λ i ≥
0 ∀i hence the sum above is also weakly positive, which implies [G(x¯,λA (x˜),θA ,ϕ)−
G(x,λA (x˜),θA ,ϕ)]− [G(x¯,λA (x˜, j),θA ,ϕ)−G(x,λA (x˜, j),θA ,ϕ)]≥ 0. Similarly one
can show that this is also true for Λ′A (x˜, j). Q.E.D.
Define M˜(A ,λ ) := argmaxx∈X ,λ∈ΛG(x,λ ,θA ,ϕ) and the setsA ≤ j := {i|(i ∈A )∩ (i≤
j)} and A ≥ j := {i|(i ∈A )∩ (i≥ j)} for some j ∈A .
Lemma 11. (i) If x′ ∈ M˜(A ,λA (x˜, j)) and x ∈ M˜(A ,λA (x˜)), then either x′ = x, or if
x′ 6= x, then V (x′,θ j,ϕ) ≥ V (x,θ j,ϕ) and V (x′,θ i,ϕ) > V (x,θ i,ϕ) ∀i < j and x′ ≤ x.
Moreover, (ii) if x ∈ M˜(A ,λA (x˜)) and x′′ ∈ M˜(A , λ¯A (x˜, j)), then either x′′ = x, or if
x′′ 6= x , then V (x′′,θ j,ϕ)≥V (x,θ j,ϕ) and V (x′′,θ i,ϕ)>V (x,θ i,ϕ) ∀i > j and x′′ ≥ x.
Proof. The results x′ ≤ x and G(x′,λA (x˜, j),θA ,ϕ)≥G(x,λA (x˜, j),θA ,ϕ) follow from
Milgrom and Shannon 1994. Suppose V (x′,θ j,ϕ)<V (x,θ j,ϕ) and x′ 6= x. Then it must
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be true that∑i∈A λ
i
A (x˜, j)
[
V (x′,θ i,ϕ)−V (x′,θ i,ϕ)]>V (x′,θ j,ϕ)−V (x,θ j,ϕ). Using
∑i∈A λ
i
A (x˜, j) = 1 the above can be rearranged as follows:
∑
i∈A
λ iA (a, j)
([
V (x′,θ i,ϕ)−V (x′,θ i,ϕ)]− [V (x′,θ j,ϕ)−V (x,θ j,ϕ)])> 0
Notice that x′ ≤ x and i ≤ j ∀i ∈ A , hence SID implies [V (x′,θ i,ϕ)−V (x′,θ i,ϕ)]−[
V (x′,θ j,ϕ)−V (x,θ j,ϕ)]≤ 0 ∀i ∈A and hence
∑
i∈A
λ iA (a, j)
([
V (x′,θ i,ϕ)−V (x′,θ i,ϕ)]− [V (x′,θ j,ϕ)−V (x,θ j,ϕ)])≤ 0
which leads to a contradiction. Hence it must be true that V (x′,θ j,ϕ) ≥ V (x,θ j,ϕ).
Given that x′ ≤ x, x′ 6= x, SID implies V (x′,θ i,ϕ) > V (x,θ i,ϕ) ∀i < j. This statement
implies that x is not part of the Pareto set of A ≤ j if x′ 6= x. In the same way it is easy to
show that the statement (ii) is also true. Q.E.D.
Lemma 12. The coalition A v (could be a singleton) that includes the median voter v is
stable only if av ∈ I(v).
Proof. Suppose av /∈ I(v). This cannot be the case if θ i = θ v for all members of A v.
Hence consider the case in which there is at least one i∈A v such that either i > v or i < v
(or both). This situation is illustrated in Fig. SM.8.1 in the additional material.
(i) If av ≥ xv(≤) for any xv = inf{I(v)} and av ∧ xv ∈ P(A v). av /∈ I(v) implies
V (xv,θm,ϕ) > V (av,θ v,ϕ). SID implies V (xv,θ i,ϕ) > V (av,θ i,ϕ) and xv i av
∀i ∈N : θ i ≤ θ v(≥). Recall that any c ∈ P(A v\A ≤v) is c≥ xv (because of Lemma 9).
Hence either c ∈ I(v) or ∑ni=1 1[V (xv,θ i,ϕ) > V (c,θ i,ϕ)] > n/2 ∀c ∈ P(A v\A ≤v)
which implies xv  c→ av /∈ SK(A v).
(ii) If av xv,av xv. Consider av∨xv(av∧xv). Revealed preferences and av /∈ I(v) imply
V (xv,θ v,ϕ)>V (av∨xv,θ v,ϕ). SM implies V (av∧xv,θ v,ϕ)>V (av,θ v,ϕ). SID implies
V (av ∧ xv,θ i,ϕ) > V (av,θ i,ϕ) ∀i ∈ N : θ i ≤ θ v. Recall that any c ∈ P(A v\A ≤v) is
c≥ x¯v ≥ av∧ xv because of Lemma 9. Hence either c ∈ I(v) or ∑ni=1 1[V (av∧ xv,θ ii ,ϕ)≥
V (c,θ i,ϕ)]> n/2 which implies av∧ xv  c.
If av∧xv is part of the Pareto set ofA ≤v this constitute a feasible and profitable deviation.
If and av∧ xv /∈ P(A ≤v) (case described in Fig. SM.8.2 in the additional material), recall
that X is a convex set and V (x,θ ,ϕ) is θ − concave, hence as av ∈ Av it has to be the
solution to a problem in the form av ∈ argmaxx∈X G(x,λA v(av),θA v ,ϕ). Consider the
following alternative: x˜ ∈ M˜(A ,λA v(av,v)) (see Lemma 11). We know from Lemma 11
that x˜ ≤ av. First of all notice that M˜(A ,λA v(av,v)) = M˜(A ′,λ ′) for some λ ′, which
implies that x˜ ∈ P(A ′), i.e. it is in the Pareto set of A ′. One needs to show that x˜ 6= av
and that x˜i av ∀i∈A ′. Suppose x˜= av→ av ∈ P(A ′). But from point (ii) we know that
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V (av∧ xv,θi,ϕ) > V (av,θ i,ϕ)∀i ∈N : θ i ≤ θ v→ av /∈ P(A ′)→Contradiction. Hence
x˜ 6= av and x˜ ≤ av. Moreover, Lemma 9 implies x˜ v av. This means that V (x˜,θ v,ϕ) ≥
V (av,θ v,ϕ) and because x˜ 6= av, the SID implies V (x˜,θ i,ϕ) > V (av,θ i,ϕ) ∀i ∈ N :
θ i ≤ θ v. Recall that any c ∈ P(A v\A ≤v) is c ≥ x¯v ≥ x˜. Hence either c ∈ M(v) or
∑ni=1 1[V (x˜,θi,ϕ)≥V (c,θi,ϕ)]> n/2 which implies x˜ c→ av /∈ SK(A v).
One can also show that some kind of coalitions containing v are stable. Suppose av ∈ I(v),
and in particular say av = x¯v = sup{I(v)} (av = xv = inf{I(v)}). Consider any coalition
A ≤v (A ≥v) such that θ i ≤ θ v(≥) ∀i ∈ A ≤v. From Lemma 9 we know that any b ∈
P(A ≤v) it must be true that b≤ xv(≥). Moreover, a deviation implies Optimality implies
V (xv,θ v,ϕ) > V (b,θ v,ϕ). SID implies V (xv,θ i,ϕ) > V (b,θ i,ϕ) and xv i b ∀i ∈N :
θ i ≥ θ v(≤). Hence ∑ni=1 1[V (xv,θ i,ϕ)>V (b,θ i,ϕ)]≥ n/2 ∀b ∈ P(A ≤v) which implies
xv  b ∀b ∈ P(A v)→ av ∈ SK(A v).
Finally Consider any coalition A v such that θ i ≤ θ v(≥) ∀i ∈A v and av = xv(xv). From
Lemma 9 we know that any b ∈ P(A v) it must be true that b ≤ xv(≥ xv). This implies
V (xv,θ v,ϕ) > V (b,θ v,ϕ). SID implies V (xv,θ i,ϕ) > V (b,θ i,ϕ) and xv i b ∀i ∈N :
θ i ≥ θ v(≤). Hence ∑ni=1 1[V (xv,θ i,ϕ) > V (b,θ i,ϕ)] > n/2 ∀b ∈ P(A v) which implies
xv  a ∀a ∈ P(A v)→ SPP(A v)(av) =∅↔ av ∈ K(Av). Q.E.D.
Lemma 13. Any coalition A j that does not contain the median voter v is stable only if
∃a j such that either of the following is true: (i) a j ∈ I(v); (ii) a j ≥ xv for all xv ∈ I(v);
(iii) a j ≤ xv for all xv ∈ I(v).
Proof. Suppose a j /∈ I(v) and a j  xv,a j  xv for some xv ∈ I(v). There are two possible
cases.
(i) say xk ∈ I(k) and ∀k ∈ A j it is true either xk ≥ a j or xk ≤ a j. This case is illustrated
in Fig. SM.8.3 in the additional material. Consider x j such that
x j ∈ argmaxx∈{x¯,xv−1}V (x,θ v,ϕ). Consider xw (x¯z) where w = maxi<v,i∈A j i
(z = mini>m,i∈A j i). Suppose xw v x¯z (xw ≺v x¯z ) Notice that xw 6= a j, optimality implies
V (xw,θw,ϕ) > V (a j,θw,ϕ) (strict because a j  xv,a j  xv SM and SID imply
xv ∧ a j w a j and optimality implies xw w xv ∧ a j). Notice that because xw 6= a j SID
implies V (xw,θ i,ϕ) > V (a j,θ i,ϕ) ∀i ∈N : θ i < θ v(>). Also notice that xw (x¯z) is in
the Pareto set P(A <v) = P({i ∈ A : i < v}) (P(A >v) = P({i ∈ A : i > v})) because it
is the lowest (highest) ideal point of the highest (lower) member of the subcoalition A <v
(see Lemma 9). Finally notice that any policy b ∈ P(A j\A <v) must be b ≥ x¯z (≤ xw)
(because of Lemma 9). Hence given that xw 6= a j (see above), then
∑ni=1 1[V (xw,θ i,ϕ) ≥ V (b,θ i,ϕ)] > n/2 ∀b ∈ P(A j\A <v) which implies
xw  b∀b ∈ P(A j\A <v)→ a j /∈ SK(A j).
(ii) ∃xk ∈ I(k), k ∈ A j, θ k > θm(<) such that xk  a j and xk  a j. Consider xk ∧ a j.
Notice that xk  a j and xk  a j imply xk ∧ a j 6= a j. Optimality implies
V (xk,θ k) ≥ V (xk ∨ a j,θ k). SM implies V (xk ∧ a j,θ k,ϕ) ≥ V (a j,θ k,ϕ). SID implies
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V (xk ∧ a j,θ i,ϕ) > V (a j,θ i,ϕ) ∀i ∈ N : θ i < θ k. Hence
∑ni=1 1[V (xk∧a j,θ i,ϕ)>V (a j,θ i,ϕ)]> n/2. which implies xk∧a j  a j.
If xk∧a j is part of the Pareto set ofA <k this constitute a feasible and profitable deviation.
If not, recall that X is a convex set and V (x,θ ,ϕ) is θ − concave, hence as a j ∈ P(A j) it
has to be the solution to a problem in the form a j ∈ argmaxx∈X G(x,λA j(a j),θA j ,ϕ).This
case is illustrated in Fig. SM.8.4 in the additional material. If xk ∧ a j is not part of the
Pareto set of A j, consider the following alternative: x˜ ∈ M˜(A ,λA j(a j,k)) (see Lemma
11). We know from Lemma 11 that x˜ ≤ a j. First of all notice that M˜(A ,λA j(a j,k)) =
M˜(A ′,λ ′) for some λ ′, which implies that x˜ ∈ P(A ′), i.e. it is in the Pareto set of
A ≤k.We need to show that x˜ 6= a j and that x˜ i a j ∀i ∈ A ≤k. Suppose x˜ = a j → a j ∈
P(A ≤k). From point (ii) we know that V (xk ∧ a j,θ i,ϕ) > V (a j,θ i,ϕ) ∀i ∈ N : θi ≤
θ v → a j /∈ P(A ≤k) → Contradiction. Hence x˜ 6= a j and x˜ ≤ a j. Moreover, Lemma
11 implies x˜ k a j. This means that V (x˜,θ k,ϕ) > V (a j,θ k,ϕ) and because x˜ 6= a j SID
implies V (x˜,θ i,ϕ) > V (a j,θ i,ϕ) ∀i ∈N : θi ≤ θ j. Recall that any c ∈ P(A \A ≤k) is
c≥ x¯k ≥ x˜. Hence either c∈ I(v) or ∑ni=1 1[V (x˜,θ i,ϕ)≥V (c,θ i,ϕ)]> n/2 which implies
x˜ c→ a j /∈ SK(A j). Q.E.D.
Now consider the same analysis but in the case in which the stability concept is given by
the T K instead of the SK. The crucial intuition of this case is that at any equilibrium only
one coalition propose a policy.
Lemma 30. In any TK-stable equilibrium only one coalition proposes a policy.
Proof. Suppose that more than one coalition propose a policy platform. Then either there
is a weak Condorcet Winner, in which case each of the non-winning active coalitions have
an incentive to withdraw without a change in their payoff, as the same policy will still be
the Condorcet Winner (because of the tie-break rule, and the fact that other coalitions’
strategies are taken as given by potential deviators). If there is no Condorcet Winner,
given that the default policy x0 is a platform that is strictly worse than any other, then a
withdraw implies a weakly better outcome for everybody. Thus, a deviation occurs thanks
to the tie-break rule. Lastly, if no coalition propose any platform, x0 is implemented, thus
each coalition can deviate, propose a feasible platform and being strictly better off. Q.E.D.
I can now state two Lemmas that are equivalent to Lemma 12-13 for the case of T K
stability. They are given by:
Lemma 12b. The coalitionA v (could be a singleton) that includes the median voter v is
stable at an equilibrium only if av ∈ I(v) or av = x0 .
Proof. At an equilibrium either AP(N )\{av} only contains a j = x0 for all j, in which case
the analysis of stability is totally equivalent to the one in lemma 13, or a j ∈ AP(N )\{av},
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such that a j 6= x0 and AP(N ) can be an equilibrium policy profile only if av = x0 (because
it is optimal that only the winning coalition runs with a platform given the tie-break rule).
Q.E.D.
Lemma 13b. Any coalition A j that does not contain the median voter v is stable at an
equilibrium only if ∃a j such that either of the following is true: (i) a j ∈ I(v), (ii) a j = x0 .
Proof. At an equilibrium either AP(N )\{a j} only contains a j = x0 for all j, in which
case the analysis of stability is totally equivalent to the one in lemma 13, or or ak ∈
AP(N )\{a j}, such that ak 6= x0, such that AP(N ) can be an equilibrium policy profile only
if a j = x0 (because it is optimal that only the winning coalition runs with a platform given
the tie-break rule). Q.E.D.
I can now use Lemmas 7 to 13 to prove Theorem 1. Recall that the theorem states the
following.
Theorem 1. (Median Voter Theorem). (i) A coalitional equilibrium of the voting game
exists. (ii) In any equilibrium the set of winning policies is a subset of the set of ideal
points of the median voter v. (iii) If the median voter has a unique ideal policy, this policy
is going to be the one chosen in any equilibrium.
Proof. The results in Lemma 12 (12b) and Lemma 13 (13b) imply that the only policies
that can be proposed by stable coalitions in equilibrium are either av = xv ∈ I(v) or
al ≤ xv or ah ≥ xv for all xv ∈ I(v). Recall optimality implies V (av,θ v,ϕ)>V (al,θ v,ϕ)
and SID implies V (av,θ i,ϕ) > V (al,θ i,ϕ) ∀i ∈ N : θ i ≥ θ v. Similarly
V (av,θ v,ϕ) > V (ah,θ v,ϕ) and SID implies V (av,θ i,ϕ) > V (ah,θ i,ϕ) ∀i ∈ N :
θ i ≤ θ v. Also, the coalition structure in which every coalition is a singleton is always
stable. Hence a (weak) Condorcet winner among the proposed policies exists, which is
also the policy chosen in an equilibrium of the coalitional game (i). The total order in the
policy space effectively available in all reduced games generated by a stable coalition
structure implies the weak Condorcet winner must be always some av ∈ I(v) (ii). The
proof of (iii) is straightforward from (i) and (ii). In the case of the T K stability concept,
there is no equilibrium in which a coalition other than A v wins proposing a policy
a j /∈ I(v), because in such case the fact that either a j ≤ xv or a j ≥ xv for all xv ∈ I(v)
implies that the median voter can change his strategy (e.g. leaving his coalition) and
being strictly better off. For instance suppose a j ≥ x¯v and a j /∈ I(v) . Then optimality
implies V (xv,θ v) ≥ V (xv ∨ a j,θ v) and by SM one gets V (xv ∧ a j,θ v,ϕ) > V (a j,θ v,ϕ).
SID implies V (xv ∧ a j,θ i,ϕ) > V (a j,θ i,ϕ) for all i ≤ v. Hence either xv ∧ a j is in
P(A ≤v) or one can use part (ii) of the proof of Lemma 12 (12b) to show that there is a
policy x˜ ∈ P(A ≤v) such that V (x˜,θ i,ϕ) > V (a j,θ i,ϕ) for all i ≤ v, which means that
the subcoalition A ≤v ⊆A v) possess a profitable deviation. Q.E.D.
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Corollary 31. (i) The equilibrium policy is in the Core of a winning coalition, i.e. x ∈
W (AP(N )∗)→ x∈KA v(X) for some winning coalitionA v. Moreover, (ii) the equilibrium
policy is in the Core of the reduced game, i.e. x ∈W (AP(N )∗)→ x ∈ K(AP(N )∗) for any
equilibrium policy profile AP∗ .
Proof. Straightforward from Theorem 1.
Theorem 2. (Monotone Comparative Statics). The set of equilibrium policies of the
voting game is (i) a sublattice of X which is (ii) monotonic nondecreasing in θ v.
Proof. Notice that the coalition structure in which the winning coalition includes all the
individuals θ i = θ v and all other coalitions are singleton is always stable if SM and SID
are satisfied, because no individual in A v has strict incentive to deviate and all the other
coalition do not admit any deviation. Given the definition of E(N ) and that I(v) is a
superset of the unions of subsets of I(v), all I need to show is that all elements of I(v) are
equilibria in that particular coalition structure, and this implies E(N ) = I(v). Suppose
this is not true. Then ∃i∈N with θ i 6= θ v and x∈ I(i), such that V (x,θ i,ϕ)>V (av,θ i,ϕ)
for a majority on individuals. If (i) x ≥ av (≤) then optimality implies V (x,θ v,ϕ) ≤
V (av,θ v,ϕ) and by the SID V (x,θ v,ϕ) < V (av,θ v,ϕ) for all i < j (>) which means
that there is no strict majority that supports x against av. Contradiction. If (ii) x  av
and x  av then optimality implies V (av,θ v,ϕ) ≥ V (x∧ av,θ v,ϕ) and V (av,θ v,ϕ) ≥
V (x∨av,θ v,ϕ). Using SM one gets V (x∨av,θ v,ϕ)≥V (x,θ v,ϕ) and V (x∧av,θ v,ϕ)≥
V (x,θ v,ϕ). Finally the SID implies V (x∨av,θ i,ϕ) > V (x,θ i,ϕ) for all i > v and V (x∧
av,θ j,ϕ) > V (x,θ j,ϕ) for all j < v, which means that x /∈ I(i) for all i ∈N such that
i /∈ A v, and this means that x cannot be proposed by any other coalition, and therefore
it cannot defeat av. Contradiction. This means that E(N ) = I(v), and I(v) is monotone
nondecreasing in θ v by Theorem 4 in Milgrom and Shannon, 1994. Q.E.D.
Theorem 3. (Monotone Comparative Statics 2). The set of equilibrium policies of the
voting game is monotonic nondecreasing in ϕ .
Proof. (i) In the proof of Theorem 2 I have shown that E(N ) = I(v). SM and ID imply
that I(v) is monotone nondecreasing in ϕ (Theorem 4 in Milgrom and Shannon, 1994).
Q.E.D.
Theorem 7. (Monotone Comparative Statics - Constraint Problems). If
(i)V (x,θ) = V (x)+υ(x j,θ), in which (ii) υ(x j,θ) satisfies the ID in (x j,θ) on X, and
(iii) B(x) is a convex function of X, then the set of equilibrium policies of the voting
game is nondecreasing in θ v for policy dimension j.
Proof. Suppose any x /∈ I(v) is implemented in equilibrium. Because of the citizen-
candidate assumption, x ∈ I(i) for some θ i > θ v (<) and the candidate i must run for
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election with no other candidates. Then the median voter v possess in M(v) a policy xv 6= x
such that xv ≥ j x (≤ j). Optimality implies V (xv)+υ(xνj ,θν) > V (x)+υ(x j,θν). The
ID of υ implies V (xv)+υ(xνj ,θ
i)> V (x)+υ(x j,θ i) for all i≥ v (≤), which means that
xv defeats x by majority voting. Thus, being inactive is not a best response to other voters’
strategies for player v. She can be strictly better off by running for election with policy
platform xv and winning the elections. Now one has to show that there is an equilibrium
in which the median voter runs unopposed. Suppose the median voter run for election
proposing a platform xν = minx j I(v) and that there is a platform x
k ∈ I(k) for some k that
can strictly defeat xν . Because the candidate proposing xi must have a strict incentive to
do so, it must be k 6= v and V (x)+ υ(x j,θ i) > V (xv)+ υ(xvj,θ i). Say k > v. Quah’s
result implies xv ≤ j xk, thus optimality implies V (xv)+υ(xνj ,θν) > V (x)+υ(x j,θν),
and because of the ID V (xv)+υ(xνj ,θ
i) ≥ V (x)+υ(x j,θ i) for all i ≤ v, thus there is a
majority of voters that weakly prefer xv to x. Say k < v. Either xv ≥ j xk, in which case
there is a majority of voters that weakly prefer xv to x for the same reason as before, or
xv < j xk. In the latter case, optimality implies V (xv) + υ(xνj ,θ
ν) ≥ V (x) + υ(x j,θν)
and thus V (xv)+υ(xνj ,θ
k) ≥ V (x)+υ(x j,θ k), which means that voter k does not have
strict incentive to deviate. Similarly, one can show the same for the case in which x¯ν =
maxx j I(v). Because there are equilibria in which both x
v and x¯v are implemented, then
the set of equilibria has the i− increasing property in θν . Q.E.D.
2.7.2 Stable Coalition Structures
Proposition 4. (Lateral Coalitions). Any coalition A j that include either (a) individuals
with index (i ≤ v) or (b) individuals with index ( j ≥ v) is always stable. Therefore a
coalition structure P(N ) is stable if each coalition A i ∈ P(N ) satisfies either (a) or
(b).
Proof. Straightforward from Lemma 12 (12b) and Lemma 13 (13b) and the definition of
a stable coalition structure.
Proposition 5. (Central Coalitions). (i) Any coalition A j that include both (a)
individuals with index (i < v) and (b) individuals with index ( j > v) plus individual v is
stable if at least one policy xv ∈ I(v) is in the Core of a game (N ,P(A ′)∪{xv},V ) for
all A ′ ⊆A . (ii) If the Core of the full game (N ,X ,V ) is non-empty, then any “Central
Coalition” is stable, including the Grand Coalition of all voters.
Proof. (i) xv ∈ I(v) is in the Core of a game (N ,P(A ′)∪ {xv},V ) for all A ′ ⊆ A j
implies that for any deviation of a subcoalition A ′ ⊆ A any policy a′ in the Pareto set
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P(A ′) of this coalition is defeated by xv by majority voting. Moreover xv ∈ P(A \A ′),
hence a′ it is not a “credible threat” to xv for coalition A . As the statement implies that
this is true for all possible A ′ ⊆A , it implies that xv ∈ SK(A ) (T K(A )) and therefore
A is stable. (ii) Notice that given that P(A ′)∪{xv} ⊆ X this implies that if the Core of
the full game (N ,X ,V ) is non-empty, then any “Central Coalition” is stable, including
the Grand Coalition of all voters. Q.E.D.
Following Levy (2004), I define a ‘‘partisan’’ equilibrium as an equilibrium in which all
party members vote for their party’s platform, if it offers one (party members are not
restricted in their votes if their party is not offering a platform).
Proposition 6. (Ends-Against-the-Middle Coalitions). (i) Any coalition A j that include
both (a) individuals with index (i < v) and (b) individuals with index ( j > v) but it does
not include any individual with index v is stable only if either of the following is true: (1)
a j ∈ I(v); (2) a j ≥ xv for all xv ∈ I(v); (3) a j ≤ xv for all xv ∈ I(v) (4) a j = x0. Therefore
(ii) if I(v)∩P(A j) =∅, then there is no Partisan Equilibrium in which A j is stable and
a j 6= x0.
Proof. (i) is straightforward from Lemma 12 (12b) and Lemma 13 (13b) and the definition
of a stable coalition structure. For (ii) notice that condition I(v)∩P(A j) = ∅ implies
xv 6= a j for all xv ∈ I(v), therefore, under the SK stability concept, lemma 12 implies that
such coalition is stable only if either a j ≥ xv or if a j ≤ xv for all xv ∈ I(v). Then, there is at
least one voter i ∈A j such that prefers xv to a j. Notice that this is relevant only under the
SK stability concept. In the case of T K, an Ends-Against-the-Middle kind of coalition is
stable only if either of the following is true: (1) a j ∈ I(v); (2) a j = x0 (Lemma 13b), thus
part (i) is proved. Part (ii) of the statement does hold in this case because in equilibrium
only one platform is proposed, and therefore all equilibria are of the “partisan” type and
a j = x0 for all A j 6=A v. Q.E.D.
2.7.3 Grandmont Conditions
Consider a weak preference relation Ri and the corrisponding strict relation Pi and
indifference relation Ii. Recall the definition of betweeness.
Definition. (Grandmont, 1978).R is between R1 and R2 (noted R ∈ (R1,R2)) if for all x
and y in X, (1) xR1y and xR2y imply xRy; (2) xP1y and xP2y imply xPy; (3) (xI1y and xP2y)
or (xP1y and xI2y) imply xPy.
Gandmont has shown that if preferences are Euclidean, this condtion corresponds to the
concept of unique median in all directions in Davis et al. (1972). Such condition requires
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the existence of a point x∗ ∈ X such that any hyperplane passing through x∗ divides the
probability distribution over the set of ideal policies in two the set of ideal points into
two parts with equal Lebesgue measure. Consider an example with 3 voters in which
the policy space X is a convex subset of R2. The set of ideal points IP is made by 3
points: IP :=
{
x1,x2,x3
}
. Given a hyperplane H, the probability assigned to an ideal
point to lie on one side of the hyperplane is either 0 or 1 if the point does not lie on H,
and it is assumed to be 0.5 otherwise. Such assumption corresponds to the case in which
a voter that is just indifferent between two alternatives, support each of them with equal
probability. Fig. 2.2 A shows that for any point x in X there is always a hyperplane H that
divides the set IP into two sets of unequal size. The only exception is the case in which
the three points lie on a straight line, as shown in Fig 2.2 B.
Figure 2.2. Grandmont Conditions in the Two-Dimensional Euclidean
Space
The example in Fig. 2.2 A implies a violation of betweeness. A Condorcet Winner does
not exist in this example17. On the other hand, it is easy to show that SM and SID are
satisfied in this example. Thus one could use the concept of coalitional equilibrium to
study the equilibrium policy outcome, but not the one of simple majority voting
equilibrium.
17Notice that betweeness is a sufficient condition for the existence of a Condorcet Winner, thus a violation
of such condition does not necessarily imply that existence fails. Neverthless, if the policy space is
sufficiently, rich as in this case, a violation of betweeness usually corresponds to a fail in existence. See
Grandmont, 1978.
56
3 A Multidimensional Theory of the
Size of Government
I investigate the relationship between income inequality and size of the public sector in
a theoretical framework. I extend the Meltzer-Richard model of public intervention in
redistribution allowing for two different kinds of public spending. Specifically, voters
choose - through the political process - a two-dimensional policy consisting of a linear
tax on labour income and of the provision of a Public Good. Under the assumption of
balanced governmental budget, these two choices determine the amount of a uniform
lump-sum grant. The multidimensionality of the policy space implies that the traditional
Median Voter Theorem does not hold. I adopt the model of electoral competition proposed
by Dotti (2015) to tackle such problem. I show that, if in the proximity of a political
equilibrium the endogenous progressivity of the tax system is sufficiently low, then a rise
in the median-to-mean income ratio increases the size of the government. This prediction
has opposite sign relative to the one in the traditional analysis. Moreover, I show that the
progressivity of the tax system is increasing in the median-to-mean income ratio. Such
results are consistent with most findings in the empirical literature.
JEL classification: D72, C71, H30, H41.
Keywords: Redistribution, Government, Public Goods, Policy, Voting.
3.1 Introduction
Does the shape of the income distribution affect the degree of public intervention in
public spending in democratic countries? If so, how? Do highly unequal countries
redistribute larger shares of their wealth? These questions have been at the very core of
the literature in Political Economy for decades. In one influential paper Meltzer and
Richard (1981) analyse the relationship between income distribution of a society and the
extent of redistributive policies adopting a unidimensional Downsian model of electoral
competition. A famous result in in their paper is that
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[..] An increase in mean income relative to the income of the decisive voter
increases the size of the government.
This result imply a positive relationship between the size of the governmental sector and
a measure of income skewness, the mean-to-median income ratio. Such prediction seems
to be in sharp contrast with most anecdotal evidence. Examples of such evidence are
provided by Be´nabou (2000) and are mostly based on cross-country correlations. He
emphasizes that, among industrial economies, the more unequal ones tend to redistribute
less, not more. For instance, one can notice the differences in the extent of redistribution
between Europe and the U.S.A., or - within Europe - the case of Scandinavian countries,
which are are not strongly unequal but have adopted highly redistributive policies. These
examples seem to suggest that the countries that are more equal also redistribute more.
Regarding the developing world, Be´nabou observes a similar contrast in the size of
public spending in policies with redistributive effects, such as public education and
health care. Namely, the size of this kind of public intervention is much larger in those
areas where income inequality is lower - such as East Asia - than in the ones where
income inequality is higher - such as Latin America. Lastly, he concludes this anecdotal
evidence by noticing that the cuts in welfare spending experienced in most industrial
democracies during the last two decades occurred at the same time as an unprecedented
rise in income inequality. Such concerns are reinforced by several findings in the
empirical literature. The predictions of Meltzer and Richard’s model have been tested
empirically in several studies - which I survey in the next section - and found very little
support. Specifically, there is limited evidence of a causal link between the degree of
inequality or of skewness of the income distribution and the size of public intervention in
redistributive policies. Moreover, if any significant relationship is found at all in such
studies, it often exhibits opposite direction relative to the one implied by Meltzer and
Richard’s paper. There are several theoretical and empirical reasons that could
potentially explain this puzzle, and some of them - which I briefly mention in the next
section - have been extensively investigated in the literature. In this paper I focus on one
specific theoretical aspect that I claim to be crucial in order to understand why higher
income inequality is likely to be associated with a smaller size of the government, rather
than with a larger one. Specifically, I study the role played by the interaction among
different kinds of policies with redistributive effects in shaping the relationship of
interest. The consequences of such interaction have been mostly overlooked in the
literature because of technical reasons. Specifically, the analysis of the choice of voters
over different forms of public intervention in redistribution requires a multidimensional
policy space. Unfortunately, the simple tools usually adopted to formulate predictions
about the equilibrium policy outcome in traditional models, such as the Median Voter
Theorem, do not generally apply when the choice set faced by voters is
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multidimensional. The reason is that, in such case, a Condorcet winner - i.e. a policy
platform that is preferred to any alternative in the policy space by a majority of voters -
does not usually exist. Moreover, the theoretical alternatives to Downsian framework in
the literature did not prove useful to study this theoretical problem. The reason is that -
as extensively described in chapter 2 - such models of electoral competition do not
always deliver sharp analytical predictions about the comparative statics of interest.
Thus, the papers in the theoretical literature that study the relationship between income
inequality and size of the government usually focus on a single endogenous
redistributive policy in isolation from the others. In this paper I tackle the problem of
multidimensionality by adopting the model of electoral competition proposed by Dotti
(2015), and the notion of coalitional equilibrium introduced in such paper. I apply this
tool to study a labour economy in which redistribution can be achieved through two
different channels: the tax system and the provision of a public good. Specifically, I
assume a tax system characterized by two variables: a linear tax on labour income and a
uniform lump-sum grant. Both are assumed to be endogenous outcomes of the political
process. The main contributions of this paper are the following. First, I show that the
result in Meltzer and Richard does not generally survive if their model is augmented by
allowing for forms of public spending other than uniform transfers, such as the provision
of a public good. Second, I show that the opposite prediction prevails in such augmented
model if the endogenous degree of progressivity of the tax system is sufficiently low in
the neighborhood of a coalitional equilibrium. Lastly, I show that the progressivity of the
tax system is weakly decreasing in median-to-mean income ratio. These predictions are
consistent with most recent findings in the empirical literature. The conclusion of this
analysis is that the interaction between different kinds of redistributive policies is crucial
to assess the relationship between income inequality and size of the government, and that
the empirical puzzle generated by Meltzer and Richard’s theoretical result does not
survive in a model in which a richer policy space is assumed. The paper is organized as
follows. In section two I survey the related literature and I describe the contrast between
theoretical prediction and empirical findings, which represents a puzzle in the Political
Economy literature. In section 3 I describe a simple model of labour economy that
extends the ones in the traditional literature. Section 4 includes all the main results,
which are about the comparative statics of the equilibrium policy outcome, of the size of
the government and of the progressivity of the tax system. Section 5 concludes by
comparing the results in section 4 with some recent empirical findings and suggesting
directions for future research.
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3.2 Related Literature
In their seminal paper Meltzer and Richard (1981) analyse in a simple general
equilibrium model of a labour economy the relationship between a specific feature of the
income distribution - the mean-to-median ratio - and the size of public intervention in
redistribution. They adopt the Downsian framework of electoral competition and assume
a unidimensional policy space, in which the collective choice only concerns the amount
of a uniform lamp-sum grant financed through a linear tax on labour income. They prove
the famous result that the size of the government - defined as the share of income
redistributed by the government - is increasing in the mean-to-median income ratio.
Such result implies a sharp relationship between the degree of income inequality - or
more precisely, a measure of skewness of the income distribution - and the extent of
redistribution in democratic countries. The analysis of such relationship has been a
major topic of research in the Political Economy literature ever since. On one hand,
several theoretical papers in this literature support similar predictions. For instance,
Persson and Tabellini (1994) and Be´nabou (1996) find that higher income inequality
leads to more redistribution through higher taxation. On the other hand, some studies
find opposite implications. The channels that underpin the non-standard predictions of
this second group of papers are very diverse. For instance, Soares (1998) and de la Croix
and Doepke (2009) focus on different forms of redistribution, and find that more unequal
societies spend less on public goods. Saint-Paul (1994) and Be´nabou (2000) show that if
there are capital market imperfections, then the relationship between inequality and
redistribution may not be monotonic increasing. Piketty (1995) proves that a negative
relationship between income inequality and size of the government prevails in a dynamic
model with imperfect learning of the social mobility process. Glomm (2004) shows that
the relationship between income inequality and the amount of redistribution through
public education services depends on the elasticity of substitution between consumption
and the quality of publicly provided education in the parents’ utility. He finds that for
empirically relevant value of this parameter, higher inequality generates less
redistribution. Lastly Dotti (2014) shows that, in a model of parental investment in
education, income inequality is positively related to public spending if the returns to
education are decreasing in parental income. An attempt to analyse a theoretical model
of redistribution that adopts a multidimensional policy space is provided by Borge and
Rattsø (2004) in a paper that is primarily empirical. They propose a model in which
voters choose a two-dimensional policy consisting of a property tax and a poll tax, and in
which tax revenues are used to provide local public services. Their model is extremely
simple and it does not include income tax and labour supply decisions. This ensures that
voter preferences satisfy the rather restrictive conditions stated by Grandmont (1978)
and extensively described in chapter 2 of this work. Unfortunately, their approach is
unlikely to prove successful in more complex theoretical environments, and in particular
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it is not suitable to analyse the one that is the object of my analysis. An example of why
this is the case is provided in the appendix of chapter 2.
On the empirical side the evidence of a link between income inequality and size of the
government is extremely mixed. Only a limited number of studies supports the
predictions of the traditional theoretical framework. Some of the findings are
summarized in Table 3.1. For instance, Meltzer and Richard (1983) test the hypothesis
formulated in their earlier paper using US time series data of government spending.
Their analysis support a negative relation between public spending and the
median-to-mean income ratio. Panizza (1999) studies the relationship between the third
quintile of the income distribution and various measures of redistribution using state
averages of 46 U.S. in the period 1970-1980. He finds a positive and significant
relationship between income inequality and various measures of redistribution, such as
progressivity indexes and total governmental spending, and a non-significant relationship
for other ones, such as total tax revenues and spending in welfare policies. Milanovic
(2000) adopts the net income gains from tax and transfers of different income groups as
a measure of redistribution. His estimates support the hypothesis that countries with
greater inequality redistribute more. Notice that such analysis does not account for any
form of redistribution other than direct in-cash policies. A more recent paper by Boustan
et al. (2010) finds that rising inequality in cities and districts is associated with higher
local revenue collection and expenditures. A majority of early papers based mostly on
cross-country data did not find any statistically significant relationship between various
features of the income distribution and some measure of the size of the government or of
redistribution (for instance Perotti 1992, 1994; Persson and Tabellini 1994, Rodriguez,
1999). Perotti (1996) analyzes a cross-section of 67 countries and estimates the direction
of the relationship of interest, separating democracies from non-democracies. He adopts
various measures of redistribution, such as the marginal tax rate and different
expenditure components, and finds no relationship between inequality and redistribution.
Bassett et al. (1999) adopt a different set of measures of redistribution and spending and
find a negative but poorly significant relationship of such measures with the degree of
income inequality. A subsequent stream of more recent studies based on panel data has
often found evidence of a significant negative relationship between the two variables.
For instance, Gouveia and Masia (1998) use panel data for U.S. states during the period
1979-1991 and find a significant negative relationship between the mean-to-median
income ratio and various measure of the size of the government based on public
expenditures. Razin et al. (2002) reach similar conclusions using a panel of 13 countries
over the period 1965-1992 for a total of 330 observations and including country fixed
effects in their specification. Their measure of income skewness is the is the ratio of the
income share of the top quintile to the combined share of the middle three quartiles and
their measure of the size of the government is the average tax rate on labour income.
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Their findings are summarized in Table 3.2. They find a negative and statistically
significant relationship between income skewness and average tax rate. Moreover, they
show that if they perform the same analysis using a different dependent variable, namely
the total amount of social transfers, the relationship becomes positive and statistically
significant. The latter analysis supports the idea that different redistributive policies may
have different relationship with income inequality. Specifically, it suggests that higher
income inequality may have a positive effect on redistribution through in-cash policies
and progressive taxation, but its effect on the overall size of the government - which
include spending in publicly provided goods and services - may have opposite sign.
Lastly, some papers explore closely related questions. For instance, a number of papers
have found that support for redistribution and public goods provision is weaker in more
unequal or more heterogeneous societies. In such studies the notions of inequality and
heterogeneity may not relate exclusively to income (Goldin and Katz 1997, Alesina et al.
1999, 2001, Luttmer 2001). Within this group, some papers find mixed evidence. For
instance, Lind (2007), using data from the U.S. General Social Survey, finds that
inequality between different groups reduces redistribution, while within group inequality
increases it. Although the evidence is highly mixed, this review of the literature suggest
that there is no convincing evidence in support of Meltzer and Richard’s result. On one
hand some limited evidence in favor of their hypothesis is provided by empirical studies
that focus on measures of redistribution such as the progressivity of the tax system or the
amount of transfers. On the other hand the results tend to be insignificant or show
opposite sign in analyses that include in-kind policies, such as public provisions of good
and services, and other policies with redistributive effects.
3.3 The Model
The setup is similar to the one proposed by Meltzer and Richard. The main difference
is that the budget of the government is spent not only in in-cash redistribution, but also
in Public Goods. For simplicity I am going to assume that the voters’ population is a
continuum with Lebesgue measure 1. This assumption is meant to represent an economy
with an arbitrarily large number of voters.
3.3.1 Policy Space and Parameter Set
The policy space denoted by X ⊆ R2 is two-dimensional with typical element (x,Y ), in
which x is 1 minus the linear tax rate on labour income and Y is the amount of a public
good provided by the government. Thus X is defined as follows:
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X := {(x,Y )|x ∈ [x, x¯],Y ∈ [0,Y¯ ]}, with 0 < x < x¯ ≤ 1. Notice that the partially ordered
set (X ,≤) is a complete and convex sublattice of R2. Individuals differ only in their
productivity ω i ∈ [ω, ω¯], which is perfectly observed by all agents, and such that ω > 0.
The distribution of productivity is right-skewed with c.d.f. R(ω,θ) and p.d.f. r(ω,θ),
where r is continuous and such that r(ω,θ) ≥ 0 for all ω ∈ [ω, ω¯] and equal to zero
otherwise. Lastly, θ ∈ [0,1] is a parameter capturing the degree of inequality in the
distribution of productivity.
3.3.2 Preferences
Each voter i has preferences represented by a concave utility function in the form:
U(ci,Y, li) = u(ci)+a(Y )+ γli (3.1)
where ci is i’s consumption of private goods, Y is the the quantity of public goods that is
provided by the government and li is leisure. The functions u and a are continuous, twice
differentiable, strictly increasing and strictly concave in c,Y . I assume weakly positive
consumption, i.e. ci ≥ 0 for all i. Individuals allocate their time between consumption
and leisure such that li + hi = T , where hi ∈ [0,T ] is i’s hours of work and T is the total
endowment of time. Denote with yi = w˜(ω i)hi the pre-tax income of an individual i facing
hourly wage w˜(ω i) and that supplies an amount hi of hours of labour.
3.3.3 Public Finances
The tax system is the same as in Meltzer and Richard’s model, namely individual post-tax
income is determined by a linear tax rate t and by a lump-sum grant g. Recall x = 1− t
and assume that the private good is the nume´raire with price normalized to 1. Thus, the
after-tax income - that is equivalent to the amount of private good consumed by individual
i - is given by:
ci = xyi+g (3.2)
The government has to break even, such that the governmental budget constraint is given
by:
(1− x)y¯(x,Y )−Y −g≥ 0 (3.3)
where y¯(x,Y ) is the average income. The inequality 3.3 simply states that the total
governmental spending cannot exceed the total tax revenues. I restrict the analysis to the
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cases in which the budget constraint above is satisfied with strict equality. Notice that if
(1− x)y¯(x,Y )−Y −g > 0, then a triple (x,Y,g) that makes all voters strictly better off is
feasible, thus the condition above must be satisfied in any coalitional equilibrium. This
implies that the restriction of balanced budget does not affect the results. Under this
assumption, one can solve the budget constraint for g and define the function g(x,Y ) as
follows:
g(x,Y ) = (1− x)y¯(x,Y )−Y (3.4)
and then substitute g into equation (2) to obtain:
ci = xyi+(1− x)y¯−Y (3.5)
In order to express individual income and consumption as functions solely of the policy
(x,Y ) and of the individual wage I need to analyse how labour demand and supply
decisions are made.
3.3.4 Production
There is a continuum of identical firms of size 1. Firms are characterized by a production
function that is linear in effective labour in the form Q(θ) =
´ ω¯
ω ωH(ω)dR(ω,θ), where
Q is output, the right hand side is the total demand for effective labour, and H(ω) is
demand for labour of type ω . Firms supply a consumption good CS and a public good
Y S, which are perfect substitutes in consumption, i.e. Q = CS +Y S. These goods are
sold on the market at prices pC and pY , respectively. Perfect substitutability in production
implies that only the most expensive good is produced in a positive quantity, thus one can
define a unique price for the output p = max{pC, pY}. Assuming that the consumption
good is produced in positive quantity, this price is equal to the normalized price of such
good, i.e. p = 1. The price of a unit of effective labour is w, such that the hourly wage
of an worker of type ω is w˜(ω) = wω . Firms are profit maximizers. The production
of Q is positive as long as profits are non-negative. This occurs if and only if Q(θ)−
w
´ ω¯
ω ωH(ω)dR(ω,θ)≥ 0, and for each type ω they demand a positive amount of labour
of type ω if ω ≥ wω , and no labour of that type otherwise. Lastly, firms are perfectly
competitive, so they make zero profits, i.e.
´ ω¯
ω [ω−wω]H(ω)dR(ω,θ) = 0. This implies
w = 1, i.e. each worker i is paid her marginal productivity ω i per hour of work supplied
to the firm. Notice that the total output of the firms is also equal to Q(θ).
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3.3.5 Labour supply
The labour supply of each individual is endogenous in (ω i,x,Y ). Specifically, at each
policy vector (x,Y ) ∈ X an individual i solves a problem of choice over consumption and
leisure (C-L problem). Recall that hourly wage is w˜(ω) = ω . After substituting the time
endowment constraint into the utility function, I define the optimal labour supply function
of individual i as a continuous function h as follows.
h(ω i,x,Y ) = arg max
h∈[0,T ]
u
(
xω ih+g(x,Y )
)
+a(Y )+ γ(T −h) (3.6)
One can define a continuous function representing optimal earned income (pre-tax
income) as follows.
y(ω i,x,Y ) = ω ih(ω i,x,Y ) (3.7)
Thus, the pre-tax income of an individual i defined above lies in the range [0,ω iT ] and
the formula for the average income can be written as follows.
y¯ = y¯(x,Y ) =
ωˆ¯
ω
y(ω,x,Y )dR(ω,θ) (3.8)
Notice that y¯ is endogenous in (x,Y ) and depends on individual labour supply decisions.
Moreover, g is itself a function of y¯ and hence of hi for each i. Nevertheless, because hi is
finite, the effect of the individual choice of hi on g tends to zero as the number of voters
grows large. Therefore, the assumption of an arbitrarily large number of voters implies
that g is constant in hi for each i in this model. This simply means each individual’s labour
supply decisions are made treating g as constant given the policy (x,Y ).
3.3.6 Market Equilibrium
Recall that the private consumption good is the nume´raire. Notice that perfect
substitutability in production implies that, if both the private and the public good are
produced in positive quantities, then they must be sold at same price, which is equal to 1
in this case. The total demand of public good at fixed policy (x,Y ) is simply Y , thus
Y s = Y clears the market for such good at price equal 1. The hourly wage is equal to the
worker’s productivity ω because of the zero-profit condition (see section 3.4), and given
this wage schedule the labour market clears at H(ω) = h(ω i,x,Y ) for all ω ∈ [ω, ω¯]
given policy (x,Y ). Lastly, the market for the private good must clear by Walras’ Law.
To verify this result, notice that the total demand of such good is given by the total
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disposable income, i.e.
CD(x,Y,θ) =
´ ω¯
ω [xy(ω,x,Y )+g(x,Y )]dR(ω,θ) = xy¯(x,Y ) + g(x,Y ), while the total
supply is simply the part of output that is not a public good, i.e.
CS(x,Y,θ) =
´ ω¯
ω ωh(ω,x,Y )dR(ω,θ)−Y . The government budget constraint implies
Y = (1 − x)y¯(x,Y ) − g(x,Y ) at any market equilibrium, thus one can rewrite
CS(x,Y,θ) = y¯(x,Y ) − (1 − x)y¯(x,Y ) + g(x,Y ) = xy¯(x,Y ) + g(x,Y ) which implies
CS(x,Y,θ) = CD(x,Y,θ) at p = w = 1 as expected. Lastly, I need to rule out the
possibility that ci = xyi + g is negative for some individuals at some (x,Y ) ∈ X . Thus, I
assume that (1− x)y¯−Y + xy(ω,x,Y )≥ 0 for all ω ∈ [ω, ω¯] and for all (x,Y ) ∈ X . This
condition ensure that g(x,Y ) cannot get too negative and induce negative consumption
for some individual. Also notice that if y¯ > 0 for all x ∈ [x, x¯] at Y = 0 the continuity of
y(ω i,x,Y ) and y¯(x,Y ) in (x,Y ) ensures that there is always a range [0,Y¯ ] with Y¯ > 0 such
that the condition above is satisfied within such range for all x ∈ [x, x¯].
3.3.7 Voter Objective Function
The objective function of an individual i in the voting game is a strictly increasing
transformation of i’s indirect utility function. It represents the utility achieved by an
individual at the optimal level of labour supply as a function of the policy vector (x,Y )
and of the individual wage ω i multiplied by ω i. Notice that such monotone
transformation does not imply any change in voter preferences. In order to obtain the
objective function, I substitute the equations for g,ci,yi, y¯ from the previous paragraphs
into U and I get the following formula.
V i =V (x,Y ;ω i) = ω i
[
u
(
xy(ω i,x,Y )+(1− x)y¯−Y)+a(Y )− γ(T −hi)] (3.9)
Using formula (3.9) I can derive the main results, which are stated in the next section.
3.4 Results
In this section I present the main results of the paper, namely the conditions for existence
and uniqueness of a coalitional equilibrium and the comparative statics results. The latter
consist of the analysis of the effects of a shock on the wage distribution on the equilibrium
policy variables, and of the implied relationship between various measures of size of the
government and the median-to-mean income ratio. Then I compare the predictions of this
augmented model with the ones implied by Meltzer and Richard’s famous result (1981).
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3.4.1 Existence of a Coalitional Equilibrium
I derive sufficient conditions for the existence of a voting equilibrium of the economic
model of redistribution proposed in the previous sections of this paper. The equilibrium
concept adopted is the one of coalitional equilibrium proposed by Dotti (2015) and
described in chapter 2. In order to prove the existence of a coalitional equilibrium I need
to show that the following conditions are satisfied: (i) The policy space X in a convex
and complete sublattice of R2 (ii) V (x,Y ;ω) is jointly continuous and concave in (x,Y ),
(iii) V (x,Y ;ω) satisfies Supermodularity (SM) in (x,Y ) and Strictly Increasing
Differences (SID) in (x,Y ;ω) for all (x,Y ) ∈ X and all ω ∈ [ω, ω¯]. Notice that condition
(i) is satisfied by the policy space defined in section 3.1. Continuity of V is ensured by
the continuity of the utility function U and by the following Lemma.
Lemma 1. Individual income y(ω i,x,Y ) is weakly increasing in productivity ω i. If T >
hi > 0, then y(ω i,x,Y ) is strictly increasing in ω iand twice differentiable with respect to
x,Y and ω i for all (x,Y ) ∈ X and all ω ∈ [ω, ω¯], and h(ω i,x,Y ) is twice differentiable
with respect to x,Y and ω i for all (x,Y ) ∈ X and all ω ∈ [ω, ω¯].
Proof. see Appendix 3.6.1.1.
Condition (iii) is satisfied thanks to the following Lemma.
Lemma 2. If the individual labour supply is such that T > hi > 0 for all i and all
(x,Y ) ∈ X, then the function V (x,Y ;ω) satisfies Supermodularity in (x,Y ) and the
Strictly Increasing Differences in (x,Y ;ω) for all (x,Y ) ∈ X and all ω ∈ [ω, ω¯].
Proof. See Appendix 3.6.1.1.
Denote with ωm the median wage under the distribution with c.d.f R(ω,θ) at θ = 0.
Lemmas 1 and 2 imply that all the conditions for the existence of a coalitional
equilibrium are satisfied if the objective function is concave and if the solution of the
consumption/leisure problem is interior for all voters. This, I can state the following
result.
Theorem 3. A Coalitional Equilibrium exists if (i) V (x,Y ;ω i) is concave in (x,Y ) for all i
and if (ii) the individual labour supply is such that T > hi > 0 for all i and all (x,Y ) ∈ X.
Moreover, if V (x,Y ;ωm) is strictly concave in (x,Y ), then the set of equilibrium policies
is a singleton.
Proof. See Appendix 3.6.1.1.
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Theorem 3 simply states that if the solution to the consumption/leisure problem is always
interior, i.e. if all individuals allocate a positive amount of time both to consumption
and to labour for any possible policy platform in the policy space, then all that is needed
for the existence of a coalitional equilibrium is the concavity of the objective function
with respect to (x,Y ). Notice that such requirement is not trivially satisfied if u(xyi+(1−
x)y¯−Y )+a(Y )+γ(T−hi) is concave in (x,Y ) for given yi, y¯,hi for all i and all (x,Y )∈X .
One has to recognize that yi, y¯,hi are endogenous functions of (x,Y ) and must account for
such endogeneity in order to asses the concavity of V (x,Y ;ω i). In the rest of the paper I
am going to assume that V is strictly concave in (x,Y ). In Appendix 3.6.2 I provide an
example with a parametric utility function in which such condition is satisfied.
3.4.2 Comparative statics
In this section I describe a comparative statics exercise and use the result in Theorem 2
in Dotti (2015) to derive the sign of the policy change induced in equilibrium by such
exercise (see chapter 2). The aim is to show that the predictions of the augmented model
proposed in this paper are, under certain conditions, more consistent with the empirical
evidence relative to the ones implied by the Meltzer and Richard’s paper. Suppose that
the sufficient conditions for the existence of a coalitional equilibrium and for uniqueness
of the policy outcome described in the previous section are satisfied. Define a continuous
distribution for ω with p.d.f. f (ω), such that f (ω) > 0 for all ω ∈ [ω,ω] and f (ω) = 0
otherwise. Denote with (x∗,Y ∗) the equilibrium policy vector given such wage
distribution. The comparative statics exercise is the following. First, define another
continuous distribution with p.d.f. f˜ (ω), such that (i) the mean income is the same under
both distribution f and f˜ at constant policy (x∗,Y ∗), i.e.
ωˆ¯
ω
y(ω,x∗,Y ∗) f (ω)dω =
ωˆ¯
ω
y(ω,x∗,Y ∗) f˜ (ω)dω = y¯(x,Y ) (3.10)
and (ii) the median income is strictly higher under the second distribution conditional on
policy (x∗,Y ∗), i.e.
F˜(ωm)dω < F(ωm)dω (3.11)
in which ωm is the median under distribution f . Notice that such a distribution with p.d.f.
f˜ exists as long as there exists a corresponding income distribution conditional on policy
(x∗,Y ∗) with continuous p.d.f. that is a mean-preserving spread of the original income
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distribution given policy (x∗,Y ∗), and that has higher median relative to the the one that
prevails under the original distribution. This is always the case for income distributions
with a continuum p.d.f. that are not symmetric about the mean. See Appendix 3.6.1.3.
Second, define a distribution with p.d.f. r(ω,θ) = (1− θ) f (ω)+ θ f˜ (ω) for θ ∈ [0,1].
Notice that the expected value of income under r for such distribution is given by
(1−θ)
ωˆ¯
ω
y(ω,x∗,Y ∗) f (ω)dω+θ
ωˆ¯
ω
y(ω,x∗,Y ∗) f˜ (ω)dω = y¯(x∗,Y ∗) (3.12)
for any θ ∈ [0,1]. The comparative statics exercise consists of a marginal increase in θ
evaluated at θ = 0. This corresponds to marginally increasing the median income
keeping the mean income constant, for a policy vector fixed at (x,Y ) = (x∗,Y ∗). Notice
that (x∗,Y ∗) = (x∗(0),Y ∗(0)), where the latter is the equilibrium policy under the
distribution with p.d.f. r(ω,0). I define the comparative statics exercise and the notion of
monotonicity of such comparative statics as follows.
Definition 1. A (marginal) increase in median income is a (marginal) increase in
parameter θ at constant policy (x,Y ).
Definition 2. The equilibrium policy vector is weakly increasing in the median income if
the vector (x∗(θ),Y ∗(θ)) is weakly increasing in θ .
In the previous section I have shown that - under the assumption stated - the conditions for
the existence of a coalitional equilibrium are satisfied. Thus, the corresponding monotone
comparative static results must also apply. Specifically, I can use Theorem 2 in Dotti
(2015) to state the following results.
Theorem 4. (i) The spending in Public Goods is weakly increasing in the median income,
and (ii) the tax rate on labour income is weakly decreasing in the median income.
Proof. See Appendix 3.6.1.2.
Notice that the comparative statics result in Theorem 4 does not state that the mean
income is unaffected by changes in θ , because the endogenous adjustment in the
equilibrium policy (x∗(θ),Y ∗(θ)) implies a change in y¯(x,Y ), and possibly in
y(ωm,x,Y ), too. Thus, in order to address the endogenous relationship between the
median-to-mean income ratio and the policy outcome one has to analyse how
y(ωm,x,Y )/y¯(x,Y ) moves as the equilibrium policy changes. The direction of such
effect is given by the following Lemma.
Lemma 5. If the income distribution at the equilibrium policy is such that
y(ωm,x∗,Y ∗) ≤ y¯(x∗,Y ∗), then (i) the median-to mean income ratio is weakly increasing
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in θ in a neighborhood of (x∗,Y ∗). Thus, if y(ωm,x∗,Y ∗) ≤ y¯(x∗,Y ∗) in the
neighborhood of a coalitional equilibrium, then (ii) a marginal increase in median
income results in both a weakly higher equilibrium policy and a weakly larger
median-to-mean income ratio.
Proof. See Appendix 3.6.1.2.
Theorem 4 and Lemma 5 deliver the sign of the comparative statics exercise on the
equilibrium policy outcome and on the median-to-mean income ratio. Thus, I can now
use these results to assess the relationship between this ratio and some measures of the
size of the government implied by such exercise.
3.4.3 Size of the Government and Progressivity
In order to answer the main questions of this paper I need to define measures of the size
of the government and of the progressivity of the tax system. In Meltzer and Richard’s
paper the size of the government is simply the marginal tax rate t = 1− x. In their
unidimensional framework this is correct because the total government spending and the
total tax revenues are weakly increasing functions of t. In the two-dimensional
framework proposed here this is not necessarily true. Thus, I define the size of the
government as either (i) the total government spending, or as (ii) the total tax revenue, or
as (iii) the average tax rate. Notice that the predictions of the Meltzer and Richard’s
model would be qualitatively the same with respect of these three alternative measures.
Thus, the results of the two papers are directly comparable. The formula for the total
revenue is:
T R(x,Y,θ)≡ ´ ω¯ω
(
1− I[g(x,Y )− (1− x)y(ω i,x,Y )≥ 0])
[
(1− x)y(ω i,x,Y )−g(x,Y )]r(ω,θ)dω (3.13)
where I(·) is an indicator function that has value equal to 0 if individual i is a net tax
payer and value equal to 1 if individual i is a net receiver of subsidies. So the integral
defining T R in (3.13) represents the sum of net tax paid. Notice that at an equilibrium
policy (x,Y ) two possible situations can occur. The first possibility is that (i) the net tax
payments if individual i are such that g(x,Y )− (1− x)y(ω i,x,Y ) < 0 for all ω i ∈ [ω, ω¯].
Because y(ω i,x,Y ) is strictly increasing in ω i, then this case occurs if g(x,Y )− (1−
x)y(ω,x,Y ) < 0. The second possibility is that g(x,Y )− (1− x)y(ω,x,Y ) ≥ 0. In such
case, because y(ω i,x,Y ) is continuous and strictly increasing in ω i, there exists a unique
ωˆ(x,Y ) ∈ [ω, ω¯] such that (1− x)y(ω i,x,Y )− g(x,Y ) ≥ 0 for all ω i ∈ [ωˆ(x,Y ), ω¯] and
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(1−x)y(ω i,x,Y )−g(x,Y )< 0 for all ω i ∈ [ω, ωˆ(x,Y )). Specifically, ωˆ(x,Y ) - if it exists
- solves the following:
g(x,Y )− (1− x)y(ωˆ(x,Y ),x,Y ) = 0 (3.14)
Notice that it cannot be the case that g(x,Y )− (1− x)y(ω i,x,Y )> 0 for all i because this
would imply that total public spending exceed total tax revenues, which implies in turn
a violation of the balanced budget rule. Thus, if g(x,Y )− (1− x)y(ω,x,Y ) ≥ 0, one can
rewrite the formula above as follows:
T R1(x,Y,θ) =
ωˆ¯
ωˆ(x,Y )
[(1− x)y(ω,x,Y )−g(x,Y )]r(ω,θ)dω (3.15)
Similarly, if g(x,Y )−(1−x)y(ω,x,Y )< 0, then the formula for the total revenue is simply
the following:
T R2(x,Y,θ) =
ωˆ¯
ω
[(1− x)y(ω,x,Y )−g(x,Y )]r(ω,θ)dω = Y (3.16)
The second measure of the size of the government proposed is the total public spending.
Given that the net tax revenue is used to finance the provision of a public good Y and
the transfers to the individuals who pay no net taxes, one can define the total public
spending as the sum of net transfers plus the expenditure in public goods. Under the same
assumptions imposed for the previous index, this has the following form. If g(x,Y )−(1−
x)y(ω,x,Y )≥ 0, then the formula is:
T S1(x,Y,θ) =
ωˆ(x,Y )ˆ
ω
[g(x,Y )− (1− x)y(ω,x,Y )]r(ω,θ)dω+Y (3.17)
while if g(x,Y ) − (1 − x)y(ω,x,Y ) < 0, the formula for total spending is simply
T S2(x,Y ) = T R2(x,Y ) = Y . Lastly, another possible way to measure the size of the
government is to use the average tax rate, which is defined as the total net tax revenues
divided by total income:
AT (x,Y,θ) =

ωˆ¯
ω
[(1− x)y(ω,x,Y )−g(x,Y )]r(ω,θ)dω
/y¯ = Y/y¯ (3.18)
Theorem 6. There exists a threshold gˆ ≥ 0 such that, if g(x,Y ) ≤ gˆ, then (i) the total
government spending, (ii) the total tax revenue, and (iii) the average tax rate are all
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weakly increasing in the median income in a neighborhood of (x∗,Y ∗). Thus, if
y(ωm,x∗,Y ∗) ≤ y¯(x∗,Y ∗) and the degree of tax progression is sufficiently low for all
income levels in the neighborhood of the coalitional equilibrium, then (iv) a marginal
increase in median income results both in a weakly larger size of the government and in
a weakly larger median-to-mean income ratio.
Proof. See Appendix 3.6.1.2.
This Theorem suggests that, differently from what is implied by the result in Meltzer
and Richard’s paper, a society with lower income skewness may exhibit - ceteris paribus
- a larger size of the government. Specifically, this is the case for economies that are
characterized by a tax system that is not strongly progressive, which occurs if transfers
g(x,Y ) are not too large. The link between progressivity and transfers will become clear in
the next few lines, in which I analyse the comparative statics of the degree of progression
of the tax system. The tax schedule implied by the balanced budget in equation (3.4) is
simply given by the formula:
T (x,Y ;y) = (1− x)y−g(x,Y ) (3.19)
Following Lambert (1989), I focus on measures of the degree of tax progression, which
is a property of an income tax schedule alone, rather then the degree of tax progressivity,
which is instead a property of the interaction between the tax schedule and the pre-tax
income distribution to which it is applied. Specifically, I am going to employ two
indexes proposed by Musgrave and Thin (1948). The first measure of tax progression is
the average rate progression (ARP):
ARP(x,Y ;y,θ)≡ ∂ [T (x,Y ;y)/y]
∂y
∣∣∣∣
x=x∗(θ),Y=Y ∗(θ)
=
g(x∗(θ),Y ∗(θ))
y2
(3.20)
The ARP simply records the rate at which the average tax rate increases with income. If
it is increased at an income y (or at all income level) the tax has become more average
rate progressive at y (or everywhere). Lastly, ARP = 0 for a proportional tax system and
ARP > 0 for progressive tax systems. A shortcoming of the ARP is that it is not unit free.
A unit free alternative to the ARP is proposed by Lambert (1989). The inverse of residual
progression (IRP)1 is defined as the inverse of the elasticity of post-tax income to pre-tax
1 Notice that the IRP is the inverse of the residual progression measure proposed by Musgrave and Thin
(1948). The former index is chosen because it increases when the tax becomes more progressive.
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income:
IRP(x,Y ;y,θ)≡
(
∂ [y−T (x,Y ;y)]
∂y
y
[y−T (x,Y ;y)]
∣∣∣
x=x∗(θ),Y=Y ∗(θ)
)−1
=
= yx
∗(θ)+g(x∗(θ),Y ∗(θ))
yx∗(θ)
(3.21)
The IRP can be interpreted as the elasticity of pre-tax income to post-tax income. An
increase in the IRP makes the tax more residual progressive. The IRP has value equal
to 1 if the tax system is proportional and greater than 1 if it is progressive. These two
measures of progression are income dependent. This is not going to matter for the sign
of the comparative statics exercise that I present in the next lines of this section, because
the direction of the effect is the same for all income levels. Thus, I can establish a notion
of monotonicity for the degree of progression of the tax system2. Specifically, I define
monotonicity for the degree of progression of the tax system as follows.
Definition 3. The degree of progression of the tax system is weakly increasing in the
median income if ARP (IRP) is weakly increasing in θ for all income levels y≥ 0.
Notice Using this definition, I can state the following result.
Theorem 7. If the tax system is weakly progressive at (x∗,Y ∗), then (i) the degree of
progression of the tax system is weakly decreasing in the median income in a
neighborhood of (x∗,Y ∗). Thus, if y(ωm,x∗,Y ∗) ≤ y¯(x∗,Y ∗) in the neighborhood of the
coalitional equilibrium, then (ii) a marginal increase in median income results both in a
weakly lower progression of the tax system and in a weakly larger median-to-mean
income ratio.
Proof. See Appendix 3.6.1.2.
Theorem 7 states an additional prediction of the augmented model. Namely, an increase
in the median-to-mean ratio due to a change in the wage distribution tends to be associated
with a rise in the degree of progression of the tax system. Such prediction is consistent
with the findings in Razin et al. (2002). Specifically, they find that the effect of an
increase in income skewness is a fall in the average tax rate on labour income and a
weak increase in the total amount of social transfers. The link with the predictions of
the model presented in this section is given by the fact that a tax system that exhibits a
lower average tax rate and (weakly) larger social transfers is actually a more progressive
tax system, which is in line with the prediction of Theorem 7. The main consequence of
2Notice that this statement does not necessarily imply that the progressivity faced by a specific individual
i moves in the same direction for all i.
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Theorems 6 and 7 is that, if one allows for different kinds of public spending to be chosen
by the population of voters, then the size of the government is not necessarily decreasing
in the median-to-mean income ratio, as postulated in Meltzer and Richard (1981). On the
contrary, the size of the government is weakly increasing in such ratio if - in the proximity
of an equilibrium - the tax system is not strongly progressive. Moreover, the progressivity
of the tax system is weakly decreasing in the median-to-mean income ratio. These results
are relevant for empirical purposes. They suggest that Meltzer and Richard’s hypothesis
may be more empirically sound if formulated as a theory of in-cash redistribution and
of progressivity of the tax system rather than a theory of the size of the government.
This alternative interpretation is more consistent with the empirical evidence presented in
section 2. Nevertheless, additional research is needed in order to claim that the empirical
puzzle generated by Meltzer and Richard’s paper has found a convincing explanation.
3.5 Concluding Remarks
In this paper I study the effects of a marginal increase in income inequality on the size of
the government. To achieve this goal, I adopt a positive model of labour supply and
redistribution in the spirit of the one proposed by Meltzer and Richard (1981). The
policy outcomes are determined by the behavior of voters through electoral competition.
The main novelty of this analysis is that voters can decide endogenously both the tax rate
on labour income and the amount of a public good provided by the government. The
budget of the public sector is assumed to be balanced. Thus, the choice of the two policy
variables determine the amount of in-cash redistribution, which is carried out through a
uniform lump-sum grant. The policy space is two-dimensional, thus a Condorcet winner
does not usually exist. As a consequence, the traditional Downsian framework of
electoral competition cannot be adopted to study the comparative statics of the
equilibrium policy outcome. I adopt the model of electoral competition introduced by
Dotti (2015), which ensures sharp comparative statics predictions even over
multidimensional choice domains. I study the effects on the equilibrium policy outcome
of a specific change in the wage distribution that translates - given a certain policy - into
a higher median income with no changes in the mean income (marginal increase in
median income). I find that a marginal increase in median income implies an increase in
the provision of the public good and a fall in the marginal tax rate on labour income.
Moreover, at the new equilibrium, the median-to-mean income ratio is weakly larger. I
use this results to study the relationship between such ratio and the size of the
government, defined either as total public spending, or total tax revenues, or as average
tax rate. I show that, if in the neighborhood of an equilibrium the progressivity of the tax
system is sufficiently low, then a rise in the median-to-mean income ratio is associated
with an increase in the size of the government. This result contrasts the prediction of the
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traditional unidimensional analysis by Meltzer and Richard, and is more consistent with
recent empirical evidence. Lastly, I show that an increase in the median-to-mean income
ratio in associated with a more progressive tax system, at all income levels. The latter
prediction is also consistent with the empirical evidence in Panizza (1999), Milanovic
(2000) and Razin et al. (2002). Two main conclusions can be derived from this analysis.
The first is that the positive relationship between income inequality and size of the
government implied by traditional positive models of redistribution is mainly an
outcome of an excessively restricted policy space, and that such result will not survive if
forms of redistribution other than in-cash transfers - such as the provision of public
goods - are included in the analysis. The second is that this analysis does not rule out the
possibility that income inequality may help explaining the degree of public intervention
in redistribution in democratic countries, but only for those policies that imply direct
in-cash effects, such as transfers, changes in marginal tax rates and in the progressivity
of the tax system. In the light of the encouraging but sometimes inconsistent evidence in
the literature, this new prediction of the model should be tested empirically as an
alternative to the traditional one. Lastly, the theoretical framework adopted in this paper
to tackle the problems induced by the multidimensionality of the policy space represents
a promising tool to address other important questions regarding the political economy of
fiscal policies. For instance, a relatively recent stream of literature has been studying the
choice of voters over different kinds of taxes. Within this group, some papers analyse the
role of wealth inequality in shaping tax rates on labour and capital income (Bassetto and
Benhabib, 2006), while other papers are interested in the determinants of the relative size
of a property tax and a poll tax (Borge and Rattsø, 2004). Such questions are
characterized by an intrinsic multidimensionality of the policy space. As a consequence,
these analyses typically rely on very strong restrictions on voter preferences and/or on
the policy space in order to ensure the existence of a Condorcet winner. Thus, an
approach like the one adopted in this paper may prove helpful in order to verify the
robustness of their findings in a more flexible theoretical environment.
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3.6 Appendix
This section is structured as follows. Appendix 3.6.1 contains all the proofs not included
in the main body of the paper. Appendix 3.6.2 proposes a parametric example of the
framework, and shows that the assumption of strict concavity is satisfied for a simple
utility representation of voter preferences.
3.6.1 Proofs
3.6.1.1 Existence of a Coalitional Equilibrium
Lemma 1. Individual income y(ω i,x,Y ) is weakly increasing in productivity ω i. If T >
hi > 0, then y(ω i,x,Y ) is strictly increasing in ω iand twice differentiable with respect to
x,Y and ω i for all (x,Y ) ∈ X and all ω ∈ [ω, ω¯], and h(ω i,x,Y ) is twice differentiable
with respect to x,Y and ω i for all (x,Y ) ∈ X and all ω ∈ [ω, ω¯].
Proof. Using the F.O.C. of the C/L problem one gets u′(xyi +(1− x)y¯−Y )xω i− γ ≤ 0.
If the solution to this problem is a corner for agent i given policy (x,Y ), then
y(ω i,x,Y ) = 0 and ∂y(ω
i,x,Y )
∂ω i = 0. If the solution is interior, given that y¯(x,Y ) is constant
in ω i, differentiability of y and h follows directly from the twice differentiability of
function u. Then:
∂y(ω i,x,Y )
∂ω i
=− u
′(xyi+(1− x)y¯−Y )
u′′(xyi+(1− x)y¯−Y )xω i > 0 (3.22)
because of the strict concavity of u. Notice that y(ω,x,Y ) is continuous in ω but may be
not differentiable at all ω ∈ [ω, ω¯] if the solution is a corner one for some ω at some
policy (x,Y ). Lastly, continuity and differentiability of y and h with respect to ω for
interior solutions of the C/L problem are ensured by the twice differentiability of u with
respect to ω . Regarding continuity and twice differentiability with respect to x and Y ,
one also needs to show that y¯(x,Y ) is continuous and twice differentiable. Recall that
y¯(x,Y ) =
´ ω¯
ω y(ω,x,Y )dR(ω,θ). Denote the inverse of function u with u
−1(·). In an
interior solution the F.O.C. of the C/L problem implies
y(ω,x,Y ) = [u−1(γ/xω i)− (1− x)y¯(x,Y )+Y ]/x. Integrating both sides under the wage
distribution with c.d.f. R(ω,θ) one gets y¯(x,Y ) =
´ ω¯
ω u
−1(γ/xω i)dR(ω,θ)+Y , which
is continuous and twice differentiable in x,Y . Q.E.D.
Lemma 2. If the individual labour supply is such that T > hi > 0 for all i and all
(x,Y ) ∈ X, then the function V (x,Y ;ω) satisfies Supermodularity in (x,Y ) and the
Strictly Increasing Differences in (x,Y ;ω) for all (x,Y ) ∈ X and all ω ∈ [ω, ω¯].
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Proof. Denote V iab =
∂V (x,Y ;ω i)
∂a∂b . Recall that - given that V
i is a twice differentiable function
- sufficient conditions for SM and SID are V ixY ≥ 0, V ixω > 0 and V iYω > 0 for all i and all
(x,Y ) ∈ X . First of all we need to calculate the marginal effects of x and Y on Vi, denoted
with ∂Vi∂x and
∂Vi
∂Y respectively. The objective function is:
V (x,Y ;ω i) = ω i
[
u′
(
c(ω i,x,Y )
)
+a(Y )+ γ
(
1−h(ω i,x,Y ))] (3.23)
where ci = c(ω i,x,Y ) = xy(ω i,x,Y )+ gˆ(x,Y ) and gˆ(x,Y ) = (1− x)y¯(x,Y )−Y . Recall
assumption (1) implies: yT > y∗i > 0 for all i and all x,Y ∈ X , which is equivalent to say
that all individuals are in an internal maximum of their problem of utility maximization
over consumption and leisure for any policy (x,Y ). This assumption allows me to use an
Envelope theorem when calculating ∂Vi∂x and
∂Vi
∂Y , for instance:
V ix = ω
i
[
u′(ci)
(
yii− y+(1− x)
dy¯
dx
)
+u′(ci)xω
dhi
dx
− γ dh
i
dx
]
(3.24)
Because we have assumed to be in an interior solution of of the consumption/leisure
problem, then the F.O.C. is: uicxωi− γ = 0. Using this result into (3.24) one gets:
V ix = ω
iu′(ci)
(
yi− y+(1− x)dy¯
dx
)
(3.25)
In the same way one can show that:
V iY = ω
iu′(ci)
(
(1− x)dy¯
dx
−1
)
+ω ia′(Y ) (3.26)
SID. Calculate the derivative of V ix and V
i
Y w.r.t. ω using (3.25) and (3.26). One gets:
V ixω =
[
ω iu′′(ci) · ∂y
i
∂ω i
+u′(ci)
](
yi− y+(1− x)dy¯dx
)
+ω iu′(ci)
∂yi
∂ω i
(3.27)
V iYω =−ω iu′′(ci)x
∂yi
∂ω i
(
1− (1− x) dy¯
dY
)
+u′(ci)
(
(1− x) dy¯
dY
−1
)
+a′(Y ) (3.28)
SM. Calculate the cross derivative V ixY using (3.25). One gets:
V ixY = ω
i
[
u′′(ci)
(
xdy
i
dY +(1− x) dy¯dY −1
)](
yi− y+(1− x)dydx
)
+
+ω iu′(ci)
(
dyi
dY − dy¯dY +(1− x) d
2y¯
dxdY
) (3.29)
Therefore a coalitional political equilibrium exists if the three inequalities above are
satisfied for all i at all (x,Y ) ∈ X . I need to show that the cross derivatives above satisfy
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the inequalities (a) V ixω > 0 and (b) V
i
Yω > 0, and (c) V
i
xY ≥ 0. (a) I know from Lemma 1
that for interior solutions of the C/L problem, i.e. T > hi > 0 one gets
dyi
dω i =
−u′(ci)
u′′(ci)ω ix > 0. Under the same assumption it is easy to calculate:
∂yi
∂x
=
−u′(ci)
u′′(ci)x2
− 1
x
(
yi− y¯+(1− x)∂ y¯
∂x
)
(3.30)
Notice that:
∂ y¯
∂x
=
∂
∂x
ωˆ¯
ω
yidR(ω,θ) =
ωˆ¯
ω
∂yi
∂x
dR(ω,θ) (3.31)
Thus, integrating both sides of (3.30), one can write:
∂ y¯
∂x
=
ωˆ¯
ω
[ −u′(c(ω i,x,Y ))
u′′(c(ω i,x,Y ))x2
− 1
x
(
yi− y¯+(1− x)∂ y¯
∂x
)]
dR(ω,θ) (3.32)
Solving equation (3.32) for ∂ y¯∂x one gets the following:
∂ y¯
∂x
=
ωˆ¯
ω
−u′(c(ω i,x,Y ))
u′′(c(ω i,x,Y ))x
dR(ω,θ) (3.33)
and substituing (3.33) into (3.30) one gets:
∂yi
∂x
=
−u′(ci)
u′′(ci)x2
− 1
x
yi− y¯+ (1− x)
x
ωˆ¯
ω
−u′(ci)
u′′(ci)
dR(ω,θ)
 (3.34)
Substitute (3.33) into (3.25) to get:
V ix = ω
iu′(ci)
(
yi− y+(1− x)dy¯
dx
)
(3.35)
and (3.33) and (3.34) into (3.27) to get:
V ixω =
[
ω iu′′(ci)x
∂yi
∂ω i
+u′(ci)
](
yi− y+(1− x)dy¯dx
)
+ω iu′(ci)
∂yi
∂ω i
(3.36)
Notice that for interior solution of the C/L problem one gets:
∂yi
∂ω i
=
−u′(ci)
u′′(ci)xω i
(3.37)
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Substitute (3.37) into (3.36):
V ixω =
[
u′′(ci)
(−u′(ci)
u′′(ci)
)
+u′(ci)
](
yi− y+(1− x)dy¯dx
)
+u′(ci)
(−u′(ci)
u′′(ci)x
)
=
= u′(ci)
(
yi− y¯+(1− x)∂ y¯∂x
)
(1−1)− u′(ci)2u′′(ci)x =
=− u′(ci)2u′′(ci)x > 0
(3.38)
Hence V ixω > 0 for all ω i ∈ [ω, ω¯] and for all (x,Y ) ∈ X . About condition (b), use the
definition of g(x,Y ) = (1− x)y¯−Y to derive:
dg(x,Y )
dY
= (1− x) dy¯
dY
−1 (3.39)
Now totally differentiate the F.O.C. of the C/L problem, that is ω i[u
(
xyi+g(x,Y )
)−γ] =
0, ω i 6= 0:
∂yi
∂Y
=
1− (1− x) dy¯dY
x
(3.40)
Recall that:
∂ y¯
∂Y
=
∂
∂Y
ωˆ¯
ω
yidR(ω,θ) =
ωˆ¯
ω
∂yi
∂Y
dR(ω,θ) (3.41)
Thus, integrating both sides of (3.40) and solving for ∂ y¯∂Y one gets:
∂ y¯
∂Y
=
∂yi
∂Y
= 1 (3.42)
Substitute (3.42) into (3.28) to get:
V iYω = −ω iu′′(ci)x2
( −u′(ci)
u′′(ci)ω ix
)
− xu′(ci)+a′(Y ) =
= xu′(ci)− xu′(ci)+a′(Y ) = a′(Y )> 0
(3.43)
Hence V iYω > 0 for all ω
i ∈ [ω, ω¯] and for all (x,Y ) ∈ X . About condition (c), use the
result (3.42) into (3.29) to get:
V ixY = ω
i [u′′(ci)(x+1− x−1)](yi− y+(1− x)dydx)+
+ω iu′(ci)(1−1+(1− x)0) = 0
(3.44)
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Hence V ixY = 0 for all ω
i ∈ [ω, ω¯] and for all (x,Y )∈ X . Thus, we got that (a) V ixω > 0 and
(b) V iYω > 0, and (c) V
i
xY ≥ 0 for all ω i ∈ [ω, ω¯] and for all (x,Y ) ∈ X . Q.E.D.
Theorem 3. A Coalitional Equilibrium exists if (i) V (x,Y ;ω i) is concave in (x,Y ) for all i
and if (ii) the individual labour supply is such that T > hi > 0, for all i and all (x,Y ) ∈ X.
Moreover, if V (x,Y ;ωm) is strictly concave in (x,Y ), then the set of equilibrium policies
is a singleton.
Proof. Recall that the sufficient conditions for the existence of a Coalitional Equilibrium
are: (i) The policy space X is a convex and complete sublattice of Rd; (ii) the objective
function V i is jointly continuous and concave in (x,Y ), (iii) the objective function V i
satisfies SM and SID for all i and all (x,Y ) ∈ X . Condition (i) is always satisfied as the
policy space assumed in this example is a convex and complete sublattice of R2.
Regarding condition (ii), notice that V i is jointly continuous in (x,Y ) because
ω i
[
u′
(
c(ω i,x,Y )
)
+a(Y )+ γ
(
1−h(ω i,x,Y ))] is a continuous function of c,Y,h and
the functions c(ω i,x,Y ) and h(ω i,x,Y ) are also jointly continuous and differentiable (see
Lemma 1). Concavity in (x,Y ) is assumed to hold for all (x,Y ) ∈ X and all ω i ∈ [ω, ω¯].
Condition (iii) is satisfied under the conditions stated in the Theorem because of Lemma
2. Q.E.D.
3.6.1.2 Comparative Statics.
Theorem 4. (i) The spending in Public Goods is weakly increasing in the median income,
and (ii) the tax rate on labour income is weakly decreasing in the median income.
Proof. The proof to Theorem 3 implies that all the conditions for a coalitional equilibrium
are satisfied. Thus, the comparative static results in Dotti (2015) apply to the equilibrium
policy outcome. Specifically, this result is an immediate consequence of Theorem 2 in
Dotti (2015). See chapter 2.
Lemma 5. If the income distribution at the equilibrium policy is such that
y(ωm,x∗,Y ∗) ≤ y¯(x∗,Y ∗), then (i) the median-to mean income ratio is weakly increasing
in θ in a neighborhood of (x∗,Y ∗). Thus, if y(ωm,x∗,Y ∗) ≤ y¯(x∗,Y ∗) in the
neighborhood of a coalitional equilibrium, then (ii) a marginal increase in median
income results in both a weakly higher equilibrium policy and a weakly larger
median-to-mean income ratio.
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Proof. It is sufficient to show that:
dx∗
dθ
∂
∂x
(
y(ωm,x,Y )
y¯(x,Y )
)∣∣∣∣
x=x∗,Y=Y ∗
≥ 0 (3.45)
and
dY ∗
dθ
∂
∂Y
(
y(ωm,x,Y )
y¯(x,Y )
)∣∣∣∣
x=x∗,Y=Y ∗
≥ 0 (3.46)
Notice that:
∂
∂x
(
y(ωm,x,Y )
y¯(x,Y )
)∣∣∣
x=x∗,Y=Y ∗
= 1y¯(x,Y )2
−u′(cm)y¯(x,Y )2u′′(cm)x2︸ ︷︷ ︸
A
+
+
−y¯(x,Y )2
x
(
y(ωm,x,Y )− y¯+(1− x)∂ y¯
∂x
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
B
+y(ωm,x,Y )
∂ y¯
∂x︸ ︷︷ ︸
C

(3.47)
Recall that dx
∗
dθ ≥ 0 and dY
∗
dθ ≥ 0 because of Theorem 4. First, part A in the formula above
is strictly positive because of the strict concavity of u. Second, notice that in a coalitional
equilibrium the median voter achieve her ideal policy. Thus, if x∗ < x¯, the F.O.C. of the
maximization problem with respect to x for voter m implies
V mx = ωmu′(ci)
(
ym− y+(1− x)dy¯dx
)
≤ 0. Because ωmu′(ci) > 0, this implies
ym− y+(1− x)dy¯dx ≤ 0 which means that part B is also positive. Lastly, ∂ y¯∂x ≥ 0 as shown
in the proof to theorem 2. Thus, dx
∗
dθ
∂
∂x
(
y(ωm,x,Y )
y¯(x,Y )
)∣∣∣
x=x∗,Y=Y ∗
≥ 0. About the case in
which x∗ = x¯, Theorem 3 implies dx
∗
dθ = 0, and the strict concavity of V (x,Y ;ω) in (x,Y )
implies that ∂∂x
(
y(ωm,x,Y )
y¯(x,Y )
)∣∣∣
x=x∗,Y=Y ∗
is finite. Thus the inequality
dx∗
dθ
∂
∂x
(
y(ωm,x,Y )
y¯(x,Y )
)∣∣∣
x=x∗,Y=Y ∗
≥ 0 is also trivially satisfied. Regarding condition in (3.46),
this can be rewritten as follows:
dY ∗
dθ
∂
∂Y
(
y(ωm,x,Y )
y¯(x,Y )
)∣∣∣
x=x∗,Y=Y ∗
=
= dY
∗
dθ
1
y¯(x,Y )2
(
∂y(ωm,x,Y )
∂Y y¯(x,Y )− ∂ y¯(x,Y )∂Y y(ωm,x,Y )
) (3.48)
Using the results in (3.42), formula (3.48), formula (3.48) becomes:
dY ∗
dθ
∂
∂Y
(
y(ωm,x,Y )
y¯(x,Y )
)∣∣∣∣
x=x∗,Y=Y ∗
=
dY ∗
dθ
y¯(x,Y )− y(ωm,x,Y )
y¯(x,Y )2
(3.49)
which is weakly positive as long as the income distribution at (x,Y ) = (x∗,Y ∗) is such that
81
Chapter 3 A Multidimensional Theory of the Size of Government
ym ≤ y¯. Q.E.D.
Theorem 6. There exists a threshold gˆ ≥ 0 such that, if g(x,Y ) ≤ gˆ, then (i) the total
government spending, (ii) the total tax revenue, and (iii) the average tax rate are all
weakly increasing in the median income in a neighborhood of (x∗,Y ∗). Thus, if
y(ωm,x∗,Y ∗)≤ y¯(x∗,Y ∗) and the degree of progressivity is sufficiently low for all income
levels in the neighborhood of the coalitional equilibrium, then (iv) a marginal increase
in median income results both in a weakly larger size of the government and in a weakly
larger median-to-mean income ratio.
Proof. Part (i) I use the definition of the size of the government as the total government
spending corresponding to (3.15):
T S(x,Y,θ)≡ Y+
+
´ ω¯
ω I [(1− x)y(ω,x,Y )−g(x,Y )≤ 0] [g(x,Y )− (1− x)y(ω,x,Y )]r(ω,θ)dω
(3.50)
(1) if g(x,Y ) ≥ 0 and g(x,Y )− (1− x)y(ω,x,Y ) ≥ 0 (this implies g(x,Y ) ≥ 0), recall
formula (3.17) states:
T S1(x,Y,θ) =
ωˆ(x,Y )ˆ
ω
[g(x,Y )− (1− x)y(ω,x,Y )]r(ω,θ)dω+Y
differentiate (3.17) w.r.t. θ and evaluate at θ = 0:
dT S(x,Y,θ)
dθ
∣∣∣
θ=0
= dωˆ(x,Y )dθ [g(x,Y )− (1− x)y(ωˆ(x,Y ),x,Y )] f (ωˆ(x,Y ))+
+
´ ωˆ(x,Y )
ω
[
dx∗
dθ
(
yi− (1− x)∂yi∂x + ∂g(x,Y )∂x
)
+
+dYdθ
(
(1− x)∂yi∂Y − ∂g(x,Y )∂Y
)]
f (ω)dω+
+dY
∗
dθ +
´ ωˆ(x,Y )
ω (1− x)y(ω,x,Y )
[
f (ω)− f˜ (ω)]dω
(3.51)
Notice that the definition of g(x,Y ) implies that g(x,Y )−(1−x)y(ωˆ(x,Y ),x,Y ) = 0. Thus
(3.51) reduces to:
=−dx∗dθ
´ ωˆ(x,Y )
ω
∂
∂x {(1− x) [y(ω,x,Y )− y¯(ω,x,Y )]} f (ω)dω+
+[1+F(ωˆ(x,Y ))]dY
∗
dθ +
´ ωˆ(x,Y )
ω (1− x)y(ω,x,Y )
[
f (ω)− f˜ (ω)]dω (3.52)
Theorem 4 implies that dx
∗
dθ ≥ 0. If at the equilibrium policy ωˆ(x,Y )−ω is small enough,
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then dT S(x,Y,θ)dθ
∣∣∣
θ=0
≥ 0. Notice that if g(x,Y )−(1−x)y(ω,x,Y )≤ 0 then ωˆ(x,Y ) /∈ [ω ¯,ω]
and the formula above is weakly positive. Because of the continuity of g and y, there exists
a threshold gˆ such that if at the equilibrium g(x,Y )≤ gˆ, then ωˆ(x,Y )−ω is small enough,
to ensure that the derivative of interest is weakly positive.
(2) if g(x,Y )− (1− x)y(ω,x,Y )< 0, then T S(x,Y,θ) = Y and therefore:
dT S(x,Y,θ)
dθ
∣∣∣∣
θ=0
=
dY ∗
dθ
> 0 (3.53)
Part (ii) total tax revenues, it is easy to show that if (1) g(x,Y ) ≥ 0 and g(x,Y )− (1−
x)y(ω,x,Y )≥ 0, then
T R(x,Y,θ) =
ωˆ¯
ωˆ(x,Y )
[(1− x)y(ω,x,Y )−g(x,Y )]r(ω,θ)dω (3.54)
Rewrite (3.54) as follows:
=
´ ω¯
ω [(1− x)y(ω,x,Y )−g(x,Y )]r(ω,θ)dω+
−´ ωˆ(x,Y )ω [(1− x)y(ω,x,Y )−g(x,Y )]r(ω,θ)dω
(3.55)
Thus, (3.55) reduces to:
=
ωˆ(x,Y )ˆ
ω
[g(x,Y )− (1− x)y(ω,x,Y )]r(ω,θ)dω+Y = T S(x,Y,θ) (3.56)
As expected, the total tax revenue has same formula as the total spending in equilibrium.
Thus, it must be the case that
dT R(x,Y,θ)
dθ
∣∣∣∣
θ=0
=
dT S(x,Y,θ)
dθ
∣∣∣∣
θ=0
(3.57)
For the same reasons explained in part (i), if at the equilibrium policy ωˆ(x,Y )−ω is
small enough, which is the case if at the equilibrium g(x,Y ) ≤ gˆ for a threshold gˆ ≥ 0,
then dT R(x,Y,θ)dθ
∣∣∣
θ=0
≥ 0. Lastly, (iii) consider the average tax rate defined in (3.18):
AT (x,Y ) =
ωˆ¯
ω
[(1− x)y(ω,x,Y )−g(x,Y )]r(ω,θ)dω/y¯(x,Y ) = Y/y¯(x,Y )
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Differentiate w.r.t. θ and evaluate at θ = 0:
dAT (x,Y,θ)
dθ
∣∣∣∣
θ=0
=
dY ∗
dθ
1
y¯(x,Y )
(
y¯(x,Y )−Y dy
dY
)
=
dY ∗
dθ
(
y¯(x,Y )−Y
y¯(x,Y )
)
≥ 0 (3.58)
Because y¯(x,Y )−Y ≥ 0 the total income in the society must (weakly) exceed the total
public spending in the public good, and dY
∗
dθ ≥ 0 because of Theorem 4. Regarding part
(iv), it is straightforward from points (i), (ii), (iii) and Lemma 5. Q.E.D.
Theorem 7. If the tax system is weakly progressive at (x∗,Y ∗), then (i) the degree of
progression of the tax system is weakly decreasing in the in the median income in a
neighborhood of (x∗,Y ∗). Thus, if y(ωm,x∗,Y ∗) ≤ y¯(x∗,Y ∗) in the neighborhood of the
coalitional equilibrium, then (ii) a marginal increase in median income results both in a
weakly lower progression of the tax system and in a weakly larger median-to-mean
income ratio.
Proof. (i) Recall avarage rate progression of the tax system has formula (3.20):
ARP(x,Y ;y) =
g(x∗(θ),Y ∗(θ))
y2
I check how this index moves, for each income level y, if a shock on the wage distribution
that causes a marginal increase in median income at constant mean in the proximity of the
equilibrium policy (x∗,Y ∗).
dARP(y,θ)
dθ
∣∣∣∣
y
=
1
y2
{
dx∗
dθ
(
−y¯(x∗,Y ∗)+(1− x∗)∂ y¯(x,Y )
∂x
)
− dY
∗
dθ
x∗
}
(3.59)
Notice that the above must be (weakly) negative. The reason is that either (x∗(0),Y ∗(0))
is an interior solution for the median voter with respect to x, and therefore y(ωm,x,Y )−
y¯(x,Y )+(1−x)∂ y¯(x,Y )∂x = 0, or it is a corner solution with respect to x, and therefore dx
∗
dθ =
0. In the former case, y(ωm,x,Y ) > 0 implies −y¯(x,Y )+ (1− x)∂ y¯(x,Y )∂x ≤ 0. Theorem 4
implies d
∗x
dθ ≥ 0 and dY
∗
dθ ≥ 0, thus the overall sign of the formula above is weakly negative.
In the latter case, dx
∗
dθ = 0,
dY ∗
dθ ≥ 0 and the fact that−y¯(x,Y )+(1−x)∂ y¯(x,Y )∂x is finite ensure
that the sign is also weakly negative. Similarly, using the definition of IRP in (3.22) one
gets:
dIRP(y,θ)
dθ
∣∣∣∣
y
=
1
yx
{
dx∗
dθ
(
−y¯(x∗,Y ∗)+(1− x∗)∂ y¯(x,Y )
∂x
−g(x,Y )
)
− dY
∗
dθ
x∗
}
(3.60)
which is weakly negative if g(x,Y ) ≥ 0. Part (ii) is straightforward from Lemma 5 and
Theorem 7 (i). Q.E.D.
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3.6.1.3 Change in the the wage distribution
Lemma 8. If there exists a continuous income distribution that is (i) a mean-preserving
spread of the income distribution given policy (x,Y ) and that (ii) has different median
relative to the the original distribution, then there exists a continuous wage distribution
with p.d.f. f˜ (ω), such that (i) the mean income is the same under both distribution at
constant policy (x,Y ), i.e.
´ ω¯
ω y(ω,x,Y ) f (ω)dω =
´ ω¯
ω y(ω,x,Y ) f˜ (ω)dω = y¯(x,Y ) and
(ii) the median income is strictly higher under the new distribution conditional on policy
(x,Y ), i.e.F˜(ωm)dω < F(ωm)dω .
Proof. Define c.d.f. S(y) such that S(y(ω,x,Y )) = F(ω) for all ω at given policy (x,Y ).
Suppose there exists a distribution with c.d.f. S˜(y) such that:
y(ω¯,x,Y )ˆ
y(ω,x,Y )
S˜(y)dy =
y(ω¯,x,Y )ˆ
y(ω,x,Y )
S(y)dy (3.61)
i.e. S˜ is a mean-preserving transformation of S, and
S˜(y(ωm,x,Y ))< S(y(ωm,x,Y )) (3.62)
which implies that the median under distribution S˜ is strictly higher relative to the median
under distribution S. Denote with y−1x,Y (y) the inverse of function y(ω,x,Y ) at fixed (x,Y ).
Such function exists because y(ω,x,Y ) is strictly increasing in ω . Lastly, define a wage
distribution with c.d.f. F˜ such that F˜(y−1x,Y (y)) = S˜(y) for all y. It is easy to show that such
function satisfies the requirement stated above. Q.E.D.
3.6.2 Example
Consider the following example: there is a continuum of voters of Lebesgue measure
1, individuals have wages ω ∈ [ω, ω¯] with E(ω) = µ and c.d.f. F(ω). Preferences are
represented by the utility function:
U(ci,Y, li) = α ln(ci)+(1−α) ln(Y )+ γli (3.63)
The policy space is X := {(x,Y )|x ∈ [x,1],Y ∈ [0,Y ]} with x > 0 and with x and Y¯ chosen
such that x ≥ µ−ωµ and Y¯ ≤ (T −α/γ)ω with T −α/γ > 0. These restrictions on the
policy space and the parameter set ensure that the solution to the Consumption/Leisure
problem is interior for all voters and for all policies in X . Solve for the optimal labor
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supply conditional on the policy (x,Y ) :
hi = h(ω i,x,Y ) =
α
γ
− (1− x)y¯
xω i
+
Y
xω i
(3.64)
This implies that:
y¯(x,Y ) =
αxµ
γ
+Y (3.65)
Thus, it is easy to derive the formula for individual income:
yi = y(ω i,x,Y ) =
α
γ
x[ω i− (1− x)µ]+Y (3.66)
and for individual consumption of private goods:
c(ω i,x,Y ) = y(ω ix,Y )+g(x,Y ) =
αxω i
γ
(3.67)
which implies that consumption is positive for all ω i. Substitute (3.64) and (3.67) into
(3.63) to get, for each voter i with wage ω i:
V i = α ln
(
αxω i
)−α ln(γ)+(1−α) ln(Y )−α+(1− x)αµ
ωi
− γY
ωi
(3.68)
The partial derivative with respect to x and Y are V ix =
α
x − γµω i and V iY = 1−αY −
γ
ω i
respectively. The cross derivatives are:
V ixω =
γµ
(ω i)2
> 0 (3.69)
V iYω =
γ
ω i
> 0 (3.70)
V ixY = 0 (3.71)
Hence SM in (x,Y ) and SID in (x,Y ;ω) hold for all (x,Y ) ∈ X and for all ω ∈ [ω, ω¯].
Notice that the indirect utility function is strictly concave in x,Y for all i if the Hessian
Matrix of the objective function is negative definite for all ω ∈ [ω, ω¯]. In this case one
gets: V ixx =− αx2 < 0, V iYY =−1−αY 2 < 0 and V ixY = 0 for all ω ∈ [ω, ω¯]. Thus the condition
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is satisfied. Notice that:
xi =

x i f ω i ≤ γµx/α
α
γ
ω i
µ i f γµx/α ≤ ω i ≤ γµ/α
1 i f ω i ≥ γµ/α
(3.72)
and that:
Y i = max
[
(1−α)ω i/γ,Y ] (3.73)
Formulas (3.72) and (3.73) confirm the expected result that the optimum is monotonic
nondecreasing in ω i. Now recall that g(x,Y ) = (1− x)y¯(x,Y )−Y . In this example for
Y < Y this is equivalent to:
g(x∗,Y ∗) =

αωm
γ2
(
α− α2ωmγµ − (1−α)ω
m
µ
)
i f x < x < 1
(αµ− (1−α)ωm)x/γ i f x = x
− (1−α)ωmγ i f x = 1
(3.74)
Notice that g ≤ 0 if x = 1 or if x < 1 and ωmµ ≥ αγα2+γ(1−α) , but interior solutions occur
only if ωmµ <
γ
α . This implies that for
γ
α >
ωm
µ ≥ αγα2+γ(1−α) there is an interior solution
with g ≤ 0. Moreover we have internal solutions with g > 0 for γα > ωmµ ≥ αγ2[α2+γ(1−α)]
which is the threshold that ensures that the total tax revenue does not exceed the total
income. Also one can prove that µ ≥ αα2−γ(1−α) and a suitable choice of Y is sufficient to
ensure that the objective function isωi− concave for all i. Finally notice that for interior
solutions:
∂g
∂ωm
=
α
γ2
(
α− 2α
2
γµ
− 2(1−α)
µ
)
< 0 (3.75)
within the range of parameters for which the solution is interior. Q.E.D.
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Tables
Table 3.1. Summary of Recent Studies: Inequality and Redistribution
Source: De Mello and Tiongson, 2006
Table 3.2. Determinants of Labor Tax Rate and Social Transfers
Source: Razin et al., 2002
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4 The Political Economy of
Immigration and Population
Ageing
I investigate the effects of population ageing on immigration policies. Voters’ attitude
towards immigrants depends on how the net gains from immigration are divided up in
the society by the fiscal policy. In the theoretical literature this aspect is treated as
exogenous to the political process because of technical constraints. This generates
inconsistent predictions about the policy outcome. I adopt a new equilibrium concept for
voting models to analyse the endogenous relationship between immigration and fiscal
policies and solve this apparent inconsistency. I show that the elderly and the poor have a
common interest in limiting immigration and in increasing public spending. This
exacerbates the effects of population ageing on public finances and results in a high tax
burden on working age individuals and further worsens the age profile of the population.
Moreover, I show that if the share of elderly population is sufficiently large, then a
society is unambiguously harmed by the tightening in the immigration policy caused by
the demographic change. The implications of the model are consistent with the patterns
observed in UK attitudinal data and in line with the findings of the empirical literature
about migration.
JEL classification: D72, C71, J610, H550.
Keywords: Immigration, Ageing, Policy, Voting.
4.1 Introduction
What are the effects of population ageing on immigration policies? Do ageing societies
tend to impose excessive restrictions on the inflow of foreign workers and if so, why?
Should we expect an adjustment in immigration and spending policies to mitigate the
impact of population ageing on public finances? This paper attempts to answer these
questions using a theoretical model. In particular, I investigate why rapidly ageing
countries - that arguably need more legal immigration - are imposing increasing
restrictions on the inflow of immigrant workers and how this choice affects the tax
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burden faced by the working population. I also analyse the effects of these policy
changes on the welfare of current and future generations. The importance of these
questions is related to the vast fiscal effects of population ageing and immigration. The
increase in longevity implies rising costs for the public sector, in particular the ones of
public pensions and health care. The fall in the fertility rates causes an insufficient
growth in the tax base. Both result in a pressure on public finances and tax rates. Several
scholars and policy makers suggest that legal immigration can help in mitigating the
effects of this problem, but this can happen only if there is political support for an
increasingly open immigration policy. This analysis is therefore crucial to assess the
fiscal soundness of ageing societies in the long run. Immigration also have demographic,
social and cultural implications. Hence the study of immigration policies is also
important to understand the evolution of the structure of our society in a broader sense.
4.1.1 Methods
In keeping with previous literature (Razin and Sadka, 1999), I analyse a political
economy model with overlapping generations, in which voters differ in their income and
in their age. In contrast with previous literature, however, I depart from a unidimensional
policy space. Specifically, in each period the society chooses a two-dimensional policy
consisiting of an immigration quota and of the provision of an imperfect public good.
The elderly receive an exogenous public pension that is financed by the tax revenues.
The government budget is balanced, hence the political choice determines the tax rate on
labour income. The bi-dimensionality of the policy allows one to model endogenously
both the immigration policy and how the net fiscal benefits from immigration are divided
up in the society. In detail, if immigrants generate a fiscal surplus, voters can employ it
to increase public spending and/or to reduce taxes. The first choice mostly benefits the
elderly and the low-income individuals, while the second favours the high earners. This
implies that the way in which the net gains are divided up by the fiscal system is crucial
to correctly assess the attitude towards immigration of different groups of voters. An
endogenous analysis of both the immigration and the fiscal policy requires a
bi-dimensional policy. Thus the standard tools in the Political Economy literature - based
on unidimensionality - cannot be used to answer this question. In order to address this
problem, I adopt a dynamic version of the model of electoral competition and of the
concept of coalitional equilibrium proposed in Dotti (2015). In such theoretical
framework simple ordinal preference restrictions are sufficient to deliver existence of
equilibrium and sharp comparative static results on the policy outcome. This is a
consequence of a key restriction on the political process. Specifically, single politicians
cannot commit to any platform other than their ideal policies, but they can form
coalitions to enhance their ability to commit through internal agreements. Coalitions
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must be stable in equilibrium, in the sense that no subcoalition has a strict incentive to
deviate and propose a different policy platform. I adopt this notion of equilibrium to
study an overlapping generations model of immigration and public spending. This
allows me to analyse how shocks on the longevity and on the fertility of the population
affect immigration policy, public spending and the tax rate faced by the working
population.
4.1.2 Summary of Results
I show that the elderly and the low income individuals have a common interest in reducing
immigration and increasing public spending. Population ageing causes both an increase
in the political power of these groups and a pressure on the government budget due to the
rising cost of pensions. These two channels underpin the main results of this paper, which
are as follows.
First, I show that, if the share of elderly is sufficiently large, a rise in the longevity and/or
a fall in the natural growth rate of the population cause a tightening in the immigration
policy and an increase in public spending. The reduced inflow of immigrant workers
implies a reduction in the tax base. This, together with the rise in public spending in
public goods and pensions, causes a sharp rise in the tax rate. Hence the political process
tends to exacerbate the effects of population ageing on public finances.
Second, the effects of demographic shocks tend to worsen with time. In detail, a reduction
in the immigration quota in the current period implies a change in the future age profile
of the population because immigrants are mostly young and have weakly higher fertility
rates relative to the natives. This causes further population ageing in the following periods
and reinforces the effects.
Third, if the share of retired population is sufficiently large, then the tightening in the
immigration policy generates a welfare loss for the society as a whole and harms the
future generations.
These results suggest that ageing countries, that arguably need more immigration, tend
to reduce it instead. This causes vast and persistent welfare and demographic effects and
can affect the fiscal sustainability of the public sector in these countries.
4.1.3 Related Literature
Population ageing has been significant since the mid-twentieth century and it is expected
to have dramatic demographic consequences in the next decades (see Figure 1). On one
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hand there are strong theoretical and empirical arguments in support of legal
immigration as an instrument to ensure the financial soundness of a rapidly ageing
society (Razin and Sadka, 1999 and Dustmann and Frattini, 2014). On the other hand the
recent political debate in many countries is dominated by the discussion about how to
limit the inflow of foreigners by introducing increasingly restrictive immigration
policies. Immigration policies have been a dominant topic of recent political campaigns,
such as the one for the referendum on Britain’s European Union membership held in
June 2016 and the one for the primary elections of the Republican Party in the USA in
the same year. In many European countries this political agenda has led to a substantial
tightening of immigration restrictions from 1994 (Boeri and Brucker, 2005) as shown in
Figure 2. For the USA, Ortega and Peri (2009) provide evidence of an increase in the
restrictiveness of immigration policy in the period 1994-2005. These trends in the
implemented policies are consistent with a widespread and increasing aversion to
immigration in those countries. Attitudinal data show that in the UK the share of citizens
that would like immigration into their country to decrease has risen from 72.8% to a
staggering 79.1% during the last 10 years (British Social Attitude Survey, 2003-2013).
Moreover, the elderly are consistently more averse to immigration relative to the young.
In the UK 85.7% of the individuals aged 60 or over would like less immigration while
71.2% of the individuals under 40 years old share the same opinion (British Social
Attitude Survey, 2013). In the USA, the corresponding values are 47.3% and 39.2%
(General Social Survey, 2014). These statistics suggest that population ageing may play
an important role in the collective choice about immigration policies.
The empirical studies of the determinants of immigration policy are mostly based on
attitudinal data and provide two main consistent facts that are relevant for this paper. The
first fact is that age, education and income have a significant impact on the disapproval
of further immigration and that in particular the elderly tend to have stronger preferences
against further immigration in comparison with the young. Dustmann and Preston
(2007), Facchini and Mayda (2007) and Card et al. (2012), using respectively data from
the British Social Attitude Survey, the International Social Survey Programme and the
European Social Survey, all support this finding. The latter paper also provides evidence
that this result is mainly due to the perceived effect of immigration on the composition of
the community in which the respendents live (or “compositional amenities”) and to its
economic effects. The second important fact is that economic hostility to immigration is
driven by concern about effects on public finances at least as much as by effects on
labour market outcomes (Dustmann and Preston, 2006, 2007; Boeri, 2010). Consistently
with this finding, Milner and Tingley (2009) show that public finance aspects play a
major role in shaping the immigration policy in the US. This is somewhat surprising
given that there is not convincing empirical evidence about negative net effects of legal
immigration on public finances (Preston, 2014), and that on the contrary some studies
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suggest that legal immigrants may be net contributors to the fiscal system in several
countries (Dustmann et al. 2010, Dustmann and Frattini 2014).
Lastly, the empirical literature about public spending provides an important result for this
analysis. That is, population ageing affects fiscal policies in two key ways. On one hand
there are direct effects - largely exogenous to the political process - due to changes in the
cost of pensions, health care and education (Banks and Emmerson, 2003). On the other
hand there is evidence that indirect political effects play an important role in shaping
spending policies (Persson and Tabellini, 1999; Galasso and Profeta, 2004). Accounting
for these two aspects is crucial to understand how demographic shocks affect the tax rates.
These three empirical findings justify some of the modelling choices of this paper. In
particular: (i) the choice of an overlapping generation model with a crucial role for the
elderly in shaping the equilibrium policy, (ii) the main role played by the political
determination of tax rates and public spending in shaping the attitudes of different
individuals towards immigration, (iii) the explicit account for the “compositional
amenities” in the preferences of native individuals, (iv) the inclusion of both exogenous
and endogenous effects of ageing on the size of public spending.
The theoretical literature has analyzed the effects of population ageing on three political
outcomes that are crucial for this paper, namely: (i) the immigration policies, (ii) the
public spending policies, and how these two affect (iii) the tax policy (Razin and Sadka
1999, 2000, Razin et al. 2002). The use of unidimensional models to study this problem
(that is largely prevalent in the literature) has constrained the analysis to a unique
endogenous outcome variable. The implication is that fiscal and immigration policies
have been studied separately. This resulted in two complementary streams of literature
whose key trade-offs are going to be relevant in the model proposed in this paper.
The first analyzes the political effects of ageing on public spending and intergenerational
redistribution. Persson and Tabellini (1999) show that in a simple overlapping generation
model the extent of intergenerational redistribution towards the elderly is increasing in
the share of elderly population, and Tabellini (1990), Lindert (1996) and Perotti (1996)
provide a partial empirical support to this hypothesis. Razin et al. (2002) propose a
second channel: a larger share of elderly implies a higher tax burden on the median voter,
because it corresponds to a lower share of taxpayers relative to the share of net benefit
receivers. These two channels imply opposite effects of ageing on the level of public
spending in equilibrium: the pro-tax coalition becomes larger but each taxpayer is relative
less supportive of public spending.
The second stream of literature analyzes the determinants of immigration policy. If on
one hand some papers focus on immigration policies related to the quality of immigrants,
such as skill requirements (Benhabib, 1996 and Ortega, 2005), on the other hand the
prevalent approach - of which this paper is an example - analyses policies that restrict
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the number of immigrants such as immigration quotas (see Preston, 2014 for a survey).
These papers (Kemnitz, 2003; Krieger, 2003; Ben-Gad, 2012) emphasize the importance
of intergenerational aspects such as the pension system and the investment in education
in explaining the determinants of the political choice about immigration policies.
A crucial finding in this literature is that the unidimensionality assumption has important
consequences on the predictive power of these models. In particular, it generates
inconsistent predictions about the comparative statics of the outcome variable depending
on the specific restrictions that are imposed in order to satisfy the required condition. An
example of these paradoxical effects is described in Facchini and Mayda (2008, 2009)
and Haupt and Peters (1998). They study a simple economy characterized by a linear
income tax and assume that revenues are lump-sum rebated to all citizen. In this setting
one may choose to meet the requirement of unidimensionality by imposing the
exogeneity of either (i) the level of public spending in benefits or of (ii) the income tax
rate. These two assumptions corresponds respectively to the classes of “Tax adjustment
models” (TAM, e.g. Scholten and Thum, 1996) and “Benefit adjustment models” (BAM,
e.g Razin and Sadka, 1999, 2000) and imply opposite predictions about the relationship
between pre-tax income, age and attitude towards immigration (Figure 1-2-3-4).
Specifically, the first model implies that the elderly and the low income individuals are
more hostile to immigration than the young and high income, while the opposite is true
in the second model. The intuition that underpins these two apparently contradictory
results lies in the consequence of an increase in the legal inflow of immigrants. Consider
for instance the case in which immigrants are net contributors to the fiscal system. If
publicly provided benefits are set exogenously, then the effect of an increase in
immigration is a fall in the tax rate. Conversely, if the exogenous variable is the tax rate,
then the effect is a rise in public spending per capita. As a result, in the former case
immigration benefits mostly the young and high income voters, while in the latter the
elderly and the low income individuals enjoy the largest share of the gains. In a recent
paper Preston (2014) clarifies that the source of this inconsistency lies in how the social
gains generated by immigration are divided up among different groups. This division is
an output of the political process, but existing models treat it as an input. The issue is
even more relevant for the purposes of this paper because I aim not only to understand
the patterns of immigration policy, but more generally to address how a democratic
society responds to population ageing in terms of immigration and fiscal policy, and the
overall consequences on the public finances. These questions can be addressed only in a
framework that allows immigration, spending and tax policy to be endogenously
determined.
The theoretical literature has recognized the crucial importance of multidimensionality
of the policy space in order to study the determinants of immigration policies, but all the
existing studies are based on unidimensional models because of technical reasons. The
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early papers by Plott (1967), Tullock (1967) and Devis et al. (1972) have established
rather restrictive conditions for the existence of a Condorcet Winner - a platform that is
preferred to any alternative by a majority of voters - if the policy space is
multidimensional. Grandmont (1978) has elegantly generalized these conditions with the
concept of Intermediate Relations. The use of Grandmont’s result in Political Economy
applications is restricted to simple problems of redistribution (e.g. Borge and Rattsø,
2004) because of the extreme constraints that it imposes on preferences’ heterogeneity.
These requirements are way too restrictive for applications in which different subgroups
of the voting population (such as the working age and the retired individuals in this
paper) have sufficiently heterogeneous preferences over the set of available policies1.
Alternatives to unidimensional voting models are popular in the literature, but they are
not generally useful to answer questions about the comparative statics of the equilibrium
policy outcomes because they do not deliver sharp analytical predictions about the policy
response to a shock to the voters’ distribution. This can be due either to a large
multiplicity of equilibria, like in the Citizen-Candidate models (Besley and Coate, 1997)
and in the Party Unanimity Nash Equilibrium (Roemer, 1999), or to the lack of
sufficiently robust analytical comparative statics results, like in Probabilistic Voting
models (Lindbeck et al. 1987, Banks et al. 2003). A more detailed analysis of the
advantages and disadvantages of different theoretical framework in the study of
comparative statics in models of electoral competition is provided in chapter 2. An
attempt to model collective choices over immigration policies and welfare spending
allowing for a multidimensional policy space is in Razin et al. (2011, 2014). They
characterize the type of political coalitions that may prevail among skilled, unskilled and
elderly voters in an overlapping generation models that shares several features with the
one proposed in this paper. Neverthless, their approach is unsuitable to answer the
questions of this paper, because of two reasons. First, they assume exogenous tax rates.
Thus, the implications in terms of preferences for immigration are the same as the ones
of Benefit adjustment models. Secondly, the assumptions they impose to tackle the
multidimensionality of the policy space severely limit the possibility of deriving
comparative statics results about the equilibrium policy outcome.
This paper is based on another stream of literature (Levy 2004, 2005) which exploits the
role of coalitions and political parties in ensuring stability in a multidimensional
deterministic voting model. I adopt a dynamic version of the model of electoral
competition proposed by Dotti (2015). Such framework, under appropriate preferences
restrictions, delivers sharp predictions about the equilibrium policy outcome, and it is
therefore suitable to answer the questions of the paper.
1In the Appendix to chapter 2 I provide an example of why the Grandmont conditions usually fail to apply
in this framework, and in particular to the model that I present in section 3 of this chapter.
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4.1.4 Organization of the Paper
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section I introduce the main model and
an equilibrium concept that allows me to answer the questions. Section 3 presents the
main results of the paper, which are stated in Theorems 7-8. In section 4 I propose four
extensions of the basic framework. In section 5 I analyze the welfare implications of
the main predictions of the paper. Section 6 provides an analysis of the determinants of
the attitude towards immigration in the UK based on the British Social Attitudes Survey
and show that they are consistent with the one implied by the model proposed in this
paper. Lastly, in section 7 I discuss some limitations of this work and future directions of
research.
4.2 A Political Model of Immigration and Spending
Policy
This section is constituted by two parts. In the first I describe the features of the political
process. In the second I present the economic model of immigration and public spending
and I formally define the notion of equilibrium. These two theoretical tools are then used
to derive the main results of this paper, which are stated in section 3.
4.2.1 The Political Process
I define a political process that translates individual preferences into a policy outcome
xt in each period t. The elements of the vector xt represent the relevant policy outcomes,
namely the immigration quota (Mt) and the uniform provision of an imperfect public good
(Yt). I adopt a dynamic version of the political model of electoral competition introduced
in a companion working paper (Dotti 2015). It is a general tool with a potentially large
range of applicability, some of which are mentioned in the concluding section of chapter
2. The closest example in the literature is in Levy (2004, 2005). A formal definition of the
equilibrium concept is provided in section 2.3 (Definition 1), while a detailed description
of the political process and its properties in the static case is available in chapter 2.
The political process is based on the assumption that voters can form coalitions in order
to enhance their capacity to influence the policy outcome. Each individual can be the
member of only one coalition, thus a coalition structure is defined as a partition of the set
of voters. As in Levy (2005), a coalition can only offer credible policies, that is, policies
in the Pareto set of its members. Thus, when a voter runs as an individual candidate, he
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can only offer his ideal policy, as in the “citizen-candidate” model. On the other hand,
when heterogeneous individuals join together in a coalition, their Pareto set is larger than
the set of their ideal policies. This assumption captures the idea that within a coalition
individuals can commit to policies that represents a compromise among the members, and
that these internal agreements are credible for the voting population provided that not all
the members have an incentive to renegotiate the terms of the deal. Individuals play a
two stage game: in the first stage they form coalitions in support of a certain proposed
policy platform (or no policy) and in the second stage a voting game is played over the
set of policies that are proposed by at least one coalition in the previous stage. Coalitions
are required to be stable in equilibrium, in the sense that each coalition must possess at
least one policy vector in its Pareto set such that - if the policy is proposed - there is
no subcoalition that have a strict incentive to deviate and propose a different platform
(named a deviator in this case)2. If the deviation occurs the policy initially proposed by
the coalition may become unfeasible. Therefore the profitability of a deviation depends on
the behavior of the remaining part of the coalition that did not participate in the deviation.
I assume that this subgroup responds to the deviation by proposing a policy (if any) that is
capable of reducing the final payoff of some (or of all) the deviating players and therefore
to prevent the deviation, and no policy if such platform does not exist. It can be shown that
the main results of this section are robust to different assumptions about such behaviour
(see chapter 2). Moreover, I assume that the profitability of a deviation is determined
by the final outcome of the voting process3. Specifically, voters fully anticipate not only
the effects of their strategies in the current period, but also the effects on the equilibrium
in the following periods. The latter effects are derived assuming rational expectations
that satisfy the Markov property. This means that expectations about future equilibrium
outcomes depend uniquely on the state of the economy in the current period. Details are
provided in section 2.3. I assume a tie-breaking rule for the case in which, given the other
platforms that are offered in equilibrium, all members of a given coalition are indifferent
between offering a platform and running at all. Specifically, I impose that in equilibrium
a coalition facing such a situation does not propose any platform. The same restriction is
assumed in Levy (2005) and it is justified if one considers some small costs of running
for elections which are not explicitly assumed in the model. If there is at least one policy
in the Pareto set of a certain coalition that does not face any deviator, then this policy is
feasible and the coalition is stable. A stable coalition structure is a partition of the set of
voters in which all coalitions that are part of such partition are stable in the sense described
above. Before observing the coalition structure each coalition (including one-member
2One can also allow for mergers between coalitions with no effects on the results in Theorems 3-4-5.
3 Alternatively one can assume that the equilibrium choices of other coalitions do not affect the behavior
of potential deviators (in such case the stability is purely internal to the coalition), with no effects on
the comparative statics results, see Ch. 2.
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coalitions) proposes either a feasible policy platform or no policy. Then the coalition
structure and the proposed platforms are observed by all the players. Voters (the whole
population) vote for one of the available policy platforms and the election’s outcome is a
weak Condorcet Winner, which I name a winning policy. If no policy is offered or no weak
Condorcet Winner exists, a default policy is implemented which is worse for all players
than any other outcome4. A set of platforms (named a policy profile), a stable coalition
structure and a winning policy given expectations about future policy outcomes constitute
a Markov-Perfect coalitional equilibrium of the game if one of the coalition is a (weak)
Condorcet Winner of the voting game at the second stage (see chapter 2 for a formal
definition). Notice that, differently from Levy (2005), I do not assume sincere voting: the
existence of a Condorcet Winner at the second stage of the voting game implies a result
that is robust to a fully sophisticated voting behavior and to a number of different voting
protocols.
The main difficulty in applying the concept of coalitional equilibrium to the analysis in
this paper is related to the dynamic nature of the problem. Specifically, voters’
expectations about the effects of current policy choices on future outcomes may affect
the equilibrium behaviour. Moreover, because of this dynamic aspect, multiple equilibria
are, in principle, possible. However, under appropriate restrictions on voters’
expectations, the analysis in each period t becomes equivalent to the one of a static
problem, as I am going to clarify in section 4.2.3. In the next section I present the
economic model of immigration that I adopt in this paper, and in section 4.2.3 I will
provide sufficient conditions on voters’ expectations such model satisfy, in each period t,
the condition for a Markov-Perfect coalitional equilibrium.
4.2.2 The Economic Environment
In this section I introduce an economic model of immigration and public spending in the
spirit of the ones in the literature, in particular of Razin and Sadka (1999). Differently
from the latter, I allow for the endogeneity of both the spending variable (an imperfect
Public Good) and the immigration policy (in the form of a quota in each period t).
4.2.2.1 Demographic Structure
Consider an overlapping generation model with three generations in each period t: the
children (ch), the working age population (y) and the elderly (o). In each period only
4The comparative statics results apply even if the default policy is the platform implemented in the
previous period, see Appendix 4.8.2.4.
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the native individuals of working age and the elderly (which include both the native and
immigrants of the previous period) have voting rights (highlighted in capital letters in Fig.
4.5). Each period has length normalized to 1 and it is characterized by a native working
age population of size nt and a number of immigrants mt in their working age. Natives
and immigrants have potentially different exogenous expected fertility rates denoted by
σnt and σmt respectively. An elderly individual at time t has life expectancy lt−1 ≤ 1. At
the end of each period immigrants and their children are fully assimilated to the native
population in terms of costs and fertility behavior. The size of each part of the population
is summarized in Fig. 4.6. Denote with ot the size of the elderly population, i.e. ot =
lt−1(nt−1+mt−1). Notice that ot is an increasing function of longevity. This assumption
captures in a simple way the implications of a more realistic continuous time model5.
Thus, the total number of individuals that possess voting rights at time t is Nt = nt + ot .
Also notice that the way in which I define the size of different groups in the population
implies a number of voters that is not necessarily a natural number, while in reality that
must be the case. Given that the object of this study are policies that are typically decided
at country level, and that the effects of this approximation tend to disappear as the number
of individuals grows large, these assumptions are reasonable and commonly used in the
literature (e.g. Razin and Sadka, 1999).
4.2.2.2 Individual Preferences
An individual i of working age (y) at time t has preferences that are represented by a
utility function whose arguments are consumption of private goods Cs and the imperfect
Public Good Ys, and the share of immigrants in the total population of working age Ms in
the form:
U i,yt
(
Ci,yt ,C
i,o
t+1,Mt ,Mt+1,Yt ,Yt+1
)
= Ci,yt +b(Yt)− c(Mt)+
+β lt
[
Ci,ot+1+d(Yt+1)− c(Mt+1)
] (4.1)
where β is a parameter capturing how an individual discounts future utility. The function
c captures the perceived effect of immigration on the composition of the community in
which the voter lives (or compositional amenities, see Card et al., 2012). It is a function of
the ratio of immigrants to total working age population, because the effects of immigration
on compositional amenities are likely to be larger in communities that face a relative large
number of immigrants. The function c take positive values if immigration has a positive
effect on the way in which the native population enjoys such compositional amenities,
5In a continuous time model the number of elderly in each moment in time t is given by
´ 1+l
s=1 nt−s(s)+
mt−s(s)ds which is also linearly increasing in the longevity l and in the size of the oldest generation of
elderly nt−1−l(1+ l)+mt−1−l(1+ l).
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and negative values otherwise. The latter case is going to be the most interesting one for
this analysis because it implies an equilibrium policy that restricts immigration even if
immigrants are, on average, net contributors to the fiscal system. The functions b and d
are restricted to take only weakly positive values. Moreover, b and d are strictly concave
while c is strictly convex. For retired individuals U i,ot is constructed in a similar way,
except that it only includes consumption and share of immigrants in the current period of
life:
U i,ot
(
Ci,ot ,Mt ,Yt
)
= lt−1
[
Ci,ot +d(Yt)− c(Mt)
]
(4.2)
One can allow for different effects of immigration on compositional amenities at different
ages, with no changes in the results of this analysis. Lastly, the function c is assumed
to be the same across different cohorts of voters (at given age). This assumption ensures
that, if the features of the society - in terms of longevity, birth rates, etc., - are constant
over time, then the choice of voters tends to converge to a stationary policy vector.
4.2.2.3 Production
Individual productivity is given by ε it and has average ε¯t . The distribution of ε it is perfectly
observed by all agents and it does not change over time. I denote its continuous c.d.f.
with Q, its p.d.f. with q and I assume q(0) > 0. Immigrants have the same expected
productivity as the natives. Individuals are endowed with 1 unit of time and their labour
supply is perfectly inelastic. I assume a linear production function Ft(Lt) = ξtLt in which
the total supply of effective labour is given by Lt = (mt + nt)ε¯t . Perfect competition on
the labour market implies a wage rate per unit of effective labour wt = ξt . Therefore
individual pre-tax income is given by:
yit = wtε
i
t (4.3)
and has average y¯t . The assumption of inelastic labour supply simplifies the results and it
is not crucial for driving the pay-offs of the model (in the supplementary online material6
I show that the results are identical if all individuals have the same tax elasticity of labour
supply). The assumption of a linear production function rules out the effects of changes
in the aggregate labour supply on wages and it is common in the literature (e.g. Razin
and Sadka, 2000). It is justified if one considers that in a more complex economy these
effects tend to be offset by the adjustment in the stock of capital of the economy - not
explicitly assumed in this analysis - that occurs in the relatively long time framework of
a generation. This adjustment is particularly strong if firms have access to international
6Available for download at http://valeriodotti.github.io/research.html.
100
4.2 A Political Model of Immigration and Spending Policy
capital markets (see Ben-Gad, 2012). In the additional online material I show that the
main results of this paper are mostly unaffected in the case of a strictly concave production
function.
4.2.2.4 Public Finances
The public sector raises revenues through a linear tax τt on labour income and spends
them on the publicly provided good Yt and on pensions for the elderly. In section 4.3 I
introduce an extension of the model in which the government also provides public
education. The government faces an exogenous amount of forgone tax revenues
λt = λ (wt) per immigrant. This assumption captures the idea that certain skills may be
country-specific and therefore the immigrants may earn less than native individuals with
similar productivity levels. Alternatively one can assume that immigrants and natives
have different average productivities ε¯mt , ε¯nt , and assume λt to be a function λ (wt , ε¯mt , ε¯nt )
that captures the net forgone government revenue due to the difference in income7.
I assume a Pay-As-You-Go pension system (in section 4.1 I present an extension in which
I allow for a partially funded system). The state pension paid to an individual i at time
t is denoted by pit−1 and has average p¯t−1. It is promised to a working age individual
at time t − 1 and it is predetermined at time t. It is a constant flow, such that the total
transfer is lt−1 pit−1 (the flow amount times the time the pension is going to be paid for).
It is a function of the relative income of the pensioner in the previous period yit−1/y¯t−1
and of the growth rate of working age population. At time t − 1, when the promise is
made, mt is not yet determined, because it is a function of the immigration policy at time
t. Thus the promised pension is a function of an exogenously fixed amount of immigrants
mˆt (which can be equal to zero). This assumption allows voters to ease the burden of
pension on the working age population by choosing an immigration quota larger than
mˆt . The assumptions on the pension system ensure that a certain positive amount of
pensions is provided even if the pivotal voter typically prefers no pensions at all. Although
not explicitly modeled in this paper, the assumption of an exogenous positive provision
of public pensions in an overlapping generation model is justified in a game theoretical
framework like the one in Rangel and Zeckhauser (2001). The state pension pit−1 is given
by the formula:
pit−1 =
(
α+ γ
yit−1
y¯t−1
)
nt + mˆt
nt−1+mt−1
=
(
α+ γ
yit−1
y¯t−1
)
σ¯t−1
(1− M̂t)
(4.4)
where σ¯t−1 = nt(mt−1+nt−1) is the natural growth factor of the working population between
period t−1 and t and M̂t = mˆtnt+m̂t is the share of immigrants implied by the default level
7Notice that these two assumptions have consequences on the post-tax income of the immigrants.
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of immigration m̂t . The parameters α ≥ 0, γ ≥ 0 determine the features of the benefits
provided to the elderly and, as a consequence, the type of public pension system. Pay-As-
You-Go pension systems are often classified into two categories. Specifically, a system is
(i) Beveridgean if it provides flat-rate benefits, and (ii) Bismarkian if it provides earnings-
related (or contribution-related) benefits. Formula (4.3) implies that the pension system
can be either Beveridgean (if γ = 0), Bismarckian (if α = 0) or a combination of the two.
Notice that if native and immigrants have different birth rates, i.e. σnt 6= σmt , then the
natural growth rate of the population σ¯t is itself endogenous in the immigration policy,
and in particular: σ¯t =
σnt nt+σmt mt
nt+mt
= σmt Mt +σnt (1−Mt). Lastly, notice that the total cost
of the pension system per taxpayer is decreasing in the number of immigrant workers that
are allowed to enter the country in period t, while pit is increasing in Mt−1 if σmt−1 > σ
n
t−1.
I assume that the government budget is balanced in every period. The choice of not
allowing for public debt simplifies the analysis and does not affect the trade-offs of the
model. The government budget constraint ensure that the total public spending in public
goods, pensions and the costs of immigration do not exceed the total tax revenue, and has
form:
Yt(mt +nt)+ lt−1 p¯t−1(mt−1+nt−1)+λtmt ≤ τt(mt +nt)y¯t (4.5)
Assume that the governmental budget constraint is satisfied with equality (it must be
true at any equilibrium of the voting game8). Using formula for the pensions (4.3) the
governmental budget constraint (4.4) can be rewritten as follows:
τt = τ(Mt ,Yt , y¯t) = y¯t−1
(
λtMt +(α+ γ)lt−1
(1−Mt)
(1− M̂t)
+Yt
)
(4.6)
Notice that this formula implies that working age voters can ease the tax burden on their
income by voting for a more open immigration policy. The intuitition is that, if the number
of immigrants increases, then the expenditure in pensions is going to be shared among a
larger number of taxpayers. This results in lower income taxes. I can use this formula to
state the feasibility condition of the policy space:
0≤ τt(Mt ,Yt , y¯t)≤ k (4.7)
for some k < 1. This restriction ensures that the implied tax rate on income will not
exceed 1 or become negative. Notice that this restriction is crucial for the results in
the next section to apply: if the tax rate hits the upper bound then the model and its
predictions become similar to the ones of a standard Benefit Adjustment Model (See
Appendix 4.8.2.5). It is easy to show that the consumption of private goods of a young
8In the case in which the pivotal voter is retired or has zero income one has to rule out Pareto inferior
outcomes to ensure this result.
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individual is given by her post-tax income such that:
Ci,yt = (1− τt)yit (4.8)
Lastly, the consumption of old people at time t depends only on the amount of pensions
provided by the government, i.e.
Ci,ot = p
i
t−1 (4.9)
Formulas (4.8) and (4.9) rule out the possibility of savings. I also abstract from bequest
motives.
4.2.2.5 Policy Space
I assume that voters face a two-dimensional policy space in each period t. Namely, a
policy platform consist of an immigration policy Mt , and of a level of public spending in
the imperfect public good Yt . Moreover, I assume that both the immigration policy Mt
and the spending policy Yt lie between zero and an upper bound, i.e. 0 ≤ Mt ≤ M and
0 ≤ Yt ≤ Y . A typical platform is given by a two dimensional vector xt = (x1t ,x2t) with
x1t = Mt and x2t =−Yt .
4.2.2.6 Voters’ Objective Function
Substituting the formulas for Cyt (4.8) and Cot+1 (4.9) into the utility function of a young
voter given by formula (4.1), one gets the indirect utility function
ν i,yt = νy(Mt ,Yt ,Mt+1,Yt+1;yit):
ν i,yt = (1− τt)yit +b(Yt)− c(Mt)+
+β lt
[(
α+ γ y
i
t
y¯t
)
σ¯t
(1−M̂t+1) +d(Yt+1)− c(Mt+1)
] (4.10)
The next step is to state the objective function of the elderly. Using the formula for Ci,ot
(4.9) into the utility function of an elderly voter (4.2) I get ν i,ot = νo(Mt ,Yt ;yit−1):
ν i,ot = lt−1
[(
α+ γ
yit−1
y¯t−1
)
σ¯t−1
(1− M̂t)
+d(Yt)− cˆ(Mt)
]
(4.11)
The formula (4.11) delivers the main intuition that underpins the results in this paper.
Notice that retired individuals internalize (indirectly) the positive effects of immigration
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through the level of public spending in the imperfect Public Good. The key difference
with traditional models is that the tax rate on income is also an endogenous variable.
Thus, the elderly always prefer, given a certain level of public spending, a policy that
finances it with high taxes on the income of native workers rather than with a larger
number of immigrants. This result follows from the fact that in this model the elderly
face the same costs of immigration as the young but, differently from the latter, they do
not internalize the negative effects of high taxes on the working age population. Moreover,
notice that the same preferences represented by ν i,ot are also represented by the function
νot = d(Yt)− c(Mt) for all the elderly at time t. This objective function implies that the
attitude of the elderly towards immigration is always more hostile than the one of any
working age individual. This is true even if immigrants are net contributors in financing
the public spending of which the elderly are net beneficiaries. This implication of the
model is consistent with the empirical findings outlined in section 1 and it is crucial in
order to understand the comparative statics of the equilibrium outcomes of the model that
I will present in the next sections of this paper. Define θ i,yt as the ratio of i’s income to
mean income at time t:
θ i,yt =
ε it
ε¯t
=
yit
y¯t
(4.12)
The preferences of each young native individual i are uniquely identified by the parameter
θ i,yt ∈ Θyt with Θyt = [θ yt , θ¯ yt ]. Notice that the function ν i,yt can be written as a function of
one exogenous parameter θ i,yt and of the choice variables (Mt ,Yt ,Mt+1,Yt+1) at time t
and t + 1, plus the parameters ϕt = ({α,β ,γ,σnt+s−1,σmt+s−1, lt+s−1}∞s=0). Moreover, the
definition of θ i,yt implies that the cumulative distribution of θ
i,y
t is the same as the one of
ε it . The value of yit−1/y¯t−1 does not affect the preferences of an elderly individual j over
xt , therefore all the elderly have the same preferences. This means that we can set a unique
parameter θ j,ot = θ ot ∈ Θot which identifies the preferences of each elderly individual j at
time t such that Θot = {θ ot }. I assign to all the elderly a parameter θ ot = −1. I can now
define the parameter set:
Θt =
{
Θyt ∪Θot
}
(4.13)
which is a totally ordered set. In order to show that the preferences described in this
section satisfy the conditions for the existence of a coalitional equilibrium I define a new
objective function that includes both ν i,yt and ν
i,o
t and has the following form:
ν it = ν(xt ,xt+1;θ
i
t ,ϕt) =
{
ν i,yt i f age = y
κνot i f age = o
(4.14)
with x1t = Mt and x2t = −Y t and for large enough κ > 0. Notice that multiplying by
κ represents a strictly increasing transformation of the original objective function of the
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elderly therefore κνot implies the same preferences as νot . The role of κ is the one of
translating an ordinal property of voter preferences into a cardinal property of the function
ν it . Specifically, consider two policy vectors x′t and x′′t such that x′t ≥ x′′t , i.e. policy x′t
implies a weakly larger share of immigrants and a weakly larger provision of the public
good relative to x′′t . Then a large enough κ ensures that, if an elderly voter is more
averse to immigration and more favourable to public spending than a young voter, then
the difference in utility between x′t and x′′t (positive or negative) should be larger for the
former relative to the latter type of voter. This transformation will prove useful to show
that the voters’ objective function satisfies Strictly Increasing Differences, as I state in
Lemma 2.
4.2.3 Markov-Perfect Coalitional Equilibrium
The equilibrium concept is a dynamic version of the coalitional equilibrium in Dotti
(2015), that is described in chapter 2. I assume rational expectations on and off
equilibrium. This implies that, given the history up to the the current period, the
expectations are the same for all the voters. I also assume that such expectations only
depend on the state of the economy in that period. Notice that, under this assumption,
the state of the economy at the beginning of period t +1 is fully summarized by the ratio
of elderly to young natives gt+1 = ot+1/nt+1, which is therefore the unique endogenous
state in the dynamic process. Denote with ht = {xs,gs}ts=0 the full history of policy
choices and states observed by all agents up to time t, with ht ∈ Ht . Denote with
x∗∗t+s(gt ,ϕt ,ht−1) the expectation at time t about the equilibrium policy at time t + s given
the state of the economy at time t and the history up to time t − 19, and with
x∗t (gt ,ϕt ,ht−1) the policy actually implemented at time t. I assume that:
x∗∗t+s(gt ,ϕt ,ht−1) = x
∗∗
t+s(gt ,ϕt ,h
′
t−1) (4.15)
for all histories ht−1,h′t−1 ∈ Ht−1 and all s ≥ 0. Moreover, the assumption of rational
expectations implies that x∗∗t+s(gt+s,ϕt+s,ht−1+s) = x∗t+s(gt+s,ϕt+s,ht−1+s) for all s ≥ 0.
These two assumptions imply that the dynamic system satisfies the Markov property.
That is, there is no equilibrium in which different histories correspond to different
equilibrium choices given an identical economic environment. I also assume that
x∗∗t+s(gt+s,ϕt+s,ht−1+s) is twice differentiable with respect to gt+s. This condition will
prove to be satisfied in any Markov-Perfect coalitional equilibrium under appropriate
restrictions (see Lemma 6). Notice that expectations are assumed to be a function of the
state of the economy at time t, which is fully summarized by the state of the economy gt .
Also notice that gt+1 is perfectly known at the end of time t because there is no
9The value of x∗∗t is also a function of the distribution of productivity Q, but this is omitted in the formula.
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uncertainty about the distribution of future productivity10. Given these assumption, I
define a Markov-Perfect coalitional equilibrium as follows.
Definition 1. A Markov-Perfect coalitional equilibrium at time t is:
(i) a partition Pt of the set of voters at time t,
(ii) a policy profile At ,
(iii) a winning policy x∗t , and
(iv) a set of expectations about future policies {x∗∗t+s(gt ,ϕt ,ht−1)}∞s=0 ,
such that:
(a) (Pt ,At ,x∗t ) is a coalitional equilibrium of the voting game given state gt and given
expectations about current and future policies {x∗∗t+s(gt ,ϕt ,ht−1)}∞s=0 ,
(b) expectations are rational, i.e. x∗∗t+s(gt+s,ϕt+s,ht−1+s) = x∗t+s(gt+s,ϕt+s,ht−1+s) for all
i and for all s≥ 0, and
(c) satisfy the Markov Property, i.e. x∗∗t+s(gt ,ϕt ,ht−1) = x∗∗t+s(gt ,ϕt ,h′t−1), for all s≥ 0, all
i and all ϕt ∈Φt .
For ease of notation, I am going to denote a Markov-Perfect coalitional equilibrium with
(Pt ,At ,x∗t {x∗∗t+s}∞s=0;gt), in which I have suppressed the arguments of x∗t and of each x∗∗t+s.
Using this notion of equilibrium, I can state the following Lemma:
Lemma 1. In a Markov-Perfect coalitional equilibrium - if it exists - (i) each individual’s
ideal policy xit and (ii) the equilibrium policy x
∗
t at time t are invariant - conditional on gt
- to the history up to time t−1, i.e. xit(gt ,ϕt ,ht−1) = xit(gt ,ϕ,h′t−1) and x∗t (gt ,ϕt ,ht−1) =
x∗t (gt ,ϕt ,h′t−1) ∀t and ∀ht−1,h′t−1 ∈ Ht−1.
Proof. See Appendix 4.8.1.1.1.
These results imply that the history up to time t − 1 is irrelevant for all aspects of the
model conditional on gt . Thus, from now on I am going to suppress the argument ht−1+s
from the formulas of x∗t+s, x∗∗t+s and xit+s. Summarizing, gt is the unique endogenous state
variable of this dynamic system and a coalitional equilibrium in this model (if it exists) is
a temporary equilibrium that depends only on the value of the state variable gt at time t
and is independent of the previous history conditional on gt . Notice that gt is the ratio of
elderly relative to native individuals of working age, and therefore it represents the crucial
variable in order to determine the identity of the pivotal voter. Lemma 1 allows one to
10 The result is the same if one allows for uncertainty and the size of the population is very large, because
the law of large numbers implies that the identity of the median voter in the next period is known with
probability equal to 1.
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disregard the effects of current policy choices (other than the effects on gt+1) on future
equilibrium outcomes when calculating the optimality conditions for each voter. This
implies that future equilibrium policy outcomes affect the individual objective functions
at time t only through their effects on gt+1. The consequence is that, given expectations
x∗∗t+1(gt ,ϕt), I can write a working age voter’s objective function V
i
t = V (xt ;θ it ,ϕt ,gt) as
follows:
V it =V (xt ;θ
i
t ,ϕt ,gt) = ν(xt ,x
∗∗
t+1(gt ,ϕt);θ
i
t ,ϕt) (4.16)
where x∗∗t+1(gt ,ϕt) represents the expected equilibrium policies at time t + 1 which are a
function solely of gt and ϕt . Similarly, one can define the corresponding objective
functions of young and old voters, V i,yt = V y(Mt ,Yt ;θ it ,ϕt ,gt) and
V i,ot = V o(Mt ,Yt ;θ it ,ϕt ,gt) respectively. Notice that these two objective function implies
that an interior solution for the optimal policy of individual i with a partially open
immigration policy x2t = Mt > 0 may exist even if immigrants “contribute less than what
they take out” in the current period, or more precisely if - at a given policy xt = (Mt ,−Yt)
- a marginal increase in the number of immigrants at constant Yt implies, ceteris paribus,
a rise in the income tax rate τt . This is true because if immigrants have higher fertility
rates in comparison with the natives (σmt > σnt ), then a native individual of working age
will have a future benefit from immigration. Specifically, higher immigration today
implies a lower dependency ratio tomorrow and, as a consequence, a more generous state
pension system. This implies that this model is not affected by the dichotomy between
“skilled migration” and “unskilled migration” in the patterns of attitude towards
immigration and income that is typical of traditional models such as Facchini and Mayda
(2008). In the model proposed in this paper the attitude towards immigration may
improve with income even if the immigrants are a net burden for the society in the short
run, because preferences accounts for the future positive effect of immigration.
Moreover, these future benefits are increasing with income if the Bismarckian
component of the pension system is positive (γ > 0). Using the previously defined V it
function I can state the following result:
Lemma 2. The function V (xt ;θ it ,ϕt ,gt) satisfies SM and SID in (xt ;θ it ) for all θ it ∈ Θt
and all ϕt ∈Φt for any given state gt .
Proof. See Appendix 4.8.1.1.2.
This Lemma is crucial in order to establish existence of a Markov-Perfect coalitional
equilibrium, and therefore to derive all the results in the next section of this paper. The
intuition about how this result can be proved relies on the effect of the Markov
assumption. Recall that the expectations about the policy outcome in any future period
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t + s are assumed to depend uniquely on the state of the economy at the beginning of
such period (gt+s), and that gt+s =
ot+s
nt+s
= lt+sMt+s(σmt+s−σnt+s)+σnt+s . Thus, the only choice at
time t that can affect the value of gt+1 - and therefore all future expectations - is the one
about the immigration policy Mt . As a consequence, conditional on Mt and given
parameters ϕt , the expectations about the policy implemented in the future periods are
unaffected by changes in Yt or θ it . This makes the cross-partial derivatives of V with
respect to each policy dimension xk,t ,x j,t , k 6= j and with respect to xk,t ,θ it for all k
realtively easy to calculate. Thus, the sufficient conditions for SM and SID - that are
based on the sign of such cross derivatives - can be shown to hold.
4.2.3.1 Conditions for a Markov-Perfect Coalitional Equilibrium
Following the static analysis in Dotti (2015), denote with ∧ and ∨ the meet and joint
operators over a lattice (see chapter 2). Recall that (i) θ it ∈ Θt is the parameter that
identifies the preference of a voter i , that (ii) the parameter space Θt is a totally ordered
set, and that (iii) ϕt ∈ Φt is a vector of parameters that do not differ across voters. I state
the conditions for a Markov-Perfect coalitional equilibrium to exist and satisfy some
desirable properties.
1. The policy space Xt must be a subset of the the d-dimensional real space Rd with
typical element xt , such that the partially ordered set (Xt ,≤) is a convex and
complete sublattice of Rd .
2. Each individual i must be endowed with a reflexive, complete and transitive
preference ordering i represented by an objective function V : Xt ×Θt ×Φt → R
that is jointly continuous in xt and θt− concave 11.
3. Individual preferences are such that the function V satisfies, given the state gt :
a) Supermodularity (SM) in xt :
V (x′t ∨ x′′t ;θt ,ϕt ,gt)−V (x′t ;θt ,ϕt ,gt) ≥ V (x′′t ;θt ,ϕt ,gt)−V (x′t ∧ x′′t ;θt ,ϕt ,gt)
for all θt ∈Θt , for all ϕt ∈Φt and for all x′t ,x′′t ∈ Xt .
b) Strictly Increasing Differences (SID) in (xt ,θt):
V (x′t ;θ t ,ϕt ,gt)−V (x′′t ;θ t ,ϕt ,gt) > V (x′t ;θ t ,ϕt ,gt)−V (x′′t ;θ t ,ϕt ,gt) for all
x′t ,x′′t ∈ Xt such that x′t ≥ x′′t and x′t 6= x′′t , for all ϕt ∈Φt and for all θ t ,θ t ∈ Θt
such that θ t > θ t .
11For any function f defined on the convex subset Xt of Rd , we say that f is concave in direction v 6= 0 if,
for all x, the map from the scalar s to f (x+ sv) is concave. (The domain of this map is taken to be the
largest interval such that x+ sv lies in Xt .) We say that f is i− concave if it is concave in direction v for
any v > 0 with vi = 0. See Quah (2007).
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Regarding condition 1, I assume that Xt is the same in all periods. The assumptions on
the policy space stated in section 2.2.5 ensure that this condition is satisfied. Condition 2
simply requires that the objective function satisfies some basic properties. Lastly,
condition 3 is equivalent to stating that all voters can be ordered along a single
preference dimension over a multidimensional choice set. These assumptions on
individual preferences are common in many fields of Economic Theory. Notice that
condition 3 is stated in a very general form, but in the case of a twice differentiable
objective function one can simply adopt the sufficient conditions in Milgrom and
Shannon (1994) in order to verify that the function satisfies SM and SID. Namely, one
needs to check that the following conditions hold. (i) ∂
2V
∂xi,t∂x j,t
≥ 0 ∀xt ∈ Xt , ∀i 6= j, and
(ii) ∂
2V
∂xi,t∂θt
> 0 ∀xt ∈ Xt , ∀θt ∈ Θt , ∀i. These sufficient conditions are usually easier to
verify in comparison with the one implied by the definitions of SM and SID. Because of
that, in the next sections I am going to make frequent use of these sufficient conditions.
4.2.3.2 Monotone Comparative Statics
Denote the set of ideal policies of voter i in period t given state gt (and for a given
expectations {x∗∗t+s(gt ,ϕt)}∞s=0) with It(it) ≡ {xt |xt ∈ argmaxy∈Xt V (y;θ it ,ϕt ,gt)},12, and
define the set of equilibrium policies as the union of all the policies that are winning
policies in some coalitional equilibrium of the game for given expectations
{x∗∗t+s(gt ,ϕt)}∞s=0. Notice that because Θt is a totally ordered set, one can identify a
median element θ vt . The individual characterized by this value of the parameter is the
median voter denoted by the index vt13. In this setting, conditional on gt and given
expectations, the political process at time t is identical to the one of the static model
described in chapter 2. Thus, the results stated in Dotti (2015) hold in the framework
proposed here with minor modifications. Specifically, if the three conditions stated in the
previous section are satisfied, then the following theorems hold for any value of the state
gt .
Theorem 3. (Median Voter Theorem). If conditions 1-2-3 are satisfied, then (i) A Markov-
Perfect coalitional equilibrium of the voting game exists; (ii) in any equilibrium the set
of winning policies is a subset of the set of ideal points of the median voter vt; (iii) if the
median voter has a unique ideal policy, then the set of equilibrium policies is a singleton.
Proof. See Appendix 4.8.1.1.3.
12Notice that the completeness of Xt implies compactness in the order-interval topology. On bounded
sets in Rd , the order-interval topology coincides with the Eucilidean topology (Birkhoff 1967). Hence
It(it) 6=∅ for all i.
13In the case of a discrete even number of voters I assume that the ties are broken in favor of the individual
with the lower index. Different assumptions would not affect the results in the next paragraphs.
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Theorem 4. (Monotone Comparative Statics). If conditions 1-2-3 are satisfied, then
the set of equilibrium policies of the voting game is (i) a sublattice of Xt which is (ii)
monotonic nondecreasing in θ vt .
Proof. See Appendix 4.8.1.1.3.
Lastly, consider a totally ordered subset Φ′ ⊆ Φ and suppose that the objective function
V (xt ,θt ,ϕt) satisfies Increasing Differences (ID) in (xt ,ϕt), namely
V (x′t ,θt ,ϕ t) − V (x′′t ,θt ,ϕ t) ≥ V (x′t ,θt ,ϕt) − V (x′′t ,θt ,ϕt) for all x′t ≥ x′′t , and for all
ϕ t ,ϕt ∈Φ′ such that ϕ t ≥ ϕt . Then I can state the following result:
Theorem 5. (Monotone Comparative Statics 2). If conditions 1-2-3 are satisfied, then the
set of equilibrium policies of the voting game is monotonic nondecreasing in ϕt .
Proof. See Appendix 4.8.1.1.3.
The interpretation of this generalized Median Voter Theorem is identical to the one
provided for the static case in chapter 2. Notice that, while It(vt) depends on voters’
expectations, the identity of the median voter vt is independent of expectations, thus the
median voter is the same in all coalitional equilibria of the voting game. The results in
this sections provide a tool to analyze the effects of a shock on the distribution of voters
or on a preference parameter on the policy outcome that emerges in a political
equilibrium. One only has to verify that an economic model satisfies the conditions
stated in this section and then use Theorems 4-5 to formulate the predictions about the
comparative statics of the platform that is implemented in equilibrium. Following this
approach, I derive the main results of this paper, which are stated in the next section.
4.3 Results
In this section I present the main results of the paper, namely the existence and
characterization of the voting equilibrium, the analytical comparative statics results, the
dynamics of the equilibrium outcome and the simulation of the other long-run
implications of the model. Notice that all the results described in this section - except for
the cases in which the opposite is explicitly stated - are also valid for the extended
version of the model with endogenous public education presented in section 4.3. The
proofs in Appendix A include both the basic model and the extended one (the objects
that refer to the extended model are denoted with a tilda in the proofs).
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4.3.1 Equilibrium Existence and Characterization
Using the results in the previous sections we get that (i) the Policy Space (Xt ,≤) is a
convex and complete sublattice of R2; (ii) the parameter set Θt is a totally ordered set;
(iii) the objective function V (xt ;θ it ,ϕt ,gt) satisfies Supermodularity in xt and the Strictly
Increasing Differences in (xt ;θ it ). Therefore all the conditions for the existence of a
Markov-Perfect coalitional equilibrium are satisfied provided that
V (xt ;θ it ,ϕt ,gt) = ν(xt ,x∗∗t+1(gt ,ϕt);θ
i
t ,ϕt) is such that x∗∗t+1(gt ,ϕt) are rational
expectations and V is concave in x. Moreover, if the objective function of each working
age individual is strictly concave, then - given expectations - the ideal policy of the
median voter is unique. Notice that, because the indirect utility function ν is continuous,
twice differentiable and strictly concave in xt in each period t, and because of the
assumptions on Q and on expectations previously stated, there exists a threshold on σˆ
such that if |σmt −σnt | ≤ σˆ , then V is also continuous and strictly concave in xt . Thus, I
can state the following result.
Lemma 6. If |σmt+s−σnt+s| ≤ σˆ for some σˆ > 0 and all s ≥ 0, then (i) a Markov-Perfect
coalitional equilibrium for the voting game exists. Moreover, (ii) in any Markov-Perfect
coalitional equilibrium at time t the equilibrium policy is the unique ideal point of the
median voter xvt = x
∗
t ∈ It(vt). (iii) The parameter θ vt that identifies the median voter
is weakly decreasing in gt . If σmt −σnt is arbitrarily small, then (iv) there is a unique
equilibrium policy that is chosen in any Markov-Perfect Coalitional Equilibrium in period
t.
Proof. See Appendix 4.8.1.1.4.
Notice that the condition on σmt+s−σnt+s is sufficient but not necessary for results (i), (ii)
and (iii) in Lemma 6. In the rest of the paper, I am going to assume that ν and ϕt are
such that continuity and strict concavity are satisfied for any x∗∗t+1 that implies rational
expectations14. Notice that Lemma 6 does not postulate the uniqueness of the
Markov-Perfect coalitional equilibrium in points (i), (ii), (iii). The reason is that, even if
the equilibrium is unique conditional on gt and on expectations {x∗∗t+s(gt ,ϕt)}∞s=0, there
may be different rational expectations {x∗∗t+s(gt ,ϕt)}∞s=0 that may support different
policies in equilibrium. Neverthless, the comparative statics results in the next sections
are valid in any equilibrium, thus the analysis is not affected by arbitrary equilibrium
selection rules15. Having established existence of an equilibrium and (conditional)
14Notice that the requirement of joint continuity and concavity in xt are necessary for a coalitional
equilibrium, but not for the Citizen-Candidate version of the equilibrium in which individuals only
run as single candidates. Thus, one does not have to impose these two restrictions if such simpler model
of electoral competition is adopted.
15The Markov assumption implies that each function x∗∗t+s(gt ,ϕt) is uniquely affected by gt and ϕt , thus
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uniqueness of the policy outcome, I can use the result of the Monotone Comparative
Statics of the equilibrium outcome in order to study the effects of shocks on the voters’
distribution on the equilibrium policy outcome.
4.3.2 Main Result: Comparative Statics
In this section I analyse the short-run effects of shocks on the parameters that are related
to population ageing on the equilibrium policy outcome. That is, how the equilibrium
policy vector changes as a consequence of a shock - in the period in which the shock is
observed - relative to the equilibrium level in absence of any shock. One has to account
for four aspects: (i) how the direct preferences over policies of each native individual of
working age are affected by the shock (“preference effect”), (ii) how the indirect
preferences change because of the effects of the shocks on the governmental budget
constraint (“budget effect”) and (iii) how the identity of the pivotal voter changes as a
consequence of the changes in the demographic composition of the population induced
by the shock (“political effect”). Lastly, one has to account for the ability of a fully
rational agent to anticipate that if σmt 6= σnt , then the choice of the immigration policy at
time t affects the demographic structure of the voting population in the following periods
and can therefore change the political equilibrium in the future. One may think that
voters are unlikely to really anticipate this (iv) “sophisticated effect”, therefore whenever
this aspect is relevant in this section I will distinguish between the predictions that
emerge with “naive” agents - i.e. if voters expectations do not account for future political
effects of current policies - and the ones implied by fully “sophisticated” agents. The
approach used is the following. First I verify if there is any effects of type (i), (ii) and
(iv). In detail, if V it satisfies the condition of Theorem 5 for a given value of gt , then the
theorem can be used to establish the sign of these effects. Then I study the effects of type
(iii). If gt is affected by the shock, then Lemma 6 (iii) implies a change in the parameter
that identifies the pivotal voter and therefore Theorem 4 can be used to formulate the
predictions. The results about the tax rate τt stated in this section refer to the case in
which immigrants provide, on average, a contribution to public finances sufficient to
ensure that τt is weakly decreasing in Mt . This is true whenever the average cost per
pensioner is sufficiently large, namely if lt−1 p¯t−1 ≥ λt . The results about Mt and Yt are
valid even if the latter condition does not hold.
the comparative statics results are valid in any equilibrium of the game, provided that no changes in the
functions x∗∗t+s(gt ,ϕt) occur.
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4.3.2.1 Unanticipated Rise in the Longevity of the Retired Population
I analyse the effects of a marginal increase in lt−1 keeping other parameters constant.
That is, the longevity of the current elderly increases, keeping the longevity of other
generations and birth rates unchanged. Recall that xt = (Mt ,−Yt). For effects of type (i)-
(ii)-(iv) one can verify that V it satisfies Increasing Differences (ID) by studying the cross
derivatives of V i,yt with respect to each policy dimension and lt−1. Denote with V
i,y
Mt (V
i,y
Yt )
the partial derivative of V i,yt with respect to the policy dimension Mt (Yt) and with V
i,y
Mt lt−1
(V i,yYt lt−1) the cross derivative of V
i,y
t with respect to Mt (Yt) and a parameter lt−1. In this
case one gets:
V i,yMt lt−1 =
θ it (α+ γ)
(1− M̂t)
≥ 0 (4.17)
V i,yYt lt−1 = 0 (4.18)
Consider a vector of parameters ϕ˜t ∈ Φt . Define a subset Φ j,t ⊆ Φt as follows: Φ j,t :=
{ϕt ∈ Φt |ϕt,k = ϕ˜t,k∀k 6= j}, where j is the position of the longevity of the elderly lt−1
at time t in vector ϕt . Notice that Φ j is a totally ordered set. Moreover, the signs of the
cross derivatives imply that V (xt ;θ vt ,ϕt ,gt) satisfies SM and ID in (xt ;ϕt), it also satisfies
SM and SID in (zt ;ϕt) where zt = (x1t ,−x2t). The conditions of Theorem 5 are satisfied,
therefore at constant gt the effect is a weak rise in Mt and no changes in Yt . Moreover, V
i,y
Mt
is solely affected through the budget constraint hence the effect is of type (ii) (“budget
effect”). For effects of type (iii) notice that gt =
lt−1
σ¯ t−1 is increasing in lt−1. Lemma 6 (iii)
implies that θ vt is decreasing in gt . Hence Theorem 4 implies a weak increase in the public
spending variable Yt and a weakly more restrictive immigration policy Mt . The total effect
of an increase in lt−1 is therefore weakly positive on the public spending variables Yt and
ambiguous on the immigration policy Mt . There are cases in which one effects dominates
and therefore the comparative statics result for the immigration policy is also sharp. In
particular, I can state the following results:
Theorem 7. The effect of an increase in the life expectancy lt−1 is weakly positive on the
spending policy and ambiguous on the immigration policy. Moreover, there exists a
threshold gˆt ∈ [0,1] such that if gt ≥ gˆt then the effect on immigration policy is
unambiguously (weakly) negative and the effect on the tax rate is strictly positive.
Proof. See Appendix 4.8.1.2.1.
In order to get an intuition of what drives this results, consider the following cases. If
gt = 1 (i.e. there are as many working age individuals as elderly), then the pivotal voter
113
Chapter 4 The Political Economy of Immigration and Population Ageing
has θ vt = 0, which implies that V
v,y
Mt lt−1 = 0. Thus, there is no “budget effect” and the
“political effect” weakly dominates. On the other hand, consider the case in which the
variance of the income distribution is arbitrarily close to zero (e.g. yit = yt for all i). In this
case, as long as gt 6= 1, the θ vt of the pivotal voter is unaffected by changes in the share
of elderly, which implies that the “political effect” is zero and that the “budget effect”
weakly dominates. Theorem 7 is a consequence of the negative relationship between age
and attitude towards immigration and the positive one between age and attitude towards
public spending implied by the the model. This result suggests the existence of a link
between the size of the two effects and two characteristics on the voting population: the
share of elderly and the degree of income inequality. Moreover, it implies that the sign
of the effect of an increase in longevity on the equilibrium level of the immigration quota
is the one implied by the Tax Adjustment Model if the share of elderly is large enough
and there is sufficient income inequality, and the one implied by the Benefit Adjustment
Model in societies characterized by opposite features (see section 1.3).
4.3.2.2 Unanticipated Fall in the Natural Growth Rate of the Woking Age
Population
The natural growth rate of the native population is ntnt−1+mt−1 −1= σ¯t−1−1. In this model
the effect of an unanticipated fall in such rate has same sign as the one of a decrease in
the lagged birth rate of the natives σnt−1. This is true because one can show that σ¯t−1 =
σmt−1Mt−1+σ
n
t−1(1−Mt−1), which implies that σ¯t−1 is predetermined at time t. This kind
of shock corresponds for instance to the case in which the birth rate actually experienced
during the period t− 1 is smaller than the one expected at the beginning of that period.
Therefore I analyse the effects of a shock on σnt−1. I can state the following:
Theorem 8. The effect of a decrease in the growth rate of the working age population is a
weak decrease in the openness of the immigration policy and a weak increase in spending
in the imperfect Public Good and in the tax rate.
Proof. See Appendix 4.8.1.2.2.
Notice that conditional on gt the shock has no effect on the equilibrium policy outcome
(i.e. there are no effects of type (i), (ii), (iv)). The reason is that the pension system adjusts
its size to changes in the birth rate for the reasons described in section 2. Nevertheless a
fall in σnt−1 implies a rise in gt , which corresponds to a “political effect”. Using Theorem
4 one gets the result stated above.
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4.3.2.3 Rise in Life Expectancy of the Working Age Population
I analyse the effects of a shock on the life expectancy of the current working age
population lt , keeping all the other elements of vector ϕt unchanged. First of all notice
that gt is unaffected by changes in lt , which means that there is no “political effect”. The
results of this paragraph are summarized in Theorem 9.
Theorem 9. The effect of an increase in the life expectancy lt is ambiguous on the
immigration policy. If voters are “naive” then the effect is weakly positive. If the birth
rate of the native is the same as the one of the immigrants, then there is no effect.
Proof. See Appendix 4.8.1.2.3.
In order to understand this result it is useful to analyze the cross derivative of V i,yt with
respect to the immigration policy Mt and the parameter lt .
V i,yMt lt =
β (α+ γθ it )
(1− M̂t+1)
(σmt −σnt )︸ ︷︷ ︸
pre f erences e f f ect
+
− d
dlt
{
β l2t
σ¯t2
[
d′(Y ∗∗t+1)
dY ∗∗t+1
dθ vt+1
− cˆ′(M∗∗t+1)
dM∗∗t+1
dθ vt+1
]
dθ vt+1
dgt+1
(σmt −σnt )
}
︸ ︷︷ ︸
sophisticated e f f ect
(4.19)
First of all, notice that if σmt = σnt , then the cross derivatives are equal to zero and gt+1 is
unaffected by changes in lt , therefore a shock on lt has no effects on the equilibrium
outcome. If σmt ≥ σnt the sign of V i,yMt lt is ambiguous. The reason is that two different
effects enter the formula. On one hand a rise in the life expectancy makes consumption
after retirement more attractive. This increases the desirability of better future pensions
and therefore implies a more favorable attitude towards immigration (“preferences
effect”). On the other hand more immigration today reduces the value of gt+1. This
changes the expected equilibrium policy in the next period in a way that harms a retired
individual (“sophisticated effect”). In particular, a decrease in gt+1 causes a weak rise in
M∗∗t+1 and a weak fall in Y
∗∗
t+1, because of the future political effect. Which of the two
effects dominates depends on many aspects, including the income distribution at time
t +1 and the values of gt and gt+1. In particular notice that if the variance of the income
distribution of the working age population tends to zero, then
dθ vt+1
dgt+1
= 0 and therefore the
“preferences effect” dominates. Finally, if agents are “naive” then there is no
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“sophisticated effect” and therefore an increase in lt has a weakly positive effect on the
openness of the immigration policy.
4.3.2.4 Fall in the Birth Rate of the Native Population
I analyse the effects of a fall in σnt keeping all other parameters constant. The results are
summarized in the following theorem.
Theorem 10. The effect of a decrease in the birth rate of the native population σnt is
ambiguous on the immigration policy and on the tax rate. If voters are “naive”, then the
effect is weakly positive on the immigration policy and weakly negative on the tax rate.
Proof. See Appendix 4.8.1.2.4.
Similarly to the previous case, the presence of a “sophisticated effect” and of a
“preferences effect” that can have opposite sign implies that the sign of the comparative
statics is ambiguous. If voters are “naive”, then the preferences effect implies a weakly
less restrictive immigration policy Mt . Moreover, if the immigrants are net contributors
to the fiscal system, this also implies a weak fall in the tax rate τt . The intuition is that a
fall in the birth rate of the natives implies a stronger positive impact of immigration of
future pensions and no fiscal effects in the short run. Theorem 10 implies that a fall in
the birth rate can have positive effects on public finances and cause a fall in the tax rate
because of an increasingly liberal immigration policy in the short run. If this result may
seem paradoxical, section 3.4 clarifies that this effect is true only in the current period,
while in the long run a fall in the birth rate may have strong negative effects on public
finances and tax rates.
4.3.2.5 Shocks to the Income Distribution of the Working Age Population
Given the state gt , a shock on the income distribution of the working age population
affects the equilibrium outcome if and only if it implies a change in the pivotal voter θ vt .
If this is the case, it represents a shock of type (iii), if it is not, it has no effects. For
instance, a shock that results in a median preserving spread of the distribution of θt does
not imply any change in the identity of the median voter and therefore it does not affect
the policy outcome. Thus, I can state the following result.
Theorem 11. An increase in the median to mean income ratio implies in equilibrium (i)
a weak increase in the openness of the immigration policy Mt and (ii) a weak decrease in
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the public spending in the imperfect Public Good Yt . Moreover, (iii) if the immigrants are
net contributors to the fiscal system then it also implies a weak fall in the tax rate τt .
Proof. Results (i), (ii), follows directly from Theorem 4. Result (iii) follows directly from
the governmental budget constraint and results (i), (ii). Q.E.D.
Corollary 12. The equilibrium levels of Yt and Mt respond in opposite directions to shocks
to the voters’ distribution.
Proof. Straightforward from Theorem 11.
Notice that this result implies a positive correlation between the tightness of the
immigration policy and the spending on the imperfect public good. This suggests that the
concerns about the relationship between an open immigration policy and cuts to public
benefits, which are documented in all attitudinal studies, may have some ground in the
observed policy outcomes even if immigrants are net contributors to the tax system.
4.3.3 Steady-State Equilibrium
I define a long-run equilibrium of the overlapping generation model as a sequence of
Markov-Perfect coalitional equilibria from time t onwards. Within this class, I define a
steady-state as follows.
Definition 2. A steady-state at time t is a sequence of Markov-Perfect coalitional
equilibria
{
(Pt+s,At+s,x∗t+r,{x∗∗t+s+r}∞r=0;gt+s)
}∞
s=0 such that, in each time t + s, and in
absence of shocks on the parameters ϕt+s, (i) the policy platform implemented in
equilibrium is the same in each period t + s, i.e. x∗t+s = x∗∗t+s = xss for all s ≥ 0, and (ii)
the state of the economy is constant gt+s = gss for all s≥ 0.
In the definition above, the superscript ss denote the steady-state value of a state or a
control variable. In other words, in a steady state the equilibrium policy and the natural
growth rate of the population are constant over time. Recall that g is the only state that
evolves endogenously in the dynamic system and that at a Markov-Perfect coalitional
equilibrium in each period t + s - conditional on gt+s and on expectations {x∗∗t+s+r}∞r=0 -
the equilibrium policy x∗t may not be unique. Neverthless, if the conditions of Lemma 6
are satisfied, then the set of equilibrium policies is a singleton, and in order to show that
the economy is at a steady state one has to show that gs = gss for all s > t. Conditional
uniqueness also implies that if gt+s = gt+s+1 in period t + s and if the parameters are
such that (lt+s,σmt+s,σmt+s) = (l,σm,σm) for all s > 1, i.e. ϕt+s = ϕ for all s > 1, then
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gt+s = gt = gss for all s > t. In such case, if gt+1 = gt+2, then the economy is at a steady
state.
Lemma 13. If there exists a Markov-Perfect Coalitional Equilibrium in each period t+ s,
for all s ≥ 0, then (i) an equilibrium for the OLG model at time t exists . Moreover, if
ϕt+s = ϕ for all s > 0, then (ii) there is an equilibrium that always converges to a steady-
state. Lastly, if σmt = σnt = σt , then (iii) the political equilibrium at time t is independent
of the previous political choices and the economy converges immediately to the steady
state after a shock.
Proof. See Appendix 4.8.1.2.5.
Notice that this statement does not necessarily imply that the steady state is unique, except
for case (iii).
4.3.4 Dynamics
The analysis of the dynamics of the OLG model is a complex exercise because of the
number of different short-run effects described in the previous sections. There are
anyways interesting results that can be stated about the long-run effects of shocks in this
framework. In particular, I present two analytical results: (i) the long-run effects of an
unanticipated permanent shock on the longevity of the elderly lt−1 and/or on the natural
growth rate of the native population σ¯t−1 on the sequence of political equilibria from the
period after the shock until the economy converges to a new steady state (keeping other
parameters constant); (ii) the long-run effects of an unanticipated permanent shock in the
life expectancy (lt) and/or on the expected birth rate of the native population (σnt ) in the
case in which immigration does not cause changes in the age profile of the society (i.e.
σmt − σnt ≤ η for arbitrarily small η). For the other cases which I cannot address
analytically I propose a simulation in section 3.5 which show that the results are not
qualitatively different from the one presented in the following paragraphs.
4.3.4.1 Long-Run Effects of a Permanent Shock on the Longevity of the
Retired Population and on the Natural Growth Rate of the Working
Age Population
The sign of the long-run effects of a positive shock on the longevity lt−1 or on the natural
growth rate of working age population σ¯t−1−1 at time t depend on the ambiguous short-
run effects on the immigration policy stated in Theorems 7-8. In order to address the
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effects at period t + 1 and the following ones it is sufficient to notice that, given that
the shock is permanent (i.e. lt+s = lt or σnt+s = σnt for all s ≥ 0), the collective choice
problem at time t+1 is identical to the one at time t except for the value of g. Thus, there
is an equilibrium in which expectations are time-independent. In such equilibrium, all the
changes in the policy choices at time t+1 must be due to the evolution of the endogenous
state gt+1. The results in Lemmas 7b-8b apply to this class of equilibrium. In particular
notice that gt+1 is strictly decreasing in Mt , and therefore if Mt ≥Mt−1 (Mt ≤Mt−1) then
gt+1 ≤ gt (gt+1 ≥ gt). Lemma 6 (iii) ensures that the parameter that identifies the pivotal
voter changes accordingly θ vt+1 ≥ θ vt (θ vt+1 ≤ θ vt ). Therefore I can state the following
results.
Theorem 7b. The long-run effect of an increase in lt−1 on the immigration policy has
same sign as the short-run effect and a weakly larger magnitude. If gt ≥ gˆt then the effect
on immigration policy is (weakly) negative and the effect on the public spending and the
tax rate is strictly positive.
Proof. See Appendix 4.8.1.2.5.
Similarly one can analyse the long-run effects of a fall in the natural growth rate of the
native population of working age (or equivalently of σnt−1, see section 3.2.2). The result
is the following.
Theorem 8b. The long-run effect of a decrease in the natural growth rate of the native
population is a weak decrease in the openness of the immigration policy and a weak
increase in spending in the imperfect Public Good and in the tax rate. All the effects have
weakly larger magnitude relative to the short-run effects.
Proof. See Appendix 4.8.1.2.5.
These results imply that the effects of population ageing are persistent and tend to increase
in magnitude in the periods after the shock. The reason is that - if immigrants have higher
fertility rate relative to the natives - then a change in the size of the immigration flow
affects the distribution of voters in the following periods. In particular, a more restrictive
immigration policy in the current period implies further population ageing in the future
and therefore an increase in magnitude of the initial effects.
4.3.4.2 Long-Run Effects of a Permanent Rise in Life Expectancy
I analyse the long run effects of changes in lt . This shock generates a number of effects
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that affect the temporary equilibrium as described in the previous sections. Moreover, the
specific path of policies depends on the timing of the different shocks (for instance shocks
on lt and lt−1 may occur simultaneously). I study the case in which σmt is arbitrarily close
to σnt and the shock is permanent, i.e. lt+s is equal to the new value of lt for all s > t.
This case is simple to analyze because the long run effects at time t and t + 1 after the
shock correspond, respectively, to the temporary effects of a rise in lt and lt−1 described
in the previous sections. Moreover, given that σmt+s−σnt+s is arbitrarily small, then the
“preference effect” and the “sophisticated effect” can be disregarded and the economy
converges to the new steady state one period after the shock16. Under the proposed
restrictions I can state a sharper result:
Theorem 14. The long-run effects of an increase in the life expectancy is a weak rise
in public spending and, if gt ≥ gˆt , a weak decrease in the openness of the immigration
policy.
Proof. In the case of σmt − σnt ≤ η the sign of the long-run effect corresponds to the
short-run effect of an increase in lt−1. Q.E.D.
4.3.4.3 Long-Run Effects of a Permanent Fall in the Birth Rate of the
Natives
I study the long-run effects of a marginal fall in σnt , in the case in which σmt − σnt is
arbitrarily small and the shock is permanent, i.e. the rise of σnt implies that σnt+s will be
equal to the new value of σnt for all s > t.
Theorem 15. The long-run effects of a marginal decrease in the birth rate of the native
population is a weak rise in public spending. The effect on the openness of the
immigration policy is ambiguous at time t and weakly negative in the following periods.
If voters are “naive” the effect on the openness of the immigration policy is weakly
positive at time t and weakly negative in the following periods.
Proof. In the case of σmt −σnt ≤ η the long-run effect corresponds to the short-run effect
of an decrease in σt followed by a decrease in σt−1. Q.E.D.
The results in this section suggest that if immigrants are not too different from the natives
in terms of fertility rates, then the long run effects of population ageing follow the patterns
of the corresponding short-run effects.
16Notice that under such restriction, the Markov-Perfect coalitional equilibrium is unique in every period
(see Lemma 6), hence - in contrast with the previous paragraph - there is no need to select a class of
equilibria.
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4.3.5 Simulation
Some interesting cases cannot be fully described analytically, in particular the long-run
effects of permanent shocks to the parameters in the case in which the birth rate of
immigrant is different from the one of the natives. In order to study these cases I run a
simulation of the model whose results are extensively presented in the supplementary
material of this paper. This exercise shows that the effects due to the sophistication of
voters may be substantial in terms of levels of the equilibrium policy, but they do not
generally imply qualitatively different predictions about the shape of the curves
describing the policy response to shocks on the parameters. I find that for several
different parametrizations - if the difference in the birth rate of immigrants and natives
(σmt −σnt ) is not too large17 - then the predictions of Theorems 14 and 15 are valid even
if voters are “sophisticated” (Figures 4.7-4.8) . Figures 4.9 A and 4.9 B show the
response of the immigration policy Mt and of the spending policy Yt to a permanent rise
in the life expectancy of the retired population, both for the case of “naive” voters
(dashed lines) and of sophisticated voters (solid lines). Although the shape of the two
lines is very similar, the equilibrium level is different. Sophisticated individuals fully
internalize the effect of current immigration on the composition of the society in the
following period. In particular, they anticipate that more immigration in the current
period would imply a higher share of young individuals in the next period, and therefore
an equilibrium policy that is less favorable to them when they will be retired. Therefore
the equilibrium with “sophisticated” voters features a more restrictive immigration
policy and a higher public spending in comparison with the case of “naive” voters.
The simulation exercise can also help to understand the factors that determine the speed
of convergence to the steady state after a shock. The crucial aspect is that the speed is
decreasing in the size of the “sophisticated effect”, specifically in the value of σmt −σnt .
Figures 4.10 A and 4.10 B show the path of convergence of the immigration policy Mt
after a positive (solid line) and a negative (dashed line) shock on the endogenous state
gt , in the case of high difference (4.10 A, σmt − σnt = 1) and low difference (4.10 B,
σmt −σnt = 0.2) in the birth rates of immigrants and natives. This exercise suggests that
the key results in the previous sections still apply even to the cases in which the long run
effects of shocks in the model cannot be characterized analytically. Thus, I can conclude
that - in a society characterized by a very large share of retired individuals - population
ageing leads to a policy that is closer to the needs of the elderly. In particular, high public
spending and increasingly restrictive immigration policies are going to be implemented.
These policy changes imply an increasing tax burden on the individuals of working age
and may affect the fiscal sustainability of public spending in the long run.
17For large value of σmt −σnt the steady-state may not be unique and a shock may cause a transition to a
different equilibrium path. Moreover, the conditions in Lemma 6 may not be satisfied.
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4.4 Extensions
In this section I propose three extensions in which I introduce alternative forms of public
intervention in social spending and a different legal status of the immigrants. I describe
if and how the equilibrium political choices differ from the one presented in section 3.
Specifically, I analyse the implication of the model if (i) the pension system is partially
funded, if (ii) immigrants do not acquire voting rights and if (iii) the government provides
public education. On one hand the main comparative statics results of this paper remain
generally valid. On the other hand these exercises deliver some understanding of how
different rules in the public sector may affect the attitude towards immigration of the
voting population. Lastly, in section 4.4, I describe (iv) an extension of the model in
which the labour market is segmented. In particular, I study the case in which the elderly
demand specific services, such as home care, and only immigrants possess the skills to
provide such services. In this case the results may differ substantially from the ones of
the baseline model.
4.4.1 Partially Funded Pension System
The assumption of a pure Pay-As-You-Go pension system is a very stylized description
of how the social security for the elderly is organized in most developed countries. In
particular partially funded pension schemes are becoming increasingly common. There
is empirical evidence of an increasing size of the funded part of the pension relative to
the “state pension” in European countries (Galasso and Profeta, 2004). The theoretical
analysis proposed by Rangel and Zeckhauser (2001) suggests that this phenomenon may
also be related to the increase in the number of elderly relative to the working age
population. In the model proposed in this paper I did not explicitly account for savings.
One simple possibility is to model the funded part of the pension system as a form of
compulsory savings. Under this assumption each individual has to save an amount
ψ(ρ)s(yit) when young and she will receive (1+ r)ψ(α + γ)s(yit) when retired, where r
is the exogenous interest rate and ψ is a strictly decreasing function. The total pension
received by i at time t+1 becomes:
pit =
(
α+ γ
yit
y¯t
)
σ¯t
(1− M̂t+1)
+(1+ r)ψ(α+ γ)s(yit) (4.20)
This formulation implies that if the state-pension component falls (e.g. if γ decreases)
then the funded pension part rises. Notice that - because the utility function is linear in
consumption - the size of the compulsory saving does not affect voter preferences over
policies. Thus, the effect of a marginal transition towards a fully funded pension system
simply corresponds to the effect of a fall in the Beveridgean part of the state pension α or
of a fall in the Bismarckian part γ (or both). Hence I can state the following result:
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Theorem 16. The effect of a marginal decrease in the size of the public pension system
in the short run is an increase in the restrictiveness of the immigration policy. In the
long run, the effect is an increase in restrictions to immigration and an increase in public
spending in the imperfect Public Good. The total effect on the tax rate is ambiguous.
Proof. See Appendix 4.8.2.1.
The intuition that underpins this result is simple. If the share of the Pay-As-You-Go
component of the pension system decreases in favor of a fully funded scheme, then the
fiscal gains from immigration for a worker decrease because the total size of public
pension expenditures to be shared among the working age population is smaller.
Moreover, the future gains from immigration also decrease, because public finance
aspects have a lower impact on the overall pension enjoyed by a retired individual.
Therefore all voters become more averse to immigration and ask for a more restrictive
policy. In the long run, if the immigrants have higher fertility rates relative to the natives,
this political choice causes an increase in the share of elderly individuals, with
consequences that are similar to the ones described in section 3.4.1 for the case of
increasing life expectancy. Namely, a further tightening in the immigration policy and an
increase in the endogenous part of public spending prevail in equilibrium. An important
aspect of this analysis is that if the size of the state pension system becomes too small
(e.g. small α + γ) then the total gains from immigration for a working age individuals
may become negative, which implies an equilibrium in which the most restrictive
immigration policy is implemented.
4.4.2 Voting Rights: Ius Soli vs. Ius Sanguinis
In the previous sections I have assumed that the children of immigrants that are born in
the guesting country are awarded the voting right when they become adults (Ius Soli).
Moreover, in the model voting rights can be also acquired after a sufficiently long period
of legal residency. These assumptions are consistent with the legal procedures to obtain
citizenship - and consequently voting rights - in several countries such as the US, Canada
and France. In many other countries - such as the UK, Japan, Germany and Italy - the legal
requirements are often quite different and they do not typically imply an automatic award
of the citizenship based of the place of birth only. The most common case is that at least
one of the parents must possess the citizenship in order for the children to obtain the same
status (Ius Sanguinis). It is out of the scope of this paper to formulate assumptions that
precisely describe the law of different countries. Nevertheless, in order to understand the
possible effects of different legal requirements, it is useful to analyze the consequences of
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the opposite assumption in comparison with the one in section 3.2 of this paper. Namely,
in this section I assume a pure form of Ius Sanguinis, in which neither the immigrants
nor their children ever obtain the nationality. This assumption is clearly extreme and only
serves as a term of comparison.
The main implications of the model stated in Theorems 7-8 are unaffected by this
modification, except for one aspect. Specifically, immigrants and their children do not
become members of the voting population at any point in time. Therefore the choice of
the immigration policy does not affect the future composition of the voting population.
This implies that there is no “sophisticated effect” in this case, and therefore some of the
results in section 4 are sharper. Namely for any σnt , σmt such that σmt ≥ σnt one gets:
Theorem 17. (i) the short-run effect of a rise in lt in unambiguously (weakly) positive
on the immigration policy Mt and weakly negative on the tax rate τt; the long-run effects
of (ii) an increase in the life expectancy and of (iii) a decrease in the birth rate of the
native population is a weak rise in public spending and, if gt ≥ gˆ, a weak increase in
the openness of the immigration policy at time t followed by a weak fall in the following
periods.
Proof. The relevant variable for determining the pivotal voter is in this case g˜t =
lt−1n˜t−1
n˜t
=
lt−1
σnt−1
where n˜t−1 ≤ nt−1 is the number of young individuals that possess voting rights at
time t−1 and it is smaller than or equal to the number of individuals that are born in the
country. Notice that g˜t is independent of Mt−1. The rest of the analysis is unaffected.
All the proofs are identical to the ones for Theorems 9-10 except that no “sophisticated
effect” occurs.
Theorem 17 suggests that the analytical predictions of the model are not strongly affected
by the cross-country differences in the law that regulates the acquisition of the citizenship,
and that - on the contrary - some results tend to become sharper and less sensitive to
changes in parameter values if an extreme version of the Ius Sanguinis is assumed.
4.4.3 Endogenous Public Education
I analyse an extension of the model in which the income of an individual depends not only
on the wage rate and on her productivity, but also on the amount of education she received
when she was a child. I assume that education is uniformly provided by the government
and has decreasing returns given by the strictly concave function f . Individual fertility of
natives is given in this alternative setting by the random variable kit , that is i.i.d. and with
E[kit ] = σnt . I get that the income of an individual i at time t can be written as follows:
yit = f (et−1)wtε
i
t (4.21)
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and the total supply of effective labour at time t becomes Lt = f (et−1)ε¯t(nt +mt). The
budget constraint accounts for the public spending in education, such that the formula for
the tax rate on labour income becomes:
τt = τ(et ,Mt ,Yt , y¯t) = y¯t−1
[
σ¯tet +λtMt +(α+ γ)lt−1
(1−Mt)
(1− M̂t)
+Yt
]
(4.22)
Moreover, I assume that working age individuals (retired individuals) care about the
utility of their children (grandchildren) such that the utility function of an individual of
generation a can be written as follows:
U˜ i,at =U
i,a
t
({
Cis,Ms,Ys
}t+1
s=t
)
+δ aE
[
kitU
j,y
t
({
C js ,Ms,Ys
}t+2
s=t+1
)]
(4.23)
Lastly, I assume that the number of voters is large, such that the uncertainty about the
size of the future generation does not affect the result. Notice that given the assumptions
about kit the preferences shown above can also represent individuals that care about the
next generation rather than about their children and grandchildren. The structure of the
overlapping generations model in the same as in the baseline model, except for the
presence of an additional endogenous state et−1 which affects the average income at time
t. A coalitional equilibrium exists under the assumptions stated in Lemma 6 and most
results of this augmented model about the comparative statics of shock on life
expectancy are the same as the ones described in the previous section. (See Appendix
A.2). The interesting aspect of this analysis is the counterintuitive effect of population
ageing on public investment in education (per child). Such effects are stated in the
following theorem.
Theorem 18. The effects of an increase in the longevity of the retired population lt−1 and
/or of a decrease in the growth rate of native population σnt−1 is a weak increase in the
public spending in education per child et .
Proof. See Appendix 4.8.2.1.
The intuition that underpins this result is that if an elderly individual cares about her
grandchildren (i.e. δ o > 0), then she will always support any policy that increases the
spending in education through a rise in the taxes on the working age population, because
she is not affected by this rise in the tax rate. The consequence of Theorem 18 is that the
next generation may enjoy a better education and a higher pre-tax income as a
consequence of population ageing. Notice that the overall welfare effect of the policy
adjustment is not necessarily positive for these individuals. The negative side for future
generations may come from the results in Theorems 7 and 8, which hold also in the
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augmented model (see Appendix A). In particular, in period t a more restrictive
immigration policy is implemented. Thus, the future generations may have to face a
society with a larger share of elderly which implies, ceteris paribus, higher tax rates on
labour income and more public spending. Such policy can be harmful for the most
productive individuals of the next generation. The second result is the following.
Theorem 19. If voters are “naive” and lt p
v
t+1
et
≥ θ vtβ , then the effects of a decrease in the
birth rate of the native population σnt is a weak fall in the public spending in education
per child et and a weak increase in the openness of the immigration policy. Otherwise
both effects have an ambiguous sign.
Proof. See Appendix 4.8.1.2.4.
Theorem 19 suggests that the cost of public education may play a role in shaping the
effects of shocks on fertility rates on the immigration policy. On one hand immigration
tends to reduce the pressure of the pensions system on public finances, on the other hand
it causes an increase in the total costs of public education. If the latter effect is
sufficiently strong, the predictions are going to be different from the one implied by the
baseline model. This is particularly relevant if one considers that several countries are
implementing reforms in order to reduce the Pay-As-You-Go share of the pensions
received by the elderly in favor of a fully funded system (see section 4.1). Nevertheless,
the public expenditures for the elderly represents a large share of the governmental
budget in most western countries and, more importantly, they consistently exceed the
ones on education and childcare (OECD 2015, 2015b). Notice that the assumption
lt pvt+1
et
≥ θ vtβ is satisfied if β is close to 1 and the median cost of a pensioner is weakly
larger than the cost of educating a child. Thus, OECD data suggest that such an
assumption is consistent with the facts about public spending in most OECD countries.
4.4.4 Services for the Elderly (“Elderly Goods”)
In this section I present the results of an extension of the model in which the labour
market is segmented. In particular, I study the case in which immigrants possess the
skills to provide those services that are needed only by the elderly, such as home care,
while the natives workers do not. This may be the case if immigrants are selected by the
firms in the receiving country on the basis of their qualifications and previous work
experience. In the next line I describe informally the characteristics that differentiate this
setting from the baseline model. A detailed description of the economic environment is
provided in Appendix B.2. Suppose that the elderly consume a different private good
denoted by Ot . This good is produced with the same technology as the consumption
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good Ct and the imperfect public good Yt , but only the immigrant workers are capable of
producing it. Immigrants can also be employed in the production of the other goods. For
simplicity I assume that there is no difference in the average tax payments of immigrants
and natives, i.e. λt = 0, that the default immigration is M̂t = 0 and I analyse the case in
which σmt − σnt is arbitrarily small. There are two possibilities. If at the equilibrium
there are enough immigrant workers to satisfy the demand for “elderly goods” at a
sufficiently low price, then the segmentation of the labour market is irrelevant and the
results are identical to the baseline model. The perfect substitutability in production and
the perfect competition ensure that all prices are are unaffected by immigration choices.
The implications change dramatically if in the proximity of an equilibrium there are not
enough immigrant workers to satisfy the demand for the “elderly good” at the constant
price18. I can state the following result.
Theorem 20. If gt ≤ 1 then at the equilibrium, if it exists, the immigration policy is
Mt = 0, else a positive level of immigration is possible.
Proof. Appendix 4.8.2.2.
This result implies that, as long as the majority of voters is of working age, the society
always chooses the most restrictive immigration policy. Moreover, a shock on the
longevity or the fertility of the native population does not affect the immigration policy
in equilibrium. The channel that underpins this result is the effect of immigration on
equilibrium prices. Specifically, immigrants are endogenously hired in the sector that
produces the “elderly good” Ot , but they consume only the other two goods Ct and Yt . As
a result, immigration in equilibrium implies a rise in the relative prices faced by the
young natives, offsetting the fiscal benefits generated by immigrants and making
working age voters extremely hostile to immigration. The conclusion one can derive
from this section is that some implications of the analysis presented in section 3 of this
paper are true for this extended case only if in the proximity of the equilibrium the
immigration policy is not too restrictive. If the number of immigrants is too low to
satisfy the demand of services for the elderly, then some predictions in section 3 of the
paper are no longer valid. The result in this case is somewhat paradoxical: a society that
is in great need of immigrants to satisfy the demand of services for the elderly tend to be
very averse to any positive level of immigration of specialized workers. Additional
details and results about this extension of the model are available in the supplementary
online material.
18Notice that multiplicity of equilibria is possible in this case.
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4.5 Welfare Analysis
In the previous section I have proved that a rise in the longevity or a fall in the birth rate of
the native population generates a political pressure towards more restrictive immigration
policy. This does not necessarily imply that this change is desirable on the point of view
of the society as a whole. In this section I present a welfare analysis which shows that, if a
society has certain demographic characteristics, a marginal increase in the restrictions to
immigration is unambiguously harmful for the society. I define a measure of the wellbeing
of the society in the form of a Social Welfare Function (SWF). The idea that is exploited in
this section is the following. If at an equilibrium policy the marginal effect of an increase
in a policy dimension x j,t on the SWF is greater than than the one of the median voter (and
at the equilibrium x∗j,t < x¯ j,t), then there exists a policy with x′j,t > x∗j,t which is welfare
improving. This implies in turn that if, as a consequence of a shock, a certain policy
dimension j is such that x∗j,t−1 > x
∗
j,t , then x j,t has moved in the “wrong direction” on a
social welfare point of view and that the society would benefit, ceteris paribus, from a
marginal change in the direction of x∗j,t−1. In other words, the society is harmed by the
change in policy at the margin. Consider a SWF that is a weighted average of the utility
of each individuals of the working age generation (y), of the retired generation (o) at time
t and the expected future utility of the children (ch), where µat (θ is) represents the Pareto
weight assigned to an individual i of generation a at time t. Notice that I am not ruling
out either the possibility that the SWF attributes zero weight to the immigrants or the
possibility that some or all the immigrants have positive weight19. The SWF has form:
SWF(xt , ;ϕt ,gt) =
´ θ¯t
0 µ
y
t (θ it )V y(xt ;θ it ,ϕt ,gt)q(θ it )dθ it+
+
´ θ¯t−1
0 µ
o
t (θ it−1)V
o(xt ;θ it−1,ϕt ,gt)q(θ
i
t−1)dθ
i
t−1+
+
´ θ¯t+1
0 µ
y
t+1(θ
i
t+1)Et
[
V y(x∗∗t+1;θ it+1,ϕt+1,gt+1)
]
q(θ it+1)dθ
i
t+1
(4.24)
Most welfare implications of this analysis depend on the Pareto weights assigned to each
individual in the SWF. For instance, some results that can be obtained using a specific
SWF (e.g. Utilitarian or Rawlsian) are presented in the supplementary material.
Nevertheless an interesting general result can be stated under relative weak restrictions
on the SWF. Specifically, I analyse the welfare effects of changes in the immigration
policy keeping the other policy dimension constant at the equilibrium level. This
analysis is also consistent with the extended model presented in section 4.3.
19One has to specify the objective function of an immigrant in this case.
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4.5.1 Welfare Effects of a Marginal Opening in the Immigration
Policy
Assume that c′(Mt) < ∞ for all xt ∈ Xt and that at the equilibrium 0 < Mt < Mt , i.e. the
solution is internal for the immigration policy. Then I can state the following result.
Theorem 21. For any Social Welfare Function SWF(xt ;ϕt ,gt) that assigns a strictly
positive weight to each native individual of working age, there exist a threshold gˇt ∈ [0,1]
such that if gt ≥ gˇt then a marginal tightening in the immigration policy caused by a
change in the equilibrium outcome reduces the Social Welfare.
Proof. See Appendix 4.8.2.3.
The intuition that underpins this result is that - as gt tends to 1 - the parameter θ vt that
identifies the pivotal voter get close to 0. On one hand, the benefits for the individuals of
working age from a marginal opening of the immigration policy increase rapidly as Mt
approaches 0. On the other hand, the cost of immigration becomes increasingly small at
low levels of Mt . If θ vt = 0, then Mt = 0, which implies that the marginal social gains
from immigration are very large relative to the marginal social costs. Also notice that the
converse of the statement in Theorem 21 is not always true. Specifically, a threshold
g˘t ∈ [0,1] such that if gt ≤ g˘t then the society would benefit from a marginally more
restrictive immigration policy may not exists for all the SWFs with the features stated
above. Nevertheless, such threshold g˘t exists for Utilitarian and Rawlsian SWF. The
result in Theorem 21 suggests that societies characterized by high income inequality
and/or by a high share of elderly in the total population (which have a gt close to 1 or
larger) are likely to adopt excessively restrictive immigration policies. Moreover, it
implies that a tightening in the immigration law - for instance the one caused by
population ageing - reduces the Social Welfare. In other words, the policy adjustment of
the immigration quota is harmful for the society. This result is suggestive in the light of
the increasingly and rather controversial restrictions to immigrations that have been
progressively introduced in countries characterized by a rapidly ageing population and
by a high degree of income inequality, such as the UK and the USA, or in countries that
feature a very large elderly population, such as Japan or Italy. In the supplementary
material I propose a welfare analysis about the effects of a change in the public spending
in the imperfect Public Good and in education. These results are less general because
they rely on more restrictive assumptions about the SWF (e.g. Utilitarianism).
Nevertheless, they suggest that the allocation of public spending may be too generous for
the imperfect Public Good and perhaps insufficient for education in society characterized
by high income inequality and by a large share of elderly.
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4.6 Empirical Evidence
In this section I investigate the determinants of the attitudes towards immigration and
public spending of adult residents in Great Britain using data from the British Social
Attitude Survey, and in particular from the rounds of data 2009 - 2011 - 2013 that
includes a specific section about immigration. The dataset accounts for a total of 6639
observations. The explanatory variables are the age of the respondent, the income decile
of the household and the highest educational qualification attained by the respondent, on
a scale from 1 (postgraduate degree) to 8 (no qualification). Observations of individuals
with foreign qualifications have been omitted. Dummy variables capture whether the
household includes children, and if the respondent is a woman, if she lives in rural areas,
if she is born abroad and if she is not part of any religion. Characteristics related to the
employment status and type are captured by dummies. In particular, I include the effects
of being employed in a manual job, unemployed or retired.
4.6.1 Determinants of Attitude towards Immigration
The outcome variable LETIN captures the attitude towards further immigration in the
country. The question is “Do you think the number of immigrants to Britain nowadays
should be increased a lot, increased a little, remain the same as it is, reduced a little
or reduced a lot?” and the respondents must choose a value on a discrete scale from 1
(“increased a lot”) to 5 (“reduced a lot”). The variable LETIN measures therefore the
degree of aversion towards further immigration. I use an ordered Logit model because of
the discrete and ordered nature of the outcome variable. Table 1 presents the results of
this analysis. In line with what is observed in the literature (Dustmann and Preston 2007,
Facchini and Mayda 2007 and Card et al. 2012) and with what is implied by the model
proposed in this paper, the age of the respondent exhibit a significant positive relationship
with the hostility towards immigration. Moreover, the parameter on household income is
negative and significant in all the specifications. This means that high income individuals
tend to be less averse to immigration relative to the low income, and this is consistent
with the implications of the model. Similarly, low level of education tend to be associated
with a stronger aversion to immigrants. Lastly, the presence of children in the household,
the location in a urban area and the birth of the respondent outside of the UK are all
significantly related to a more positive attitude towards immigrants.
4.6.2 Determinants of Attitude towards Public Spending
The outcome variable TaxSpend is a measure of the attitude towards public spending
financed through taxation. This variable capture a fundamental trade-off that drives the
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results in section 3. Namely, it measures the degree of aversion to higher taxes in
exchange of more social spending. The question is “Suppose the government had to
choose between the three options on this card: reduce taxes and spend less on health,
education and social benefits, Keep taxes and spending on these services at the same
level as now, Increase taxes and spend more on health, education and social benefits.
Which do you think it should choose?” and the respondents must choose a value on a
discrete scale from 1 (“spend less”) to 3 (“spend more”). I use an ordered Logit model
for the same reasons explained in the previous section. Table 2 shows the results of this
analysis. The relationship between the outcome variable and the age and the income of
the respondent are both significant and the signs are consistent with the implication of
the model and in line with the previous literature (Brook, Hall and Preston, 1998).
Unemployment is also related with a more favorable attitude towards public spending. It
is somewhat surprising that low levels of education are associated with a stronger
aversion to taxes and public spending. This may be due to factors that are not considered
in the theoretical analysis and that are likely to vary across different education level, such
as knowledge of the structure of the fiscal system, awareness of the demographic and
economic structure of the country and degree of altruism.
4.6.3 Discussion
The analysis in this section provides a strong support for two crucial implications of the
model regarding voters’ preferences in Britain. Namely, the analysis of the attitudinal
data in the BSA suggests that older age tend to be associated with stronger aversion
towards immigration and with a higher propensity to increase the size of public
intervention in public spending policies, even if this implies higher taxes. Moreover, the
analysis implies that (conditional and unconditional on the level of education), higher
levels of income tend to correspond to a more positive attitude towards immigrants and
to a stronger propensity to cut taxes and public spending. It may be worth underlining
that this analysis does not make any claim about a causal relationship between the
variables of interest. The results in section 6.1 are consistent with other similar studies in
the literature that use alternative dataset and analyse other countries or group of
countries. For instance Dustmann and Preston (2007), Facchini and Mayda (2007) and
Card et al. (2012), using respectively data from the British Social Attitude Survey, the
International Social Survey Programme and the European Social Survey, all support
these findings. Thus, one can conclude that there is substantial empirical evidence in
support of the patterns of attitudes induced by age and income that are implied by the
model proposed in this paper, even if no causal relationship can be claimed. A more
general question concern the empirical support to the main predictions of the paper,
which concern the comparative statics of the policy outcome. Specifically, it would be
critical for this stream of literature to assess in future research if population ageing tend
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to be associated to more restrictive immigration policies and, if so, to what extent this is
due to a causal link between these two variables. The answer to this question is not
straightforward. First of all, population ageing is a demographic phenomenon that
produces effects on a very long time span and it is likely to be associated with a number
of other economic and political transformations. Thus, it is not an easy task to
disentangle its effect on specific policies, such as immigration, from other endogenous
processes that may induce correlation between the the variables of interest. Moreover,
immigration policies are not easy to measure. The “tightness” of an immigration policy
is a multidimensional concept, in the sense that such policies can be restricted in various
ways, targeting different kinds of immigrants, etc. Moreover, its relationship with the
number of immigrants that legally enter a country in a given period of time may be
highly endogenous. For instance, on one hand it is reasonable to expect that a country
with a more restrictive immigration policy allows, ceteris paribus. a smaller number of
immigrants to enter the country relative to one with a more liberal set of rules. On the
other hand, a country that is subject to a more intense immigration pressure, for instance
because it is more attractive for potential immigrants, may tend to experience a larger
inflow of immigrants even if its immigration policy is more restrictive in comparison
with a less attractive country. Similarly, an increase in the immigration pressure due to
exogenous factors may translate into a more restrictive immigration law and to a larger
inflow of foreigners in the country. In other words, immigration choices and policy
choices are two interdependent endogenous processes, and this must be accounted for if
one aims to study the latter in isolation from the former. Lastly, immigration policies are
often formulated in terms of qualitative requirements, which may not be easy to translate
into an objective measure of “tightness”. For instance, the immigration law often assigns
different status to potential immigrants that possess different education levels, or that
come from specific countries. Attempts to measure the “tightness” of immigration
policies have been made by Boeri and Brucker (2005) for 15 European countries
countries and by Ortega and Peri (2009) for 14 OECD countries. Their measures consist
of a number of indexes constructed under different definitions of “tightness” of an
immigration policy. The limitations in the use of these data are not negligible.
Specifically, the low number of observations, the limited extent of time variation that can
be exploited and the robustness of the findings to different concepts of “tightness” are
important issues. Thus, this literature did not provide so far enough evidence in support
or against the predictions of the model proposed in this paper. This remains an open and
challenging question for future research.
4.7 Concluding Remarks
This paper investigates the interaction between two crucial demographic, economic and
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social processes in our society: ageing and immigration. The aim is to analyse how these
two processes shape policy choices in democratic countries, and how such policy choices
may affect the demographic profile of the society. In particular, I study the effects on
immigration policies of two major demographic changes that have caused population
ageing in western societies, namely increasing life expectancy and decreasing birth rates.
The main finding concerns the fiscal consequences of population ageing. That is, if the
share of elderly population is large enough, population ageing increases the political
pressure to restrict the inflow of immigrant workers into the country and to arise public
spending. This result implies that the negative effects of population ageing on public
finances - due to increasing costs for public pensions - may be exacerbated by the
endogenous political effects on immigration and public spending policies. Direct and
indirect effects of the ageing phenomenon may affect the overall fiscal soundness of the
public sector in the long run. The second result looks at the demographic consequences
of ageing. In particular, I show that the effects of a demographic shock on the age profile
of the population tend to worsen with time because of the endogenous political effects on
the immigration policies. Specifically, I find that an ageing society tends to support
increasingly restrictive immigration policies. This translates into a reduced number of
immigrants and - in some cases - into further population ageing in the future. The third
finding is about social welfare. I show that the changes in the immigration policy
induced by population ageing tend to harm the society, in particular the young
individuals and future generations. One element that emerges from this analysis is that
the way in which costs and benefits generated by immigration are divided up in the
society is crucial to determine the attitudes towards immigration of different
demographic groups. This implies that an analysis of the political processes that lead to
the division of these net gains is essential in order to assess the political effects of ageing
on immigration policies. Thus, the study of the latter cannot abstract from how fiscal
policies are determined.
There are anyway some limitations in this analysis that one has to consider. First, in this
study the endogenous adjustment of wages has no effect on the equilibrium policy
choices. This is due to the assumption that the individual labour supply is perfectly
inelastic both at the extensive and at the intensive margin. This modelling choice is
justified by theoretical (Ben-Gad, 2004) and empirical considerations (Dustmann and
Preston, 2006, 2007; Boeri, 2010) and can be relaxed to some extent (see additional
material). Nevertheless this aspect is likely to play a role in shaping immigration
policies. Thus, this is a topic that calls for further research. Secondly, I do not fully
investigate the effects of the heterogeneity in the productivity of immigrants. This aspect
is likely to be relevant given that such heterogeneity may be - at least to some extent -
endogenous in the political process. For instance, simple theoretical models suggest that
countries with a generous welfare system may attract relatively low skilled immigrants
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(Borjas, 1999), and that the attitude towards different types of immigration may vary
with the composition of skills of the native population (Benhabib, 1996). Even if the
empirical literature provide limited support for either of these channels (see Preston,
2014), they represent important elements to enrich the study of the determinants of
immigration policy. Lastly, a deeper analysis of the determinants of the aversion to
immigration due to concerns related to the effects on the “compositional amenities” of
the society is needed in order to better understand what other factors shape immigration
policies. This aspect has been shown to play a major role in attitudinal studies (Card et
al., 2012) and it is an active field of research in other disciplines (see Brettell and
Hollifield, 2007), but it has not been sufficiently analyzed with the tools of economic
theory. A more general remark should be made about the model of political interaction
and the equilibrium concept adopted in this paper. This framework represents a tool that
does not only serves for the purposes of this analysis, but it is sufficiently general to be
used in many other applications in Political Economy. There are many other questions in
Political Economy for which the multidimensionality of the policy space represents a
major obstacle in the analysis, and that therefore represent a promising field of
application for the voting model presented in this paper. Examples of these potential new
applications are described in chapter 2 of this work.
Lastly, I emphasize that this analysis delivers an essentially pessimistic message about
the evolution of our society in the immediate future and its consequences for the young
generations. If population ageing means an increasing power for the elderly to shape
public policies according to their needs, the main victims of this process are going to be
the young, both the ones born in rich countries and the ones native of poorer regions. On
one hand the former will have to support the fiscal burden of an increasingly large and
long-living elderly population through high tax rates on their income. On the other hand
the latter are going to be prevented from searching for better employment opportunities
by the excessively restrictive immigration policies that are going to be implemented in the
high income countries.
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4.8 Appendix
4.8.1 Proofs: Main Results
Appendix A includes the proofs to the main results of the paper. Specifically, in
appendix A.1 I prove the Lemmas related to the existence of a Markov-Perfect
coalitional equilibrium. In appendix A.2 I provide proofs of the main comparative statics
results.
4.8.1.1 Existence of Equilibrium
4.8.1.1.1 Markov Property of Ideal Policies
Lemma 1. In a Markov-Perfect coalitional equilibrium - if it exists - (i) each individual’s
ideal policy xit and (ii) the equilibrium policy x
∗
t at time t are invariant - conditional on gt
- to the history up to time t−1, i.e. xit(gt ,ϕt ,ht−1) = xit(gt ,ϕt ,h′t−1) and x∗t (gt ,ϕt ,ht−1) =
x∗t (gt ,ϕt ,h′t−1) ∀t and ∀ht−1,h′t−1 ∈ Ht−1.
Proof. Part (ii) is simply a consequence of rational beliefs and of the Markov property.
Part (i) follows the F.O.C.s for each individual i at time t:
V˜ i,yMt = −c′(Mt)+θ it (α+ γ)
lt−1
(1−M̂t)+
−θ it λt +
(
β lt
(1−M̂t+1)(α/θ
i
t + γ)− et
)
(σmt −σnt )θ it+
+β lt∑3j=1
∂V i,ot+1
∂x j
dx∗∗j,t+1
dMt
(4.25)
V˜ i,yYt =−θ i+b′(Yt)+β lt
3
∑
j=1
∂V i,ot+1
∂x j
dx∗∗j,t+1
dYt
(4.26)
V˜ i,yet =−E(σt)θ it +δσnt f ′(et)E(ω¯t+1)+β lt
3
∑
j=1
∂V i,ot+1
∂x j
dx∗∗j,t+1
det
(4.27)
as x∗∗t+1 only depends upon gt+1 =
lt
σ¯t(Mt) , (and in the case of endogenous education, the
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pivotal voter is unaffected by et) then the above reduces to:
V˜ i,yMt = −c′(Mt)+θ it (α+ γ)
lt−1
(1−M̂t) −θ
i
t λt+
+
(
β lt
(1−M̂t+1)(α/θ
i
t + γ)− et
)
(σmt −σnt )θ it+
+β lt∑3j=1
∂V i,ot+1
∂x j
dx∗∗j,t+1
dgt+1
lt(σmt −σnt )
σ¯2t
(4.28)
V˜ i,yYt =−θ i+b′(Yt) (4.29)
V˜ i,yet =−E(σt)θ it +δσnt f ′(et)E(ω¯t+1) (4.30)
Given that the F.O.C.s are invariant to hs for all s < t and that the optimum is unique, then
the individual ideal policy must be invariant to hs for all s < t as well. Q.E.D.
4.8.1.1.2 SM and SID
Lemma 2. The function V (xt ;θ it ,ϕt ,gt) satisfies SM and SID in (xt ;θ it ) for all θ it ∈Θ and
for all ϕt ∈Φt for any given state gt .
Proof. Given the definition of V it (V˜
i
t for the full model), using formula (4.14) one gets:
V it =V (xt ;θ
i
t ,ϕt ,gt) =
{
V i,y i f young then θ = θ it
κV o i f old then θ =−1 (4.31)
With x1t = Mt , x2t = −Yt , x3t = −et and for an arbitrarily large κ > 0. Notice that κ
represents a strictly increasing transformation of the original objective function of the
elderly therefore κV o implies the same preferences as V o. First I need to show that each
component V i,yt , V ot (V˜
i,y
t , V˜ ot ) satisfies the required properties and then I will show that
it also holds for the overall function V it (V˜
i
t ). Recall that formula (4.16) implies that the
objective function of a young individual in the baseline model is:
V i,yt = (1−τt)ω it +b(Yt)−c(Mt)+β lt
(
(α+ γθ i,yt )σ¯t
(1− M̂t+1)
+d(Y ∗∗t+1)− c(M∗∗t+1)
)
(4.32)
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and in the full model is:
V˜ i,yt = (1− τt) f (et−1)ω it +b(Yt)− c(Mt)+
+β lt
(
(α+ γθ i,yt )
σ¯t
(1−M̂t+1) +d(Y
∗∗
t+1)− c(M∗∗t+1)
)
+
+δ yσnt f (et)ω¯t+1
(4.33)
Below I derive the conditions for the full model with endogenous education. Given these
conditions, the ones for the baseline model are straightforward. Given that the function
V˜ i,yt is twice differentiable under the assumption stated in section 2.3, sufficient conditions
for SM and SID are simply related to the sign of the cross derivatives and in particular:
V˜ i,yetMt ,V˜
i,y
etYt ≤ 0, V˜
i,y
MtYt ≥ 0 for all x ∈ X and all θ ti ∈Θ and V˜
i,y
etθ it
,V˜ i,y
Ytθ it
< 0, V˜ i,y
Mtθ it
> 0 for all
x ∈ X and all θ ti ∈Θ. The first derivatives are:
V˜ i,yMt = −c′(Mt)+θ it (α+ γ)
lt−1
(1−M̂t) −θ
i
t λt+
+
(
β lt(α/θ it+γ)
(1−M̂t+1) (α/θ
i
t + γ)− et
)
(σmt −σnt )θ it+
+β lt
(
d′(Y ∗∗t+1)
∂Y ∗∗t+1
∂Mt − c′(M∗∗t+1)
∂M∗∗t+1
∂Mt
)
(4.34)
V˜ i,yYt =−θ i+b′(Yt) (4.35)
V˜ i,yet =−σ¯tθ it +δσnt f ′(et)ω¯t+1 (4.36)
Notice that the expectations M∗∗t+1 and Y
∗∗
t+1 are solely affected by Mt (through gt+1)
because of the Markov assumption. Calculate the cross derivatives of V˜ i,yt with respect to
each two policy dimensions:
V˜ i,yetMt =−θ it (σmt −σnt )≤ 0 (4.37)
V˜ i,yetYt =V
i,y
YtMt = 0 (4.38)
And with respect to each policy dimension and the parameter θ it (recall that x∗∗t is a
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function of solely gt+1 and it is therefore invariant to θ it ):
V˜ i,y
etθ it
=−E(σt)< 0 (4.39)
V˜ i,yMtθ it
=
(α+ γ) lt−1
(1− M̂t)
−λt−
(
et− β ltγ
(1− M̂t+1)
)
(σmt −σnt )> 0 (4.40)
V˜ i,yYtθ it
=−1 < 0 (4.41)
Notice that the FOCs with respect to Mt imply that an interior solution with a partially
open migration policy Mt > 0 can exist even if immigrants “contribute less than what
they take out” in the current period, or more precisely if at a given policy (et ,Yt ,Mt) a
marginal increase in the number of migrants at constant et ,Yt implies a rise in the income
tax rate. This is true because a native individual of working age will have a future benefit
from immigration β lt(σ
m
t −σnt )
(1−M̂t+1) (α + γθ
i
t ) which incorporates the fact that he will partially
internalize the positive effect of immigration today on the governmental budget constraint
in the following period through the adjustment in the pension system. This implies that
this model is not affected by the dichotomy between “skilled migration” and “unskilled
migration” in the patterns of attitude towards immigration and income that is typical of
traditional models such as Facchini and Mayda (2008). In my model the attitude towards
immigration may improve with income even if the immigrants are a net burden for the
society in the short run, because if the Bismarkian component of the pension system
is positive (γ > 0), then the future benefits of current immigration are increasing with
income. The next step is to state the elderly’s objective function and calculate its first
derivatives. Using the formulas for Cot+1 (4.9) one gets:
V˜ o = lt−1 [d(Yt)− c(Mt)]+δ oE(kit) f (et)ω¯t+1 (4.42)
First derivatives are:
V˜ oet = E(k
i
t) f
′(et)E(ωt+1)> 0 (4.43)
V˜ oMt =−lt−1c′(Mt)< 0 (4.44)
V˜ oYt = lt−1d
′(Yt)> 0 (4.45)
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and the cross derivatives are given by:
V˜ oetMt = V˜
o
etYt = V˜
o
YtMt = 0 (4.46)
Notice that the preferences for (Mt ,Yt ,et) are the same for all elderly individuals. Now I
can show that the function V˜ (xt ;θ it ,ϕt ,gt) satisfies (i) SM and (ii) SID in (xt ;θ it ).
(i) SM. It follows from SM of V˜ i,yt and V˜ ot . (ii) SID. I need to show that if x
′
t ≥ x′′t , x′t 6= x′′t
and θ ′t > θ ′′t then
V˜ (x′t ;θ
′′
t ,ϕt ,gt)−V˜ (x′′t ;θ ′′t ,ϕt ,gt)> V˜ (x′t , ;θ ′t ,ϕt ,gt)−V˜ (x′′t ;θ ′t ,ϕt ,gt)
(ii) (a) θ ′t ,θ ′′t 6= −1. SID follows from SID of V i,yt and V ot . (ii) (b)θ ′ 6= −1, θ ′′t = −1.
Notice that V˜ (x′t ;θ ′′t ,ϕt ,gt)− V˜ (x′′t ;θ ′′t ,ϕt ,gt) > 0 is always true under the assumption
previously stated so it is sufficient to choose κ large enough such that SID holds trivially.
(ii) (c) θ ′t ,θ ′′t =−1. Straightforward. Also notice that under the restriction the parameter
set Θt defined in (4.13) is a totally ordered set. Q.E.D.
4.8.1.1.3 Median Voter Theorem and Comparative Statics
Theorem 3. (Median Voter Theorem). If conditions 1-2-3 are satisfied, then (i) A Markov-
Perfect coalitional equilibrium of the voting game exists; (ii) in any equilibrium the set
of winning policies is a subset of the set of ideal points of the median voter vt; (iii) if the
median voter has a unique ideal policy, then the set of equilibrium policies is a singleton.
Proof. Consider an objective function ν(xt ,x∗∗t+1(gt ,ϕt);θ
i
t ,ϕt) for some (common)
expectations x∗∗t+1(gt ,ϕt). Notice that notion of coalitional equilibrium implies that
rational expectations must exists at time t, because the political process implied by such
equilibrium concept always delivers a policy outcome (it can be an equilibrium outcome
in the form of a Condorcet winner, or, in case such outcome does not exist, a default
policy x0). Thus, rational expectations exist even if there is no Markov-Perfect
coalitional equilibrium at time t + 1. Moreover, given that in each period t + s voters’
indirect utility ν - conditional on gt+s and xt+1+s is unaffected by history up to time
t − 1+ s, then there must be rational expectations x∗∗t+1(gt ,ϕt) that satisfy MP. Thus,
choose a function x∗∗t+1 such that the expectations are rational and satisfy the MP. These
two ensure that conditions (a) and (b) of the definition of Markov-Perfect coalitional
equilibrium (Definition 1) are satisfied. The Markov assumption (MP) implies
x∗∗t+1(gt ,ϕt) = x
∗∗
t+1(gt+1(xt ,ϕt),ϕt+1). Using such rational expectations, define the
function V (xt ;θ it ,ϕt ,gt) = ν(xt ,x∗∗t+1(gt+1(xt ,ϕt),ϕ);θ
i
t ,ϕt). This is the objective
function that corresponds to the static case of coalitional equilibrium. Theorem 1 in
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Dotti (2015) states that, if condition 1-2-3 are satisfied, then a coalitional equilibrium
exists in the form (Pt ,At ,x∗t ) (see Ch.2, Theorem 1). This implies that condition (a) of
Definition 1 is also satisfied. Then a Markov-Perfect coalitional equilibrium exists.
Results (ii) and (iii) in Theorem 3 follow directly from Theorem 1 in Dotti (2015) (see
Chapter 2). Q.E.D.
Theorem 4. (Monotone Comparative Statics). If conditions 1-2-3 are satisfied, then
the set of equilibrium policies of the voting game is (i) a sublattice of Xt which is (ii)
monotonic nondecreasing in θ vt .
Proof. Theorem 3 implies that if conditions 1-2-3 are satified, then
(Pt ,At ,x∗t {x∗∗t+s}∞s=0;gt) is a Markov-Perfect coalitional equilibrium and (Pt ,At ,x∗t ) is a
coalitional equilibrium given the objective function
V (xt ;θ it ,ϕ) = ν(xt ,x∗∗t+1(gt+1(xt ,ϕt),ϕ);θ
i
t ,ϕt), in which x∗∗t+1 satisfy Rational
Expectations and MP. Thus, the results in Theorem 2, chapter 2 apply. Q.E.D.
Theorem 5. (Monotone Comparative Statics 2). If conditions 1-2-3 are satisfied, then the
set of equilibrium policies of the voting game is monotonic nondecreasing in ϕ .
Proof. Theorem 3 implies that if conditions 1-2-3 are satified, then (Pt ,At ,x∗t {x∗∗t+s}∞s=0;gt)
is a Markov-Perfect coalitional equilibrium and (Pt ,At ,x∗t ) is a coalitional equilibrium
given the objective function V (xt ;θ it ,ϕt ,gt) = ν(xt ,x∗∗t+1(gt+1(xt ,ϕ),ϕ);θ
i
t ,ϕt), in which
x∗∗t+1 satisfy Rational Expectations and MP. Thus, the results in Theorem 3, chapter 2
apply. Q.E.D..
4.8.1.1.4 Equilibrium Existence and Characterization
Lemma 6. If |σmt+s−σnt+s| ≤ σˆ for some σˆ > 0 and all s ≥ 0, then (i) a Markov-Perfect
coalitional equilibrium for the voting game exists. Moreover, (ii) in any Markov-Perfect
coalitional equilibrium at time t the equilibrium policy is the unique ideal point of the
median voter xvt = x
∗
t ∈ It(v). (iii) The parameter θ vt that identifies the median voter
is weakly decreasing in gt . If σmt −σnt is arbitrarily small, then (iv) there is a unique
equilibrium policy that is chosen in any Markov-Perfect Coalitional Equilibrium in period
t.
Proof. (i) Consider expectations {x∗∗t+s(gt ,ϕt)}∞s=0 that are consistent with a MCE such
that x∗∗t+s(gt+s,ϕt+s) is unique and differentiable, and
∣∣∣dx∗∗k,t+sdx j,t+s ∣∣∣ ≤ ct+s(k, j) for all k, j and
all s ≥ 0, in which ct+s(k, j) are numbers that are arbitrarily close to 0. I need to show
that such expectations are rational for σˆ close enough to zero. Start with x∗∗t (gt ,ϕt). As
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stated, x∗∗t+1(gt ,ϕt) satisfies the Markov property, hence
x∗∗t+1(gt+1(xt ,ϕt),ϕt+1) = x
∗∗
t+1(gt ,ϕt). Moreover, it is differentiable and consistent with a
unique MCE. This means x∗∗t+1(gt+1,ϕt+1) = x
∗
t+1(gt+1,ϕt+1) = x
v
t+1(gt+1,ϕt+1), i.e.
must be the unique ideal point of the median voter vt+1. Thus
dx∗∗k,t+1
dx j,t
=
∂x∗∗k,t+1
∂gt+1
∂gt+1
∂x jt
=
∂x∗∗k,t+1
∂θ vt+1
∂θ vt+1
∂x j,t
. Notice that
∂θ vt+1
∂x j,t
= 0 for all j except for the one such
that x j,t = Mt . In such case,
∂θ vt+1
∂Mt = −
lt(σmt −σnt )
[(σmt −σnt )Mt+σnt ]2
1
q(θ vt+1)
, which is finite for all Mt
and tends to 0 as σmt −σnt → 0 (notice that if vt+1 is the median voter, then q(θ vt+1)> 0,
and continuity of q implies that his must be true in a neighborhood of θ vt+1). Moreover,
∂x∗∗k,t+1
∂θ vt+1
= 0 if k is in a corner solution of the maximization problem of the median voter,
else
∂x∗∗k,t+1
∂θ vt+1
= −Vxk,t+1θt+1+∑ j 6=k Vxk,t+1x j,t+1Vx j,t+1θvt+1Vxk,t+1xk,t+1 . The numerator is finite (see A.1.2).
About the denominator, it is finite if
dx∗∗k,t+2
dx j,t
is finite for all k, j. But this is true because
expectations are such that
∣∣∣dx∗∗k,t+2dx j,t+1 ∣∣∣ ≤ ct+2(k, j) for all k, j. One gets dx∗∗k,t+1dx j,t is the product
of a finite factor times a factor that is continuous in σmt − σnt and tends to zero as
σmt − σnt → 0. Hence, there exists σˆ > 0 such that if |σmt − σnt | ≤ σˆ , then∣∣∣dx∗∗k,t+1dx j,t ∣∣∣ ≤ ct+1(k, j) for all k, j. Because ct+1(k, j) are arbitrarily close to zero, this
implies that V (xt ;θ it ,ϕt ,gt) is strictly concave, thus x∗t (gt ,ϕt) is consistent with a MCE,
unique and differentiable and
dx∗k,t
dx j,t
≤ ct(k, j) for all k, j. As rational expectations are
assumed, then x∗∗t (gt ,ϕ) must also satisfy those properties. Similarly, one can show that
x∗∗t+1 is consistent with MCE, unique, differentiable and satisfies
dx∗∗k,t+1
dx j,t+1
≤ ct+1(k, j) for
all k, j given such expectations. Thus, recursively, one can show that this is true for all
x∗∗t+s(gt+s(xt+s−1,ϕt+s−1),ϕt+s) with s ≥ 0 and, because of the Markov assumption, for
x∗∗t+s(gt ,ϕt) for all s ≥ 0. This means that V (xt+s,θ it+s,ϕt+s,gt+s) is continuous and
strictly concave in xt+s (it satisfies SM and SID because of Lemma 2) and that the
expectations {x∗∗t+s(gt ,ϕt)}∞s=0 are rational and satisfy the Markov property.
Summarizing, (i) Lemma 2 and the definitions of the policy space Xt and of the
parameter space Θt , plus the result above imply that all the conditions for the existence
of a coalitional equilibrium in Theorem 1 are satisfied. (ii) The strict concavity of the
objective function of each working age individual and the convexity of X imply that the
pivotal voter has a unique ideal policy, and therefore that is the only policy vector that
can be implemented in any coalitional equilibrium of the voting game. (iii) If gt ≤ 1,
then the median individual in the totally ordered set Θt solves
Q(θ vt )nt + lt−1(mt−1+nt−1) = [1−Q(θ vt )]nt20. Rearranging and solving for θ vt one gets
θ vt = Q−1
(
1−gt
2
)
which is weakly positive and weakly decreasing in gt . If gt > 1, then
the parameter of the pivotal voter is fixed at θ it = −1. Lastly, for (iv), if σmt → σnt then
dx∗∗k,t+1
dx j,t
→ 0 for any rational expectations. Thus V (xt ;θ it ,ϕt ,gt) is strictly concave in xt
and in period t there is a unique policy vector x∗t that is chosen in any MCE given gt .
20The tie-breaking rule assumed in section 2.1.2 ensures that this formula is correct even if the number of
voters is even.
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Given that gt is known at time t, then x∗t must be unique. Q.E.D.
4.8.1.2 Comparative statics
4.8.1.2.1 Unanticipated Rise in the Longevity of the Retired Population
Theorem 7. The effects of an increase in the life expectancy lt−1 is weakly positive on
the spending policy and ambiguous on the immigration policy. Moreover, there exists a
threshold gˆ ∈ [0,1] such that if gt ≥ gˆ then the effect on immigration policy is
unambiguously (weakly) negative and the effect on the tax rate is strictly positive.
Proof. Calculate the cross derivatives of V i,yt (V˜
i,y
t ) with respect to each policy dimension
Mt ,Yt ,et and the parameter lt−1 using (4.34), (4.35) and (4.36).
V˜ i,yMt lt−1 =
θ vt (α+ γ)
(1−M∗t )
> 0 (4.47)
V˜ i,yYt lt−1 = 0 (4.48)
V˜ i,yet lt−1 = 0 (4.49)
(i) Effects at fixed gt . Consider a totally ordered subset Φ jt := {ϕt ∈Φt |ϕi,t = ϕˆi,t∀i 6= j}
where j is the position of the longevity parameter in the vector ϕt , i.e. ϕ j,t = lt−1. Notice
that V˜ (xt ;θ it ,ϕt ,gt) in Φ
j
t satisfies SM in (xt) and SID in (xt ;ϕt), it also satisfies SM in
(zt) and SID in (zt ;ϕt) for zt = (x1t ,−x2t ,−x3t). Using Theorem 3, one gets 4Mt ≥ 0,
4Yt = 0,4et = 0,4τt ≤ 0. (ii) Recall that
gt =
lt−1
σ¯ t−1
(4.50)
which is increasing in lt−1. Hence a rise in lt−1 corresponds to a change in the voter
distribution such that the new median voter is lower than before. Hence4Mt ≤ 0,4Yt ≥
0, 4et ≥ 0, 4τt ≥ 0. Total effect: ambiguous for Mt . But 4et ≥ 0, 4Yt ≥ 0. Finally
notice that if gt = 1 then θ vt = 0 and V˜
i,y
Mt lt−1 = 0, which means that the “budget effect” is
equal to zero and therefore the the political effect (weakly) dominates. Hence there exists
a threshold gˆ ∈ [0,1] (possibly gˆ = 1) such that if gt ≥ gˆ then the effect on immigration
policy is unambiguously (weakly) negative. Q.E.D.
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4.8.1.2.2 Unanticipated Fall in the Natural Growth Rate of the Native
Population
Theorem 8. The effects of a decrease in the growth rate of the working age population
is a weak decrease in the openness of the immigration policy and and a weak increase in
spending in the imperfect Public Good and in the tax rate.
Proof. Calculate the cross derivatives of V i,yt (V˜
i,y
t ) with respect to each policy dimension
Mt ,Yt ,et and the parameter σnt−1.
V˜ v,yetσnt−1 = V˜
v,y
Ytσnt−1
= V˜ v,yMtσnt−1 = 0 (4.51)
The share of “old” voters decreases at each point in time because of the formula for gt in
(4.50), which implis that gt is decreasing in σnt−1. Using Theorem 3, a fall in σ
n
t−1 implies
4Mt ≤ 0,4Yt ≥ 0,4et ≥ 0,4τt ≥ 0. Q.E.D.
4.8.1.2.3 Rise in the Life Expectancy of the Working Age Population
Theorem 9. The effects of an increase in the life expectancy lt is ambiguous on the
immigration policy. If voters are “naive” then the effect is weakly positive. If the birth
rate of the native is the same as the one of the immigrants, then there is no effect.
Proof. One needs to analyze the cross derivative of V˜ i,yt with respect to Mt , Yt , et and the
parameter lt . Define p˜i i,ot+1 = (α + γθ
i
t )
σ¯t
1−M̂t+1 + d(Yt+1)− c(Mt+1) (this is only relevant
for the case of endogenous public education).
V˜ i,yMt lt =
β (α+ γθ it )
(1− M̂t+1)
(σmt −σnt )︸ ︷︷ ︸
pre f erences e f f ect
− β2lt
σ¯t2
[
3
∑
j=1
dp˜i i,ot+1
dx∗∗j,t+1
∂x∗∗j,t+1
∂θ vt+1
]
dθ vt+1
dgt+1
(σmt −σnt )︸ ︷︷ ︸
sophisticated e f f ect
− β l
2
t
σ¯t2
[
3
∑
j=1
d2V˜ i,ot+1
dx∗∗j,t+1
∂x∗∗j,t+1
∂θ vt+1
dx∗∗j,t+1
dlt
+
dp˜i i,ot+1
dx∗∗j,t+1
d
dlt
(
∂x2∗∗t+1
∂θ vt+1
)]
dθ vt+1
dgt+1
(σmt −σnt )︸ ︷︷ ︸
sophisticated e f f ect
(4.52)
V˜ i,yYt lt = 0 (4.53)
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V˜ i,yet lt = 0 (4.54)
First of all notice that if σmt = σnt , then the cross derivatives are equal to zero and gt+1 is
unaffected by changes in lt , therefore a shock on lt has no effects on the equilibrium
outcome. If σmt ≥ σnt the sign of V˜ i,yMt lt is ambiguous. The reason is that two different
effects enter the formula. On one hand an increase in life expectancy increase the relative
weight of consumption after retirement in the utility function of a working age
individual, increasing the desirability of better future pensions and therefore of an
increase in the number of immigrants at time t (“preferences effect”). On the other hand
there is a “sophisticated effect” that concerns the effect of current political choices on
future outcomes. If the “preferences” effect dominates, then using the same procedure as
in C.5.1 I can show that V˜ (xt ;θ it ,ϕt ,gt) satisfies SM in (xt) and SID in (xt ;ϕt) in Φ
j
t
where ϕ j,t = lt , it also satisfies SM in (zt) and SID in (zt ;ϕt), for zt = (x1t ,−x2t ,−x3t),
which by Theorem 3 implies 4Mt ≥ 0,4τt ≤ 0 and no effect on the other variables. If
the “sophisticated” effect dominates in a similar way one can show that 4Mt ≤ 0,
4τt ≥ 0. If agents are “naive” then there is no “sophisticated effect” because dθ
v
t+1
dgt+1
= 0
and therefore an increase in lt has a weakly positive effect on the openness of the
immigration policy. Q.E.D.
4.8.1.2.4 Decrease in the Birth Rate of the Natives
Theorem 10. The effects of a decrease in the birth rate of the native population σnt is a
weak increase in the openness of the immigration policy and a fall in the tax rate. The
effects of a decrease in the birth rate of the native population σnt is ambiguous on the
immigration policy. If voters are “naive”, then the effect is weakly positive.
Proof. Calculate the cross derivatives of V i,yt (V˜
i,y
t ) with respect to each policy dimension
Mt ,Yt ,et and the parameter σnt . v˜
i,o
t+1 is defined as in 4.8.1.2.3.
V˜ vMtσnt = etθ
v
t︸︷︷︸
b.e.
− β lt(α+ γθ
v
t )
(1− M̂t+1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
pre f erences e f f ect
+
+
β lt
σ¯t2
[
d′(Y ∗∗t+1)
∂Y ∗∗t+1
∂θ vt+1
− c′(M∗∗t+1)
∂M∗∗t+1
∂θ vt+1
]
dθ vt+1
dgt+1
[
1+
2(1−Mt)(σmt −σnt )
σ¯t
]
+︸ ︷︷ ︸
sophisticated e f f ect
(4.55)
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+
β lt(σmt −σnt )
σ¯t2

 3∑
j=1
d2p˜i i,ot+1
dx∗∗j,t+1
(
∂x∗∗j,t+1
∂θ vt+1
)2
dx∗∗j,t+1
dσt
+
︸ ︷︷ ︸
sophisticated e f f ect
+
dp˜i i,ot+1
dx∗∗j,t+1
∂x2∗∗t+1
∂ (θ vt+1)2
](
dθ vt+1
dgt+1
)2
+︸ ︷︷ ︸
sophisticated e f f ect
+
[
3
∑
j=1
dp˜i i,ot+1
dx∗∗j,t+1
∂x∗∗j,t+1
∂θ vt+1
]
d2θ vt+1
d(gt+1)2
}
︸ ︷︷ ︸
sophisticated e f f ect
Notice that in this case the effect of σnt on future outcomes affect the pivotal voter. Also
notice that d′(Y ∗∗t+1)
∂Y ∗∗t+1
∂θ vt+1
− cˆ′(M∗∗t+1)
∂M∗∗t+1
∂θ vt+1
≤ 0 because Theorem 11. Hence for σmt = σnt
the sophisticated effect is weakly positive hence the overall effect is ambiguous. If agents
are naive then
dθ vt+1
dgt+1
= 0 and the overall sign is negative if and only if:
lt pvt+1
et
≥ θ
v
t
β
(4.56)
i.e. the total transfer in pensions to the median voter at time t + 1 is sufficiently large in
comparison with his tax expenditure in education per pupil (notice that this is always true
in the basic model with no public education).
V˜ vYtσt = 0 (4.57)
V˜ vetσnt =−θ
v
t (1−Mt)+δ f ′(et)ω¯t+1 > 0 (4.58)
as long as et > 0 at the equilibrium (this condition is only relevant for the extended
model). V˜ (xt ;θ it ,ϕt ,gt) satisfies SM in (z′t) and SID in (z′t ;ϕt) in Φ j (ϕ j,t = σnt ), where
z′t = (−x1t ,−x2t ,−x3t), it also satisfies SM in (z′′t ) and SID in (z′′t ;ϕt) where
z′′t = (−x1t ,−x2t ,x3t). By Theorem 3 a fall in σnt implies: 4Mt ≥ 0, 4Yt = 0, 4et ≤ 0,
4τt ≤ 0. Q.E.D.
4.8.1.2.5 Steady-State Equilibrium
Lemma 13. If there exists a Markov-Perfect Coalitional Equilibrium in each period t+ s,
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for all s ≥ 0, then (i) an equilibrium for the OLG model at time t exists . Moreover, if
ϕt+s = ϕ for all s > 0, then (ii) there is an equilibrium that always converges to a steady-
state. Lastly, if σmt = σnt = σt , then (iii) the political equilibrium at time t is independent
of the previous political choices and the economy converges immediately to the steady
state after a shock.
Proof. Fix the value of the parameters. (i) Notice that if a Markov-Perfect coalitional
equilibrium exists in each period t+ s (Lemma 6), then an equilibrium of the OLG model
also exists because it is simply a sequence of such temporary equilibria. Q.E.D. (ii) The
equilibrium political choice at time t depends uniquely on the value of the state gt . Notice
that gt depends on the parameters lt−1, σmt , σnt and on the choice variable Mt−1 but is
is independent of anything else. This implies that the evolution of g depends uniquely
on the evolution of M if l,σm,σn are constant over time. Notice that if σmt = σnt = σt
then the political equilibrium at time t is independent of the previous political choices
because the state gt is independent of history: gt =
lt−1
σt = g
∗, which implies in turn that
the economy converges immediately to the steady state after a shock. Also notice that in
this case the equilibrium is independent of the lagged value Mt−1, hence the steady-state
is unique. If σmt > σnt then this is no longer true and the convergence may take several
periods. Finally notice that at constant parameters if gt+s = gt+s+1 for some t + s, then
gt+s+u = gt+s for all s > 0, i.e. gt+s = gt+s+1 is sufficient for a steady state. Suppose a
steady state does not exists, i.e. gt+s 6= gt+s+1 for all s ≥ 0. If gt+1 > gt (<) then the
pivotal voter θ vt+1 ≤ θ vt (≥) which using Theorem 9 implies M∗t+1 ≤M∗t (≥). This implies
in turn that gt+2 ≥ gt+1(≤). If gt+2 = gt+1 then we have reached a steady state. If instead
gt+2 > gt+1(<) the process continues recursively. There are three possibilities. Either (1)
the process stops because gt+s = gt+s+1 and a steady state is achieved, or (2) the process
converges to some gss. Else, (3) suppose that gt+s+1− gt+s > 0 (<) for all s ≥ 0. if this
is true, then the process implies M∗t+s+1 < M
∗
t+s(>) for all s ≥ 0. Because the direction
of this iterative process is monotonic (increasing or decreasing), if it does not converge
to some Mss, then it this implies that if M is unbounded it will diverge to −∞ (+∞).
But Mt ∈ [M,M] by assumption, hence the process must stop at M∗t+s = M (M) for some
s≥ 0. Notice that monotonicity under case (3) implies gt+s+1−gt+s > 0 (<) and therefore
M∗t+s+1 < M
∗
t+s(>), but this is impossible because M
∗
t+s = M (M). Hence, M
∗
t+s+1 = M
(M), which means M∗t+s+1 = M
∗
t+s and implies gt+s+1 = gt+s. Hence the system has
achieved a steady state, and this leads to a contradiction. Q.E.D. (iii) Straightforward
from (ii) and Lemma 6. Q.E.D.
Theorem 7b. The long-run effect of an increase in lt−1 on the immigration policy has
same sign as the short-run effect and a weakly larger magnitude. If gt ≥ gˆ then the effect
on immigration policy is (weakly) negative and the effect on the public spending and the
tax rate is strictly positive.
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Proof. If at time t the “Budget Effect” prevails, i.e. Mt ≥ Mt−1, then gt+1 ≤ gt and
θ vt+1 ≥ θ vt by Lemma 6. Using Theorem 2 one gets Mt+1 ≥Mt and Yt+1 ≤ Yt . Notice that
this is implies recursively θ vt+s+1 ≥ θ vt+s and therefore Mt+s+1 ≥Mt+s and Yt+s+1 ≤ Yt+s
for all s > 0. Hence I can conclude that at the new steady state Mss ≥ Mt ≥ Mt−1 and
Y ss ≤ Yt but Y ss R Yt−1, which means that the long run effect of an increase in lt−1 is
positive on the openness of the immigration policy and ambiguous on the public spending
variable, which increases at the time in which the shock occurs and falls in the following
periods. Similarly one can show that if at time t the “Political Effect” dominates, then at
the new steady state Mss ≤Mt ≤Mt−1 and Y ss ≥ Yt ≥ Yt−1.
Theorem 8b. The long-run effect of a decrease in the growth rate of the native population
is a weak decrease in the openness of the immigration policy and a weak increase in
spending in the imperfect Public Good and in the tax rate.All the effects have weakly
larger magnitude relative to the short-run effects.
Proof. Similar to the previous case.
4.8.2 Proofs: Extensions and Welfare Analysis
Appendix 4.8.2 includes the proof to the results regarding extensions in section 4 of the
paper and of the Welfare results in section 5. Moreover, it provides a formal description
of the setup in the case of “Elderly goods” informally described in section 4.4.
4.8.2.1 Partially Funded Pension System
Theorem 16. The effect of a marginal decrease in the size of the public pension system
in the short run is an increase in the restrictiveness of the immigration policy. In the
long run, the effect is an increase in restrictions to immigration and an increase in public
spending in the imperfect Public Good. The total effect on the tax rate is ambiguous.
Proof. It is sufficient to show that the objective function V i,yt (V˜t
i,y
) satisfies ID in α (γ).
Calculate the cross derivatives of V i,yt (V˜t
i,y
) with respect to Mt ,Yt (et) and the parameter
α (γ).
V˜ i,yMtα =
θ it lt−1
(1−M∗t )
+
β lt(σmt −σnt )
(1−M∗t+1)
≥ 0 (4.59)
V˜ i,yYtα = 0 (4.60)
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V˜ i,yetα = 0 (4.61)
Hence given a subset Φ jt defined as in 4.8.1.2.1 with ϕ j,t = α (γ), one can show that
V˜t
i
satisfies ID with respect to (xt ;ϕt) and to (zt ;ϕt) with zt = (x1t,− x2t − x3t). Using
Theorem 3 this implies that the short-run effect of a fall in α (γ) is4Mt ≤ 0. In the long
run the effect of a weak fall in Mt is a rise in gt , which implies in turn a “political effect”
at time t +1 with4Mt ≤ 04Yt ≥ 0, which implies recursively the same effect for all the
periods after t + 1 until the economy converges to a new steady state. Notice that the
effect on the tax rate is ambiguous at time t because of a simultaneous reduction of the
total cost of pension (as α falls) and of the workforce (because of the fall in Mt), while
from time t +1 the tax rate increases until a new steady state is achieved, because of the
fall in the workforce and the rise in public spending. Therefore the overall long-run effect
is ambiguous. Q.E.D.
Theorem 18. The effects of an increase in the longevity of the retired population lt−1 and
/or of a decrease in the growth rate of native population σnt−1 is a weak increase in the
public spending in education per child et .
Proof. Straightforward from 4.8.1.2.1 and 4.8.1.2.2.
4.8.2.2 Services for the Elderly (“Elderly Goods”)
Suppose that the elderly consume a different private good, for instance home care, denoted
by Ot while the young consume the private good Ct . The good Ot is produced with the
same technology as the consumption good Ct and the imperfect public good Yt , but only
the immigrant workers are capable of producing it. For simplicity I assume that there is
no cost of immigration, i.e. λt = 0, that the default immigration is M̂t = 0 and I analyse
the case in which σmt − σnt is arbitrarily small. Also assume that the functions a(Y )
and d(Y ) are such that −a′′a′ Y ≥ 1 and −d
′′
d′ Y ≥ 1 for all Y in the policy space. There
are two possibilities. If at the equilibrium there are enough immigrant workers, then
the segmentation of the labour market is irrelevant and the results are identical to the
baseline model. The perfect substitutability in production and the perfect competition
ensure that all prices are are unaffected by immigration choices. The implications change
dramatically if in the proximity of an equilibrium there are not enough immigrant workers
to satisfy the demand at the constant price. In detail, the total demand of services for the
elderly is given by:
OT Dt =
p¯t−1lt−1nt
Pot
=
(α+ γ)lt−1nt
Pot
(4.62)
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Suppose that all the immigrants endogenously select themselves into the sector that
produces Ot (this is the case if wages are higher in this sector), then the total supply is
given by: OT St = ξmt ε¯t , and the equilibrium price of the elderly good POt is
POt =
(α+γ)lt−1nt
ξmt ε¯t
. The zero profit condition implies that the total revenue in the elderly
good sector must be equal to the total cost, thus one gets a different wage wOt in this
sector, namely wOt =
(α+γ)lt−1nt
mt ε¯t , such that the total nominal income of the workers in the
elderly good sector is wOt ε¯tmt = (α + γ)lt−1nt . Notice that the perfect substitutability in
production between the consumption good and the imperfect public good, together with
the zero profit condition still imply PCt = P
Y
t = Pt (else only one of the two would be
produced and the result would still hold). Hence, in order to solves for the wage of the
native workers, we can use the total demand of consumption and imperfect public good.
Using the budget constraint one can show that (Ct +Yt)T D =
wCt ε¯tnt
Pt
. Because the total
supply is ξnt ε¯t one can solve for the price Pt = wCt /ξ . The zero profit condition for the
production of the consumption good holds for all prices Pt , namely Ptξnt ε¯t−wCt ε¯tnt = 0.
Hence I can normalize Pt = 1 (this means that good C is the nume´raire) and I get the
wage wCt = ξ . A competitive equilibrium of this kind exists only if wOt ≥ wCt . In this
problem this condition is equivalent to: p¯t
(
1−Mt
Mt
)
≥ ξt ε¯t . Notice that as long as positive
pensions are paid, one can always find Mt small enough that such inequality is satisfied. I
can now state the formulas for the consumption of young and old individuals.
Ci,yt = (1− τt)ξε it (4.63)
and
Ci,ot =
[α+ γ(ε it−1/ε¯t−1)]σ¯t−1ξ
(α+ γ)lt−1
Mt
1−Mt (4.64)
Finally notice that the government budget constraint is now different because the
immigrants have different wages relative to the natives. In order to keep the problem
tractable it is useful to define a new variable Y˜t = Yt(1−Mt) . In detail:
τt =
Y˜t
[ξ ε¯t +(α+ γ)lt−1]
+
(α+ γ)lt−1
ξ ε¯t +(α+ γ)lt−1
(4.65)
The objective function of a young individual becomes:
V i,yt = (1− τt)ξε it +a[Y˜t(1−Mt)]− c(Mt)+
+β lt
{
[α+γ(θ i,yt )]σ¯tξ
(α+γ)
M∗∗t+1
1−M∗∗t+1 +d[Y
∗∗
t+1]− c(M∗∗t+1)
} (4.66)
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where θ i,yt = yit/y¯t . Notice that the assumption of σmt −σnt arbitrarily small implies that
M∗∗t+1 is unaffected by current policy choices. Thus, the first derivatives are:
V i,yMt =−a′[Y˜t(1−Mt)]Y˜t− c′(Mt)< 0 (4.67)
V i,y
Y˜t
= a′[Y˜t(1−Mt)](1−Mt)− ξθ
i,y
t
ξ +(α+ γ)lt−1/ε¯t
(4.68)
Regarding the elderly, they have an objective function in the form:
V i,ot =
[α+ γ(ε it−1/ε¯t−1)]σ¯t−1ξ
(α+ γ)lt−1
Mt
1−Mt − c(Mt)+d[Y˜t(1−Mt)] (4.69)
Notice that
V i,oMt =
[α+ γ(ε it−1/ε¯t−1)]σ¯t−1ξ
(α+ γ)lt−1(1−Mt)2 − cˆ
′(Mt)−d′[Y˜t(1−Mt)]Y˜t (4.70)
and
V i,o
Y˜t
= d′[Y˜t(1−Mt)](1−Mt)> 0 (4.71)
One can notice that in this case the young individuals are more hostile to immigration and
to public spending than the elderly. Using the same method presented in the paper, one
can define a common objective function V it =V (xt ;θ it ,ϕt ,gt) by setting θ it = θ
i,y
t = ε it/ε¯t
for the young individuals and θ it = −ε it−1/ε¯t−1 for the elderly. Moreover I apply the
increasing transformation V it = (1+ θ it )V
i,y
t for all young individuals and (κ − θ it )V i,ot
with κ arbitrarily large (these transformation do not affect the preferences). Define zt =
(−Mt ,−Y˜t). I can show the following results.
Lemma 23. (i) If lt−1 is small enough, the function V it satisfies SM and SID in (zt ;θ it ).
Therefore (ii) a coalitional equilibrium exists.
Proof. (i) It is easy to show that V i,o
Mtθ it
< 0 and V i,y
Y˜tθ it
> 0 for all Mt ,Yt ,θ it . Because V
i,y
Mt < 0
and V i,o
Y˜t
> 0 for all Mt ,Yt ,θ it , then the SID is satisfied within the young and within the
elderly respectively. Lastly, one need to show that V (z′t ;θ it ,ϕt ,gt)−V (z′′t ;θ it ,ϕt ,gt) >
V (z′t ;θ
j
t ,ϕt ,gt)−V (z′′t ;θ jt ,ϕt ,gt) for all z′t ≥ z′′t and z′t 6= z′′t and whenever i is a young
individual and j is an elderly. Notice that for lt−1 arbitrarily small V i,oMt > 0 for all Mt ,Yt ,θ
i
t .
Hence V (z′t ;θ
j
t ,ϕt ,gt)−V (z′′t ;θ jt ,ϕt ,gt) is strictly negative and because κ is large enough,
the condition is satisified for all Mt ,Yt ,θ it . (ii) Straightforward from Theorem 3.
Theorem 20. If gt ≤ 1 then at the equilibrium, if it exists, the immigration policy is
Mt = 0, else a positive level of immigration is possible.
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Proof. If gt ≤ 1 and an equilibrium exists, then the pivotal voter is a young individual
with V i,yMt < 0. Hence her ideal policy is Mt = 0.
Further details and additional results for this extension are provided in the supplementary
online material.
4.8.2.3 Welfare Analysis: Immigration Policy
Theorem 21. For any Social Welfare Function SWF(xt ;ϕt ,gt) that assigns a strictly
positive weight to each native individual of working age, there exist a threshold gˇt ∈ [0,1]
such that if gt ≥ gˇt then a marginal tightening in the immigration policy caused by a
change in the equilibrium outcome reduces the Social Welfare.
Proof. Notice that the theorem above is stated for the baseline model without
endogenous education. Here I show the proof for the full model with SWF denoted by
SWF(xt ;ϕt ,gt) = S˜WF(Mt ,Yt ,et ;ϕt ,gt) for xt = (Mt ,−Yt ,−et). The proof of the
baseline model is straightforward. Define the overall weight of each generation as
follows:
θ¯tˆ
0
µyt (θ it )qt(θ
i
t )dθt
i = µy (4.72)
θ¯t−1ˆ
0
µot (θ
i
t−1)qt−1(θ
i
t−1)dθt−1
i = µo (4.73)
θ¯t+1ˆ
0
µyt+1(θ
i
t+1)qt+1(θ
i
t+1)dθt+1
i = µc (4.74)
Normalize µy = 1 and assume µy + µo + µc = µ with 0 < µ < ∞. This can be done
without loss of generality under the assumption that µyt (θ it )> 0 for each native individual
of working age. Suppose the equilibrium policy x∗t is such that Mt < Mt < Mt , which
implies that a marginal opening in the immigration policy is feasible. If the difference
between the marginal social benefit for the society from an increase in Mt and the marginal
utility of Mt for the pivotal voter evaluated at the equilibrium policy vector is strictly
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positive, i.e.
W˜DMt (M
∗
t ,Y
∗
t ,e
∗
t ;ϕt ,gt) =
S˜WFMt (M
∗
t ,Y
∗
t ,e
∗
t ;ϕt ,gt)−V v,yMt (M∗t ,Y ∗t ,e∗t ;ϕt ,gt)> 0
(4.75)
then a marginal increase in the openness of the immigration policy Mt is, ceteris paribus,
beneficial for the society. Notice that if Mt <Mt <Mt , then V
v,y
Mt (M
∗
t ,Y
∗
t ,e
∗
t ;θ vt ,ϕt ,gt) = 0
from the F.O.C. The social benefit for the society from an increase in Mt is given by:
S˜WFMt =
´ θ¯t
0 µ
y
t (θ it )V˜
y
Mt (M
∗
t ,Y
∗
t ,e
∗
t ;θ it ,ϕt ,gt)qt(θ it )dθ it+
´ θ¯t−1
0 µ
o
t (θ it−1)V˜
o
Mt (et ,Mt ,Yt ;θ
i
t ,ϕt ,gt)qt−1(θ it−1)dθ
i
t−1+
´ θ¯t+1
0 µ
y
t+1(θ
i
t )E[V˜
y
Mt (Mt+1,Yt+1,et+1;θ
i
t+1,ϕt+1,gt)]qt+1(θ
i
t+1)dθ
i
t+1
(4.76)
First of all notice that the linearity in consumption of the utility function implies
E[V yMt (Mt+1,Yt+1,et+1, ;θ
i
t+1,ϕt+1,gt+1)] =V
y
Mt (Mt+1,Yt+1,et+1; θ¯t+1,ϕt+1,gt+1)] hence´ θ¯t+1
0 µ
y
t+1(θ
i
t+1)E[V
y
Mt (Mt+1,Yt+1,et+1;θ
i
t+1,ϕt+1,gt+1)]qt+1(θ
i
t+1)dθ
i
t+1 =
E[µyt+1(θ
i
t+1)]V
y
Mt (Mt+1,Yt+1,et+1; θ¯t+1,ϕt+1,gt+1). Moreover, notice that a change in xt
only affects the future generation through a fall in gt+1, which has no effects neither on
the budget constraint at time t +1 nor on the preferences of an individual (it only affects
the political equilibrium at time t + 1). Therefore V yMt (Mt+1,Yt+1,et+1, ;θt+1,ϕt+1,gt+1)
is independent of Mt and therefore SID implies: V
y
Mt (Mt+1,Yt ,et+1; θ¯t+1,ϕt+1,gt+1)≥
V yMt (Mt+1,Yt+1,et+1;θ
v
t+1,ϕt+1,gt+1) as long as θ
v
t+1 ≤ θ¯t+1. I use the latter result and I
substitute the formulas for V i,yMt , V
i,o
Mt into W˜DMt , and I can write the following inequality:
W˜DMt ≥
[
(α+γ)lt−1
(1−M∗t ) −λt +
(
β ltγ
(1−M∗t+1) − et
)
(σmt −σnt )
](´ θ¯t
0 θ
i
t µ
y
t (θ it )qt(θ i)dθt i−θ vt
)
+
−c′(Mt)
´ θ¯t−1
0 µ
o
t (θ it−1)g(θ
i
t−1)dθ
i
t−1
(4.77)
Notice that:
V v,yMt = −c′(Mt)+θ vt (α+ γ)
lt−1
(1−M̂t) −θ
v
t λt+
+
(
β lt
(1−M̂t+1)(α/θ
v
t + γ)− et
)
(σmt −σnt )θ vt
(4.78)
also represent the FOC of the optimization problem of the pivotal individual. This implies
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that if at the equilibrium Mt < Mt then:
(α+γ)lt−1
(1−M̂t) −λt +
(
β ltγ
(1−M̂t+1) − et
)
(σmt −σnt )≥
≥ 1θ vt
(
c′(Mt)− αβ lt(σ
m
t −σnt )
(1−M̂t+1)
) (4.79)
Define the weighted average
Egt (µ
y
t θ i) =
θ¯tˆ
0
λ yt (θ it )θ
i
t gt(θ
i
t )dθ
i
t = hgt
θ¯tˆ
0
θ it g˙t(θ
i
t )dθ
i
t = hgt Eg˙t (θt) (4.80)
for some p.d.f g˙t . Notice that hgt Eg˙t (θt) > 0 under the assumption that µ
y
t (θ it ) > 0 for
each native individual of working age. Therefore we can state the following inequality:
W˜DMt ≥
(
c′(Mt)− αβ lt(σ
m
t −σnt )
(1− M̂t+1)
)
hgt Eg˙t (θt)−θ vt
θ vt
− c′(Mt)µo (4.81)
The F.O.C.s of the pivotal individual plus the assumption that immigrants are not net
beneficiaries (in expectation) of the fiscal system imply c′(Mt)− αβ lt(σ
m
t −σnt )
(1−M̂t+1) > 0 for Mt <
Mt <Mt . Finally notice that because of a previous assumption c′(Mt)<∞ and that µo < 0
imply:
lim
θ vt →0+
(
c′(Mt)− αβ lt(σ
m
t −σnt )
(1− M̂t+1)
)
hgt Egˇt (θ)−θ vt
θ vt
− c′(Mt)µo =+∞ (4.82)
Therefore, given a certain distribution of weights, either W˜DMt (M
∗
t ,Y
∗
t ,e
∗
t ;ϕt ,gt)> 0 for
all θ vt > 0, else the Intermediate Value Theorem implies the existence of a threshold
0 < θˇt < θ¯ such that W˜DMt (M∗t ,Y ∗t ,e∗t ;ϕt ,gt) = 0. This threshold is always meaningful
because I have previously assumed that the distribution of θt is such that q(0) > 0 and
therefore θ jt = 0. Moreover, W˜DMt (M∗t ,Y ∗t ,e∗t ;ϕt ,gt) is strictly decreasing in θ vt because
W˜DMt is independent of θ vt and V
v,y
Mt is strictly decreasing in θ
v
t because of SID.
Therefore if the wage distribution is such that θ vt < θˇt then W˜DMt (M∗t ,Y ∗t ,e∗t ;ϕt ,gt) > 0
which implies that it would be welfare improving to increase Mt . Lastly, because of
Lemma 6 (iii), a threshold gˇt ∈ [0,1] exists, such that if gt ≥ gˇt iff θ vt < θˇt , which implies
the result stated. Q.E.D.
4.8.2.4 Alternative Assumption about the Default Policy: Status Quo
One may want to assume that the default platform is the policy implemented in the
previous period (if feasible) In such case, x0t = x
∗
t−1. Following the same steps described
in the proofs to Theorem 1 in chapter 2 one can show that there is no equilibrium in
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which a platform xt ∈ Xt such that xt ∈M(vt) is implemented. Neverthless, given that the
default policy under this alternative assumption may not be the least preferred option for
some players, then there may additional possible outcomes. Specifically, there may be (i)
equilibria in which no coalition is active and the default policy is implemented and (ii)
situations of instability, in which some coalitions are active only in order to prevent the
victory of some other candidate. This may be possible because of the assumption that, if
no Condorcet Winner exists in the final stage of the voting game, then x0t is implemented.
Suppose that is the case. The characterizations of all the equilibria given in Theorem 3 is
no longer valid. Neverthless, the compartative statics results in Theorem 4-5 still apply
for those equilibria in which a platform other than x0 is chosen. Thus, the main results
are still valid, with the possible exception of those cases in which the comparative statics
exercise induces a change from an equilibrium in which x0t is implemented to an
equilibrium in which a platform different from the default one is chosen (or the
opposite).
4.8.2.5 Maximum Tax Rate
In section 3 we have restricted the policy space in such a way that for all xt ∈X the tax rate
is internal 0 < τt < k < 1. Suppose that this assumption fails and at an equilibrium τt = k.
In this case it is not straightforward to derive results in the full model. Nevetheless, some
results can be obtained in the baseline model with xt = (Mt ,−Yt) under the assumption
that d′(Yt)≤ b′(Yt) for all Yt ∈ [0,Y ] and cˆ′(Mt)≥ c′(Mt) for all Mt ∈ [0,M]. If τt = k the
policy space is unidimensional, thus the traditional Median Voter Theorem applies if voter
preferences satisfy the Spence-Mirrlees condition. Consider the slope of the indifference
curve of an working age individual i:
MRSi,yMt ,Yt =−
1
b′(Yt)
[
β lt(σmt −σnt )
(1− M̂t+1)
(α/θ it + γ))θ
i
t − c′(Mt)
]
(4.83)
and its derivative with respect to θ it :
∂MRSi,yMt ,Yt
∂θ it
=− 1
b′(Yt)
β lt(σmt −σnt )γ
(1− M̂t+1)
≤ 0 (4.84)
Moreover, notice that the MRS of any retired individual is given by MRSoMt ,Yt =
cˆ′(Mt)
d′(Yt) ,
which implies that MRSoMt ,Yt ≥ MRS
i,y
Mt ,Yt for all i. Thus, preferences satisfy the Spence-
Mirrlees condition, and standard results can be applied to make predictions about the
effects of changes in the pivotal voter on the equilibrium outcome. The results differ from
the ones of most Benefit Adjustment Models. Specifically, an increase in the relative share
of the elderly implies, ceteris paribus, an fall in public spending and a reduction of the
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immigration quota. In this framework I cannot derive analytical results about the effects
of a rise in life expectancy, because this kind of shock typically involves not only a change
in the pivotal voter but also in the position and slope of the budget constraint, such that
the sign of the overall effect cannot be determined using the Spence-Mirrlees condition
only.
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Tables
Table 4.1. Determinants of Attitudes Towards Immigration
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Table 4.2. Determinants of Attitude towards Public Spending
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Figures
Figure 4.1. Share of Population of Age 65 or Older
Evolution of the share of population of age above 65 from 1950 to 2015 and the forecast
for the next decades (source: United Nations, 2015).
Figure 4.2. Trends in Migration Policies
Comparison of the value of the index of tightness of immigration policies proposed by
Boeri and Brucker (2005) in 1990 and 2005 for 12 European countries.
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Figure 4.3 Effects of income on the attitudes towards immigration
Relationship between income and attitude towards immigration (preferred number of immigrants)
in a Tax Adjustment Model (A) and in a Benefit Adjustment Model (B). Based on Facchini and
Mayda (2008).
Figure 4.4. Effects of age on the attitudes towards immigration
Attitude towards immigration (preferred number of immigrants) of different generations of voters
in a Tax Adjustment Model (A) and in a Benefit Adjustment Model (B). Based on Haupt and
Peters (1998).
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Figure 4.5. Structure of Overlapping Generations
time
born
t−3
born
t−2
born
t−1
born
t
born
t+1
t−1 t t+1
OLD (o) → ×
NATIVE (n)
(y) → OLD (o) → ×
Immigrant (m)
Children (ch)
→ NATIVE (n)
(y) → OLD (o)
Immigrant (m)
Children (ch)
→ NATIVE (n)
(y)
Immigrant (m)
Children (ch)
The categories of individuals that possess voting rights are highlighted in capital letters.
Figure 4.6. Size of each generation
t−1 t t+1
lt−2(nt−2+mt−2) (o) → ×
nt−1+mt−1 (y) → lt−1(nt−1+mt−1) (o) → ×
σnt−1nt−1+σ
m
t+1mt−1 (ch) → nt +mt (y) → lt(nt +mt) (o)
born σnt nt +σmt mt (ch) → nt+1+mt+1 (y)
born σnt+1nt+1+σmt+1mt+1 (ch)
The arrow denotes the transition of a group of individuals into the next period
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Figure 4.7. Long-Run Effects of an Increase in Life Expectancy
Parameters: σn = 1, σm = 1.5, before shock l = 0.6, after shock: l = 0.62.
Effects of a positive shock on life expectancy on the immigration quota Mt (A) and on public
spending per worker Yt (B).
Figure 4.8 Long-Run Effects of a Decrease in the Birth Rate of the Natives
Parameters: σn = 1.2, σm = 1.5,l = 0.6, after shock: σn = 1.
Effects of a negative shock on the birth rate of the native population on the immigration quota Mt
(A) and on public spending per worker Yt (B).
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Figure 4.9. “Naive” vs. “Sophisticated” agents
Parameters: σn = 1, σm = 1.5, before shock l = 0.6, after shock: l = 0.62.
Effects of a positive shock on life expectancy on the immigration quota Mt (A) and on public
spending per worker Yt (B) for “naive” (dashed line) and “sophisticated” voters (solid line).
Figure 4.10. Convergence to the Steady-State
Parameters: σn = 1, l = 0.6.
Effects of a temporary negative shock on gt (solid lines) and of a temporary negative shock on gt
(dashed line) for σm = 1.5 (A) and σm = 2 (B).
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5 The Political Economy of Public
Education
I study the relationship between income inequality and public intervention in education
in a probabilistic voting model. Traditional Political Economy models typically imply a
positive relationship between income inequality and public intervention in redistributive
policies. Empirical evidence suggests that this may hold true only for certain kinds of
policies, such as public education, but it may not hold true for other forms of public
intervention. I propose a method to study the sign of this this relationship in the case in
which forms of redistribution other than the public provision of education are available
to voters. Moreover, I allow consumers to opt-out of the public education system and
get private education. This feature of the public provision of education plays a crucial
role in shaping the results. I show that an increase in income inequality causes a rise in
governmental intervention in education if the expected marginal returns to education are
larger for children of low income parents. This finding is is consistent with the results in
the empirical literature about public investment in education. Moreover, I show that the
policy adjustment tends to reduce future inequality. Lastly, I show that for other kind of
publicly provided goods, such as Health care, the relationship has ambiguous or opposite
sign.
JEL classification: D72, H42, I21, I22.
Keywords: Probabilistic Voting, Education, Inequality.
5.1 Introduction
What is the effect of an exogenous increase in income inequality on the level of public
intervention in public education in a democratic country? Does such effect mitigate
income inequality of future generations? This paper attempts to provide a theoretical
framework to answer these questions. The relationship between the degree of
governmental intervention in the provision of good and services and the features of the
population in democratic political systems has been a major topic of research in Political
Economy. Traditional models typically imply a positive relationship between the size of
the intervention and income inequality (Meltzer and Richards, 1981). The reason is that
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such policies tend to have redistributive effects1, thus an increase in the public provision
favors the relatively low income part of the voting population. This has important
consequence in a voting model because of two factors. First, an increase in income
inequality is associated with an increase in the share and the political power of the
relatively low income voters. Second, traditional models do not allow voters to access
other redistributive policies such as lump-sum grants because of technical constraints.
Thus, unsurprisingly, such models usually imply a positive relationship between income
inequality and the size of any kind of policy with redistributive effects. Empirical
evidence suggests that this relationship may hold true only for certain kinds of policies,
for instance public education, but it may not hold true for other policies with
redistributive effects such as social security and public health. In this paper I attempt to
disentangle voters’ preferences for redistribution from their demand for public education
by allowing them to choose both the size of in-cash redistribution - through a flexible tax
system - and the quality of public education. This implies that the policy space is
multidimensional. In this setting, the specific features of the public provision of
education play an important role in determining the relationship between the size of
public intervention and the degree of income inequality. Specifically, the presence of
private alternatives to public education and the possibility of opting-out of the public
sector are crucial in shaping the results. Because of these reasons, both a
multidimensional policy space and the possibility of opting-out are essential features of
this analysis. Unfortunately, both such modeling choices are source of well-know
problems of existence of a voting equilibrium in the traditional deterministic Downsian
framework. Thus, I adopt a Probabilistic Voting framework that allows one to tackle
both issues, and I use it to study voters’ behavior in a model of parental investment in
education. I find that public intervention in education may be affected by income
inequality not because of its redistributive effects, but because of the peculiar way in
which the provision is delivered. I derive analytical conditions for a positive relationship
between income inequality and quality of the publicly provided education. I find that the
sign of this relationship is positive if the expected marginal returns to public education
are decreasing in parental income. This is consistent with recent empirical evidence, and
can be due to credit constraints that induce relative low income parents to underinvest in
their children. Moreover, I show that if this condition is met, then an increase in the
quality of public education reduces income inequality in the next generation.
The paper is structured as follows. In section 2 I describe the findings of the empirical
literature about the relationship between public provision of education and income
inequality and how the theoretical literature has tackled this question. In section 3 I
present the voting model and the methodology I propose to study the sign of the
relationship between the equilibrium level of public provision of a good of interest and
1Such effects are typical consequences of in-kind policies and are achieved even if no income
redistribution occurs. For a definition see Appendix 5.7.1.
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the degree of income inequality in the population of voters. In section 4 I apply these
results to a model of parental investment in education in order to provide an answer to
the main question of the paper. In section 5 I compare the predictions in section 4 with
the one that the same framework would deliver for other kinds of publicly provided
goods such as pure public goods and health insurance. Section 6 concludes highlighting
the achievements and the limitations of this analysis.
5.2 Facts and Literature
There is a large empirical literature about the relationship between income inequality
and governmental spending in redistributive policies (see de Mello, Tiongson 2006 for a
review of this literature). On one hand the traditional theoretical literature typically
predicts a positive relationship between income inequality and size of redistribution
(Meltzer and Richard, 1981). On the other hand, empirical evidence provides mixed
results. Perotti (1996) finds no relationship between inequality and redistribution in
democracies. Using data from the U.S. General Social Survey, Lind (2007) finds that
inequality between different groups reduces redistribution, while within group inequality
increases it. A number of papers have found that support for redistribution and public
goods provision is weaker in more unequal or more heterogeneous societies (Goldin and
Katz 1997, Alesina et al. 1999, 2001, Luttmer 2001). A more recent paper by Boustan et
al. (2010) finds that rising inequality in cities and districts is associated with higher local
revenue collection and expenditures. The question becomes even more challenging if
one in interested in modeling the degree of public intervention in a specific policy with
redistributive effects, such as public education. The literature about the relationship
between income inequality and public spending in education is limited and provides
mixed evidence. A majority of empirical studies find evidence of a positive correlation
between income inequality and public intervention in schooling in cross-sectional studies
about US states. Easterly and Rebelo (1993) using cross sectional country data show that
high level income inequality tend to be associated with future high level of public
spending in education in the period 1970-1988. Sylwester (2000) also finds a weak but
significant positive correlation between income inequality and future public spending in
education, even if the issue of reverse causality in the relationship is not completely
addressed in his paper. Conversely, Corcoran and Evans (2010) using a panel of U.S.
school districts spanning 1970-2000 find a negative relationship between inequality and
local spending in public education. Figure 5.1 shows a small positive correlation
between the pre-tax Gini index of income inequality in 2013 and the public expenditure
per capita in education in the 50 U.S. States (American Community Survey, 2013). The
observed correlation is weak and may be due to several sources of endogeneity. In
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particular, one that has been suggested in the literature is reverse causality. On one hand
Political Economy models typically imply an important role for income inequality in
shaping the degree of public intervention in certain policies. On the other hand, part of
the literature in public economics suggests that a uniform public investment in education
may induce a fall in the degree of future income inequality (see Coons et al., 1970 and
Sylwester, 2002). Nevertheless, the theoretical foundations of a positive effect of
uniform public education on future income inequality have been challenged by the
theoretical literature (Glomm and Ravikumar, 2003), and the empirical evidence about
this second channel is mixed (see Abdullah et al., 2015 for a review of this literature).
The theoretical literature in Political Economy has relied mostly on the traditional
Downsian framework (Downs, 1957) to answer this question. Such theoretical
framework has many appealing features described in chapter 2 of this thesis. In
particular, the pivotal voter result described in section 2.2 implies that comparative static
results are easy to derive (see Appendix 5.7.1 for an example). The effect of a rise in
income inequality on public investment in education in Downsian models typically
depends on the features of voters’ preferences and on how public intervention interacts
with market choices. For instance, Ferna´ndez and Rogerson (1995) show that in a model
in which education is partially subsidized, poorer individuals may be excluded from
obtaining an education and that increased inequality in the income distribution makes
this outcome more likely. Glomm (2004) adopts the Downsian framework and finds that
the relationship between inequality and the amount of redistribution through public
education services depends on the elasticity of substitution between consumption and the
quality of education in the parents’ utility. He argues that for empirically relevant value
of this parameter, higher inequality generates less redistribution. Stiglitz (1974) has
pointed out that the use of Downsian models to study this question may be prone to some
relevant theoretical issues. Namely, he has shown that if consumers are allowed to
opt-out of the public service in presence of private alternatives, then a a Condorcet
Winner may fail to exist. In detail, the existence of a Condorcet Winner relies on the
assumption that individual preferences satisfy some ordinal condition, such as single
peakedness. Such condition often fails to apply if opting-out occurs. In the cases in
which the Downsian framework is successful in characterizing a Political equilibrium
(for instance in Ireland 1990, Epple and Romano 1996a, Gouveia 1997, Glomm and
Ravikumar 1998, Naito and Nishida 2012), the opting-out assumptions is shown to play
a crucial role in shaping the relationship between the shape of the income distribution
and the equilibrium level of public spending in education (Epple and Romano, 1996b).
Neverthless, this kind of analysis may deliver some paradoxical results. For instance, a
change in income inequality typically has non-zero effect on the equilibrium level of
public education even if, in absence of public intervention, all voters choose exactly the
same level of education on the private market. The reason is that in order to achieve
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single peakedness such models assume a unidimensional policy space. This means that
the degree of redistribution provided by the tax system is assumed to be exogenous. The
uniform provision of a good financed by tax revenues has redistributive effects2. Thus,
low-income individuals support a larger amount of public provision relative to the
high-income simply because the model does not allow for other endogenous forms of
redistribution. In other words, a relatively poor voter can only achieve redistribution
through the provision of the good, thus she votes for larger level of provision relatively
to a high income individual. Lastly, higher income inequality increases the political
power of the less well-off, and this translates into larger governmental intervention in
education. Another way to think about the same mechanism is to notice that that in
pivotal voter models - abstracting from possible externalities - the collective demand for
public provision of the good is equal to the private demand for the good of an individual
characterized by an income level and by a specific marginal tax-price for the good3. If
the identity of the pivotal voter changes, the marginal tax-price faced by the pivotal
individual also changes. Thus, the sign of the overall effect depends on the relative size
of income and price elasticities. This example suggests that in those models the
relationship between income inequality and degree of public intervention in education is
driven - at least to some extent - by the redistributive effects of the provision rather than
by the specific features of the good. An intuitive way to tackle this problem is to include
in the analysis at least another endogenous redistributive policy variable (for instance a
uniform in-cash grant). This would allow one to disentangle the social demand for
redistribution from the one for public intervention in education. Unfortunately, such
modelling choice implies a second theoretical issue, that worsens the problems of
existence of a Condorcet Winner induced by the opting-out assumption mentioned
above. Namely, it determines an increase in the dimensionality of the policy space. In
chapter 2 of this thesis I have described extensively the important issues that arise in the
analysis of collective choices over a multidimensional policy space if the traditional
Downsian framework is employed. Because of these issues, a vast majority of Political
Economy papers that study voters’ choices over public investment in education employ a
unidimensional choice space. In chapter 2 I have also proposed a new theoretical
framework that can tackle the problem of multidimensionality of the policy space if
voter preferences possess specific ordinal properties. A model of electoral competition
with similar features can be employed to answer questions regarding the Political
Economy of public education. An example of this approach is in Levy (2005). She
studies how democratic societies choose the level of public intervention in education if
redistribution in-cash is also available to voters. She allows individuals to differ in their
income and age and show that positive levels of provisions are possible in equilibrium.
2In the sense that low-income individuals pay a lower tax-price for the good relatively to its market price.
The tax-price is defined as total taxes paid by the individual divided by the size of the public provision.
3Defined as the increase in taxes induced by a marginal increase in the provision.
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Nevertheless, Levy’s analysis cannot be extended to answer the specific question of this
chapter, because she abstracts from the other aspect that - as previously mentioned - is
deemed to be crucial in the traditional literature. Namely, she does not allow for
opting-out. More generally, a theoretical approach like the one proposed in chapter 2 of
this thesis would not prove useful to tackle such a question. The reason is that the ordinal
conditions on voter preferences stated in section 2.3.4 are usually not satisfied in
presence of non-convexities induced by the opting-out assumption. In order to allow
both for opting-out and for a multidimensional policy space I employ a more traditional
model of electoral competition, namely a Probabilistic Voting Model. This choice relies
on three appealing features. First - as extensively described in section 2.5.5 of this thesis
- the Probabilistic Voting framework delivers existence and uniqueness of an equilibrium
under relatively mild restrictions even if the choice domain is multidimensional.
Secondly, the probabilistic nature of voters’ choice helps to smooth out the potential
non-convexities in individual preferences induced by opting-out. Third, departing from a
pivotal voter equilibrium in favor of a concept in which the equilibrium policy depends -
in principle - on the entire distribution of voters’ preferences, allows one to link the
predictions of the model directly to some measure of income inequality, such as the
variance of the income distribution. The latter aspect differs from traditional
deterministic voting models, in which the feature of income distribution that is relevant
for comparative statics is a measure of skewness, such as the mean-to-median ratio. The
shortcoming of this approach is that - for the reasons described in section 2.5.5 of this
thesis - analytical comparative statics exercises are not as straightforward to perform as
in Downsian models, thus the results one can derive are limited. For instance, in two
recent papers de la Croix and Doepke (2009) and Arcalean and Schiopu (2012) employ a
probabilistic voting model to study the relationship between income inequality and
public intervention in education. They assume a parametric specification of the income
distribution and of consumer preferences and a unidimensional policy space. They find
that higher inequality decreases public spending per student and increases enrollment in
public schools in poor economies, while the opposite holds in the rich ones. In this paper
I propose a more general analytical result about the relationship between the variance of
the income distribution and the equilibrium level of public intervention in a publicly
provided good. I do not impose strong parametric restriction on voters’ direct utility
function other than quasilinearity in consumption of a composite private good and
additive separability in other goods. Moreover, I allow for a more general income
distribution, namely income is the sum of a continuously distributed variable (with no
parametric restrictions) and a uniform i.i.d. component. Details about the voting models
are described in the next section.
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5.3 Probabilistic Voting with Non-Convex
Preferences
In this section I will present a relatively simple model of Probabilistic Voting that is
substantially similar to the ones that are prevalent in the literature, such as the one
proposed by Lindbeck and Weibull (1987), Enelow and Hinich (1989), Banks and
Duggan (2004). The key feature of these models is that the vote of every individual (or
type of individual) is not deterministic. This assumption eases dramatically the
conditions for the existence of a Political Equilibrium when the policy space is
multidimensional in comparison with Downsian models. The shortcoming is that the
characterization of the equilibrium outcomes is not as simple as in Downsian models. In
the next subsections I describe the setup of the voting model and I provide sufficient
conditions for existence and uniqueness of a political equilibrium in the case in which
the interaction between public and private provision of a good leads to possible
non-convexities in voters’ preferences. Then I derive the sign of comparative statics of
interest in such environment.
5.3.1 Setup
The voting population consists of a continuum of size 1 of consumer-voters. They differ
from each other only in a unidimensional parameter w that is continuously distributed with
c.d.f. Rˆ(θ ,w) and p.d.f. rˆ(θ ,w) for some parameter θ ∈ [0,1]. A feasible policy is a N-
dimensional vector x∈ X where X ∈ RN is a convex set such that X := {x∈ Rn : B(x)≤ 0}
and B(x)≤ 0 is a constraint that ensures the feasibility of the policy. There are 2 parties:
A and B. Before the election the two parties simultaneously choose a feasible policy xA
and xB, respectively. Denote with v(x,w) the indirect utility induced by policy x to an
individual with parameter w. Following Banks and Duggan (2005), I define the expected
vote share of type w voters for party A given policies xA, xB as follows:
PA(xA,xB,w) = P[v(xA,w)− v(xB,w)] (5.1)
where P(·) is an increasing C2 function. Hence the expected vote share for party A is:
V A(xA,xB,θ) =
wˆ
w
[P(vn(xA,w)− v(xB,w))]rˆ(θ ,w)dw (5.2)
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The expected vote share for party B given policies xA, xB is simply V B(xA,xB,θ) = 1−
V A(xA,xB,θ). Each party maximizes the expected share of votes4. Notice that a large
numbers of voters implies that the actual vote share is equal to the expected share. So far,
this setting is relatively standard and resembles the one in Banks and Duggan (2005). In
the next paragraph I am going to impose additional restrictions to this model to allow for
the interaction of public and private provision of a good.
5.3.1.1 Interaction between Public and Private Provision
Denote with xi the i-th element of the policy vector x and suppose that xi represents the
degree of uniform public provision of a good that is also available on the private market.
Examples of such goods are Education, Health Care, social security, etc. Publicly
provided goods may differ in the way in which the provision is delivered. In particular
one can distinguish the following cases. (i) Exclusive provision (socialization of
commodities). The publicly provided good is not available on the private market. This is
typical in the case of some pure public goods such as national defense (an example is
Usher, 1977). (ii) Top-up goods. For this kind of goods the nature of the consumer
choice is quantitative. Individuals receiving a certain level of public provision can
decide to supplement this quantity with private purchases. A typical example is Health
insurance (see Epple and Romano 1996a and Gouveia, 1997). (iii) Opting-out goods.
The nature of the consumer choice is qualitative in this case, meaning that individuals
can either enjoy the publicly provided good or purchase a different level of quality on the
private market (no supplementation occurs). This case is often claimed to represent a
good description of the way in which public education is provided in several countries
(Stiglitz, 1974; Epple and Romano, 1996b), although some supplementation may occur.
In this section I propose a general setting that allows for the interaction of Public and
Private provision of a good in the Probabilistic Voting Model described in the previous
section. This setting applies for all cases (i); (ii) (iii) mentioned above. In sections 4 and
5 I describe the different implications of these three cases. First, consider the indirect
utility of an individual with income w:
v(x,w) = max [vn(x,w),vm(x,w)] (5.3)
Where vm(x, t) is the indirect utility if the individual decides to purchase some positive
amount of the good on the private market and vn(x, t) is the indirect utility of an
individual that does make any private purchase for the good of interest. Notice that, even
4Aranson, Hinich and Ordeshook (1974) have shown that in Probabilistic Voting models this is equivalent
to maximizing the expected plurality and, as the number of voters approaches infinity, it is also
equivalent to maximize the probability of winning the elections.
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if vn(x,w),vn(x,w) are concave functions, the function v(x,w) may be neither
differentiable in all the points of his domain nor concave. In order to keep the problem
tractable I will assume that vm(x,w)−vn(x,w) is monotone weakly increasing in w ∀x,w.
This assumption implies that for each vector of policies x either vm(x,w) ≤ vn(x,w) for
all z -i.e. no opting-out occurs-, or vm(x,w) > vn(x,w) for all w -i.e. all individuals
opt-out-, or there exists wˆ(x) such that:
v(x,w) =
{
vn(x,w) i f w≤ (≥)wˆ(x)
vm(x,w) i f w > (≤)wˆ(x) (5.4)
Party A’s objective function in formula (5.1) becomes
V A(xA,xB,θ) =
´ wˆ(xA)
w [P(v
n(xA,w)− v(xB,w))]rˆ(θ ,w)dw+
+
´ w
wˆ(xA)[P(v
m(xA,w,m)− v(xB,w))]rˆ(θ ,w)dw
(5.5)
Following Banks and Duggan (2005), in order to show that the voting game has a unique
Nash equilibrium in pure strategies, one has to show that (i) X is compact and convex,
(ii) for each w, P[v(xA,w)− v(xB,w)] is jointly continuous in (xA,xB), (iii) for each xA
and xB , V A(xA,xB,θ) is strictly concave in xA and V B(xA,xB) is strictly concave in xB. In
the setting proposed in this paper, (ii) is ensured because P is continuous and
v(xA,w),v(xB,w) are jointly continuous in (xA,xB). So one need to show the condition
under which (i) and (iii) are satisfied. Regarding (i) the condition is not trivially satisfied
if one of the good is publicly provided. Specifically, X may not be a convex set because
B(x) may fail to be a convex function. This can be the case, for example, for opting-out
goods (see Epple and Romano, 1996b). In the next sections, I am going to show that
convexity holds in the applications of this paper. Regarding (iii), V A(x,xB) (V B(xA,x,θ))
is strictly concave in x for all x ∈ X if the Hessian matrix HAV (x) (HBV (x)) is negative
definite. Linbeck and Weibull (1987) have shown in a slightly different setting that in the
case of concave indirect utility function this condition is satisfied if the distribution of P
is such that p′[v(xA,w)−v(xB,w)]≤ p¯′ for some positive p¯′, where p′ denotes the second
derivative of the function P. This result simply means that the function P is sufficiently
“flat”. Here we have an additional condition to be satisfied. One can show the following.
Theorem 1. (Existence and Uniqueness). If there exist positive r¯ and p¯′ such that the
distributions Rˆ(θ ,w) and P(d) satisfy rˆ(θ ,w)≤ r¯ for all w and p′[v(xA,w)− v(xB,w)]≤
p¯′, then there is a unique equilibrium in pure strategies. The unique electoral equilibrium
is such that the two parties choose the same policy.
Proof. See Appendix 5.7.2.1.
The additional condition simply states that the distribution of the individual parameter w
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does not have peaks with excessively high density. Intuitively, this additional condition
is required because a marginal change in the choice vector x in this case has an
additional consequence relatively to the standard case described in Linbeck, Weibull
(1987). On one hand, there is a direct effect of the change in x due to the change in the
expected voting behavior of each type w, similar to the one of the standard analysis. On
the other hand, there is also an indirect effect. Namely, the threshold wˆ(x) may change as
a consequence of the change in policy, and the size of the effect of such change on the
objective function depends on the density of the distribution in a neighborhood of wˆ(x).
If such density is sufficiently low, then the effect of the change in wˆ(x) is dominated by
the direct effect. If the additional condition rˆ(θ ,w) ≤ r¯ for all w is satisfied, not only
existence and uniqueness of a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies are ensured, but also
other properties of the standard framework hold. Specifically, it is possible to show that
an important welfare result holds in this setting as much as in the convex case. Denote
with V (x,θ) =
´ w
w v(x,w)rˆ(w,θ)dw the utilitarian social welfare function and with with
x∗(θ) the policy vector that maximizes V (x,θ) subject to the governmental budget
constraint, i.e. x∗(θ) = argmaxB(x)≤0V (x,θ). One can state the following Theorem.
Theorem 2. (Utilitarian outcome). The policy chosen by both parties in equilibrium is
the same as the policy that would be chosen by an omnipotent Benthamite government,
i.e. xA = xB = x∗(θ).
Proof. See Appendix 5.7.2.2.
This result is very useful for the purposes of this paper because it reduces the study of the
comparative statics of the equilibrium policy outcome to the one of the utilitarian social
optimum.
5.3.2 Comparative Statics
In this section I describe the way in which a change in income inequality is defined in
this paper. I assume that individual productivity is given by the sum of two independent
random variables Z⊥Σ such that w = z+ ε . One can interpret this as the sum of a
component due to parental and public investment in early life plus an idiosyncratic i.i.d.
component. Variables z and ε have joint p.d.f. r(z,ε,θ) in the form5:
r(z,ε,θ) = { f (z)+θ [g(z)− f (z)]}σ(ε) (5.6)
In order to impose an exogenous variation to the degree of inequality, I adopt the concept
of Mean Preserving Spread (MPS). Consider the marginal distributions of z at θ = 0 and
5Notice that the distribution of w would have the following p.d.f. rˆ(w,θ) =
´ +∞
−∞ σ(w− z)r(z,θ)dz
172
5.3 Probabilistic Voting with Non-Convex Preferences
θ = 1, given by g(z) and f (z) respectively. Denote with G(z), F(z) the correspondent
marginal c.d.f.s. Distribution G is a MPS of F if and only if Eg(z) = E f (z) and
VARg(z)>VAR f (z). Notice how this concept is much more general and easy to interpret
in comparison with the mean-to-median ratio that typically drives the comparative statics
in Downsian models. A mean preserving spread is imposed as follows: F , G are two
c.d.f.s such that
´ z
z [G(z)−F(z)]dz≥ 0 for all z≤ z (i.e. the distribution F Second Order
Stochastically Dominates G), and
´ z
z [G(z)−F(z)]dz = 0 (i.e. z has same mean under G
and F ). The expected value of productivity is given by
E(w) =
´ z
z
´ ε
ε (z+ ε)r(z,ε,θ)dεdz =
= (1−θ)´ zz z f (z)dz+θ
´ z
z zg(z)dz+
´ ε
ε εσ(ε)dεdz =
= E f (z)+Eσ (ε)
(5.7)
Notice that a change in θ preserves the average of w. Moreover, independence implies
that Var(z+ ε) = Var(z)+Var(ε). Thus, the effect of moving θ in a neighborhood of
θ = 0 corresponds to the effect of increasing the variance of w keeping the mean
constant. Moreover, the derivative of the equilibrium value x∗i of a policy dimension i
with respect to θ at θ = 0 corresponds to the comparative statics of interest. Lastly, in
order to understand the effect of a marginal mean preserving spread in the distribution of
z on the equilibrium level of one policy variable, say xi, one can use the simple monotone
comparative statics result that follows. Consider a subset of policy dimensions with
index i≤ L < N. Suppose that the utilitarian social welfare function can be written in the
form in the form V (x,θ) = a(x,θ)+∑i<L ei(xi,θ) and the government budget constraint
B(x,θ) = b(x,θ) +∑i∈L δi(xi) for some twice differentiable functions a,b,{ei,δi}Li=1.
Suppose that a,b are constant functions of xi for all i≤ L.
Lemma 3. (Monotonicity): If there exists at least one x j with N ≥ j > L such that (i) the
solution of the maximization problem is interior for x j, (ii) b(x,θ) is such that ∂b(x,θ)∂x j =
α ∂a(x,θ)∂x j for some constant α , and if (iii)
∂ 2ei(xi,θ)
∂xi∂θ
≥ 0 (≤ 0), then xi is weakly increasing
(decreasing) in θ in a neighborhood of x∗(θ).
Proof. See Appendix 5.7.2.3.
This result is relatively restrictive, but it will prove useful for the purposes of this paper.
In the next section I show that a simple model of public provision of a good financed by
tax revenues satisfies the conditions of Lemma 3.
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5.3.2.1 General Publicly Provided Good
Suppose that w is a scalar individual parameter capturing some characteristics that are
positively related to income, such as productivity. Income is a weakly increasing
function y of w. Pmi represents the unitary cost for the public sector of a level of public
provision of good xi for each individual that purchase a positive amount of the good on
the private market. Pni is the cost for an individual who consumes exclusively the public
provision. Notice that if an individual cannot supplement the public provision, then
Pmi = 0. Conversely, if the public provision can be perfectly supplemented and the
government also purchases the good on the private market, then Pmi = P
n
i . Intermediate
cases are possible (see section 4.2). Denote with pi(x) ∈ [0,1] the share of individuals
that enjoys exclusively the public provision. Notice that pi(x) is not affected by θ under
the assumptions stated in section 3.2. Lastly xl is the amount of another good that is
provided by the government at price Pl per unit. This captures other public spending,
such as provision of public goods. The choice of opting-out is endogenous, thus the
governmental budget constraint can be modeled in the form proposed here:
B(x) =−Ew[τ(x,w)−λ (x,w)]+Pni xipi(x)+Pmi xi(1−pi(x))+Plxl ≤ 0 (5.8)
where x is a N × 1 vector of policy variables and τ(x,w)− λ (x,w) is strictly convex
in x. In this setting τ(x,w) represents the amount of taxes paid by an individual with
productivity w under policy x and λ (x,w) is a function capturing losses from taxation with
Ew[λx j(x,w)] = γEw[τx j(x,w)] for some j 6= i, l and some constant γ . Lastly xi is the level
of provision of the private good of interest, and xl represents the public spending on other
goods and services. For instance, one may consider a tax system with a linear component
and a lump-sum tax in the form τ(x,w) = x1w− x2 for x1 ∈ [0,1] and x2 ∈ [0,E(w)], and
loss function in the form λ (x,w) = λˆ (x1w)+αx2 for some convex function λˆ . Because of
the presence of pi(x) the budget constraint may not be linear. I study a simple model with
quasilinear utility in the form Un(c,xi,xl,w) = c+ u(xi,w) + d(xl,w) for an individual
that chooses to consume only the public provision, and in the form Um(c,xi,xl,w) =
c+υ(xi,w)+d(xl,w) for an individual that purchase some positive amount on the private
market, in which c is the consumption of a composite private good. Notice that u,υ are
(possibly non-constant) functions of the parameter w. The reason of this assumption will
become clear in the next sections. The corresponding indirect utility functions conditional
on choice of provision are vn(x,w) = y(w)− τ(x,w)+u(xi,w)+d(xl,w) and vm(x,w) =
y(w)− τ(x,w)+υ(xi,w)+ d(xl,w) respectively. Thus, the indirect utility of a voter is
given by:
v(x,w) = max[vn(x,w),vm(x,w)] (5.9)
Lastly, assume that in the neighborhood of the equilibrium, either (i) z−ε ≤ wˆ(x)≤ z+ε
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or (ii) wˆ(x) ∈ {w,w}. Now in case (i) one can define a threshold level ε˜(x,z) that satisfies
vn(x,z+ ε˜(x,z)) = vm(x,z+ ε˜(x,z)). In case (ii) one gets ε˜(x,z) = ε¯ if vn(x,z+ ε) <
vm(x,z+ ε) for all ε; ε˜(x,z) = ε if vn(x,z+ ε) >< vm(x,z+ ε) for all ε . The utilitarian
social welfare is given by:
V (x,θ) = E[y(z+ ε)− τ(x,z+ ε)]+´ zz
´ ε˜(x,z)
ε u(xi,z+ ε)kr(z,θ)dεdz+
+
´ z
z
´ ε
ε˜(xi,z)υ(xi,z+ ε)kr(z,θ)dεdz+
−Pxipi(x,θ)+
´ z
z
´ ε
ε d(xl,w)kr(z,θ)dεdz
(5.10)
Assume that r(z,θ) and k are such that the conditions of Theorem 1 are satisfied. Theorem
2 implies that the unique equilibrium of the voting game corresponds to the vector of
policies that maximizes V (x,θ). The quasilinearity of the utility function simplifies the
analysis because it implies that the threshold ε˜(x,z) is a constant function of x j for all
j 6= i. Moreover it is easy to show that under the assumption stated pi(x) = k´ zz [ε˜(x,z)−
ε]r(z,θ)dz is also a constant function of x j for all j 6= i. An immediate consequence of
Theorem 3 is that if the solution to the optimization problem is internal for xi, then the
sign of the effect of a marginal increase in θ on the equilibrium level of xi is given by the
following Theorem.
Theorem 4. If the solution to the utilitarian social welfare maximization problem is
interior xk, and (ii)
´ z
z [υ122(xi,z+ ε¯)−u122(xi,z+ ε)]
(´ z
z [G(s)−F(s)]ds
)
dz≥ 0, then
xi is weakly increasing in θ in a neighborhood of x∗(θ).
Proof. Notice that V (x,θ) and G(x,θ) satisfy all the assumptions of Lemma 3 for
a(x,θ) = E[y(z + ε) − τ(x,z + ε)], b(x,θ) = −E[λ (x,w)],
ei(xi,θ) =
´ z
z
´ ε˜(x,z)
ε u(xi,z + ε)kr(z,θ)dεdz +
´ z
z
´ ε
ε˜(xi,z)υ(xi,z + ε)kr(z,θ)dεdz,
δi(xi) = Pixipi(x,θ), el(xl,θ) =
´ z
z
´ ε
ε d(xl,w)kr(z,θ)dεdz and δl(xl) = Plxl . Thus then
xi is weakly increasing in θ in a neighborhood of the equilibrium policy x∗ if
∂ 2ei(xi,θ)
∂xi∂θ
≥ 0, and weakly decreasing if ∂ 2ei(xi,θ)∂xi∂θ ≤ 0.
Notice that
´ z
z [G(s)−F(s)]ds is weakly positive by assumption, therefore the sign of the
above depends on υ122(xi,z+ ε¯)−u122(xi,z+ ε).
5.3.2.2 Interpretation as weighted average
Define function h over the support z ∈ [z, z¯]. Specifically,
h(z) =
2
´ z
z [G(s)−F(s)]ds
VARg(z)−VAR f (z) ≥ 0 ∀z ∈ [z, z¯]. It is easy to show that h(z) is weakly positive for
all z ∈ [z, z¯], it integrates to 1 and it is inverse U-shaped. Thus, it can be interpreted as the
p.d.f. of a distribution with support [z, z¯] and with higher density for central values of z.
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Denote with Eh the expectation under such distribution and with
c˜ = 0.5[VARg(z) − VAR f (z)] > 0. One can rewrite´ z
z [υ122(xi,z+ ε¯)−u122(xi,z+ ε)]
(´ z
z [G(s)−F(s)]ds
)
dz =
c˜Eh[υ122(xi,z+ ε¯)− u122(xi,z+ ε)], thus the condition above can thus be restated as
follows.
Corollary 5. If (i) the solution to the utilitarian social welfare maximization problem is
interior for xk, and (ii) Eh[υ122(xi,z+ ε¯)−u122(xi,z+ε)]≥ 0, then xi is weakly increasing
in θ in a neighborhood of x∗.
Proof. Straightforward from Theorem 4 and the definition of h.
Corollary 5 delivers the conditions for local monotonicity of the outcome of interest. In
the next section I show how these conditions have a useful economic interpretation if the
model is applied to the study of public intervention in education.
5.4 Publicly Provided Opting-out Good: Public
Education
In this section I assume that the good of interest is an opting-out good, such as public
education. It is publicly provided at a uniform quality level xi and is also available on
the private market at a continuum of different quality levels q ∈ Q at price Pq, with
Q = [0, q¯] for sufficiently large q¯ (one may assume a discrete number of quality levels
with no changes in the results, see Appendix C.1). Notice that with opting-out Pmi = 0,
i.e. an opting-out individual has no cost for the government. For simplicity I assume
Pni = P, i.e. the price of quality on the private market is equal to the one faced by the
government. The first consequence of the opting-out assumption is that the governmental
budget set may not be linear. In order to understand why this is the case, consider the
following way of modeling uniform provision of an opting out good. The total cost of
providing the quality xi is equal to the price per unit of quality P = Pn times the quality
xi times the number of individuals that use the public service and the price per unit of
quality P. Because the consumers-voters are a continuum of size 1, this means that the
total spending on public education is given by Pxipi(xi) = xiP
´ z¯
z
´ ε˜(x,z)
ε kr(z,ε,θ)dεdz.
Lastly assume that w is the marginal productivity of a worker and income y(w) = w. This
would be the case in a model with labor supply if the labor market is perfectly competitive
and labor supply is perfectly inelastic. The governmental budget constraint is also more
complex in comparison with the convex utility case because of the endogeneity of the
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threshold ε˜(x,z) as I described in section 3.1. The budget constraint has form:
zˆ
z
 εˆ
ε
−[τ(x,z+ ε)−λ (x,z+ ε)]kdε+Pxi
ε˜(x,z)ˆ
ε
kdε
r(z,θ)dz+Plxl ≤ 0 (5.11)
Consider the following simplified version of the Becker-Tomes (1979) model of parental
investment in children’s education, in which the utility of a parent with income w is a
function of parents’ consumption c, of public spending in public goods xl , and of the
expected income of their children ws, i.e.:
U(c,xi,w) = c+d(xl,w)+βE [ws(xi,w)|w] (5.12)
Suppose a child’s future productivity ws is a function of the quality of education and of the
endowment e(w) she receives from her parents, plus an idiosyncratic i.i.d. ability νs. For
simplicity, I assume e = w. This formulation describes a simple transmission mechanism
of human capital from parents to children. Education is provided by the government at
uniform quality level xi but other levels of quality q are available on the private market.
Lastly, one may want to allow for positive spillovers of education. This can be the case,
for instance, if there are peer effects. The formula for the productivity of a child with
parents of type w and public education of quality xi is given by the following formula:
ws(xi,w) =
{
ρt+1 [H(xi,w)+ s(xi,φ)+νs] i f public
ρt+1
[
Hˇ(qˇ(w),w)+ s(xi,φ)+νs
]
i f private
(5.13)
where qˇ(w) represents the quality of private education chosen among the levels available
in the set Q, and H, Hˇ and s are twice differentiable. The human capital production
function of the child is allowed to differ between a child that attends public school (H)
relative to one that receive private education (Hˇ). Assume that the first derivative
H1(xi,w) is finite for all x,w and that νs is independent of w,x and of the choice of the
kind of education. Lastly, s(xi,φ) represents the spillovers from other children’s
education. For instance, s(xi,φ) could be the average human capital of other children
s(xi,φ) = φEw,ν [ws(xi,w)] and therefore
s(xi,φ) = φ1−φ
[´ z¯
z
´ ε˜(xi,z)
ε H(xi,z+ ε)kdεr(z,θ)dz +
´ z
z
´ ε
ε˜(xi,z) Hˇ(qˇ,z+ ε)kdεr(z,θ)dz
]
for some φ ∈ [0,1). The objective functions of a parent choosing public education or
private education respectively have form:
vn(x,w) = ξw− τ(x,w)+d(xl,w)+βρt+1 [H(xi,w)+ s(xi,φ)] (5.14)
and
vm(x,w) = max
q∈Q
ξw− τ(x,w)−Pq+d(xl,w)+βρt+1
[
Hˇ(q,w)+ s(xi,φ)
]
(5.15)
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Formulas (5.14) and (5.15) correspond to u(xi,w) = H(xi,w) + s(xi,w) and
υ(xi,w) = Hˇ[qˇ(w),w] + s(xi) − Pqˇ(w) respectively. Notice that because H is
differentiable, then υ(xi,w) is continuous and differentiable with respect to xi,w under
the assumption that Q is a continuum. The conclusions are unchanged if one allows for
a discrete number of alternatives, see Appendix 5.7.3. First of all, one can notice that
equilibria with a positive level of public intervention are possible even if there are no
externalities in consumption , i.e. φ = 0 and the tax system allows for uniform lump-sum
transfers. The reason is that, if some opting out occurs, the amount that can be rebated to
the voters if the government stops providing the good is lower than the cost of
purchasing the same amount on the private market (if available). Nevertheless, if the tax
system fully flexible, a positive level of provision may emerge in equilibrium only if
there are positive externalities in consumption. If a positive level of provision is chosen
in equilibrium, then the sign of the comparative statics of interest can be derived using
Corollary 5. It is straightforward to show that in this case υ12(xi,z+ ε¯) = 0, thus the
condition (ii) in Corollary 5 reduces to Eh [H12(xi,z+ ε)] ≤ 0. Again, the sign of the
comparative statics depends on the sign of H12. An interesting interpretation of this
condition follows. Define the Expected Individual Marginal Returns to Public
Education: MRE(xi,w) =
∂E[ws(xi,w)|w]
∂xi
= ρt+1 [H1(xi,w)+ωs(xi)]. Moreover, define the
public spending per capita in education as the total spending divided by the size of the
population, i.e. PCE(xi,θ) = Pxipi(xi,θ). One can show the following.
Proposition 6. If MRE(xi,w) is decreasing in income for all x,w, then (i) the quality of
public education xi and (ii) the public spending per capita in education PCE(xi,θ) are
weakly increasing in θ in a neighborhood of x∗(θ).
Proof. (i) One can derive the Expected Individual Marginal Returns to Public Education:
MRE(xi,w) = ρt+1 [H1(xi,w)+ωs(xi)], hence ρt+1H12(xi,z + ε) =
∂MRE(xi,w)
∂w .
Substituting in condition (ii) of Corollary 5 one gets
Eh [u12(xi,z+ ε)] = Eh
[
∂MRE(xi,z+ε)
∂w
]
, which is negative if MRE(xi,w) is decreasing in w
for all xi,w. (ii) The derivative including the political equilibrium change is:
dPPE(xi,θ)
dθ =
∂PPE(xi,θ)
∂θ +
∂PPE(xi,θ)
∂xi
dxi
dθ =
P∂xi∂θ
[´ z
z
(´ ε˜(x,z)
ε kdεr(z,θ)dt+
∂ ε˜(x,z)
∂xi
k
)
r(z,θ)dz
]
+ Pxi
∂pi(xi,θ)
∂θ =
P∂x
∗
i
∂θ
(
pi(xi,θ)+ ∂ ε˜(x,z¯)∂xi
)
. Result (i) implies ∂x
∗
i
∂θ ≥ 0. Moreover, ∂ ε˜(x,z)∂xi =
H1(xi,z+ε˜(x,z))
Hˇ2(q∗,z+ε˜(x,z))−H2(xi,z+ε˜(x,z)) ≥ 0 because the denominator is positive by assumption.
Thus, PPE(xi,θ) is weakly increasing in θ in a neighborhood of x∗(θ).
The result in Proposition 6 has an intuitive interpretation. That is, an increase in the
political weight of relatively low income individuals imply a rise in the quality of public
education if a better education reduces the intensity of the transmission mechanism of
income from parents to children. This implication is potentially testable and can be the
object of future empirical research. There are both theoretical and empirical argument
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in favor and against a negative value for such derivative. Some are related to aspects
not explicitly modeled in this paper, such as credit constraints, partial supplementation,
complementarities between parental education and children’s returns to education, etc.
As explained in Becker, Kominers, Murphy, Spenkuch (2015), the question is strictly
related to the one if government spending and parental investments are substitutes or
complements in the production of human capital. Another aspect that is highlighted in
the literature is the possibility that parents that wish to supplement public education with
private spending face credit constraints. To understand why this may be important, it
is useful to show a simple example. Suppose parents can supplement public education
with private spending s ∈ [0, s¯], which is a substitute (perfect or imperfect) of the public
spending in education in the form: H(x,w) = max
s ∈ [0, s¯] H˜[xi+a(s)]− p˜s subject to
w− τ(x,w)− s ≥ 0. Say X is such that τ(x,w) = −b for all w ≤ wmin and some b ≥ 0
which means that low income households do not pay taxes, but they may receive a grant
that ensure a minimum level of private consumption. Denote with sint(xi) the optimal
level of private spending of a parent that is not credit constrained. Lastly, suppose that
sint(xi)≤ b+wmin, which means that all liquidity constrained individuals are not positive
taxpayers under any policy x ∈ X . These two assumptions imply that the optimal level
of private investment s∗(xi,w) = sint(xi) for w+ b− sint(xi) ≥ 0 and s∗(xi,w) = w+ b
otherwise. Then H12(xi,w) = H˜ ′′[xi+a(w)]a′(w)< 0 for all w< s∗ and H12(xi,w) = 0 for
all w ≥ sint(xi). Because there are theoretical arguments in both directions, the question
if the marginal returns to education are decreasing in income can only be addressed by
empirical analysis. The estimation of returns to education is a classical exercise in applied
economics that involves several issues, the analysis of which is beyond the scope of this
paper. Nevertheless, it is interesting to mention the results of a few recent papers that have
tried to disclose the relationship between returns to education and parental income in the
data. Brenner and Rubinstein (2012) estimate a model of returns to a year of additional
education and find that controlling for individual and family characteristics the returns
to educations are decreasing in the quintile of parental income. Their findings suggest
that individuals from low-income families have lower levels of educational attainment
because they face higher costs of schooling, not because they cannot gain from further
education. In particular a strong and statistically significant difference between the 1st
and the 5th quintile is observed in all specifications, such that the returns to educations at
the top quintile are less than 50% the ones in the lowest quintile. Although the concept
of returns to education in their paper is not directly comparable with the one implied
by this analysis, this result suggests that the sign of the above may be indeed negative.
Conversely, other papers (Altonji and Dunn, 1996) find a positive relationship between
parental education and marginal returns to education. Lastly, Card (2001) reviewing the
literature about returns to education, find some support for the partial supplementation
hypothesis by comparing OLS and IV estimates of the returns to education in several
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studies.
5.4.1 Effects on future generations
It is interesting to analyse how a change in the level of public intervention in education
affects the income levels and income inequality of the future generations. This analysis
provides a further possible interpretation of the condition derived in the previous section.
In this section, I derive results about how the expected income, the variance and the
coefficient of variation of the distribution of ws change if there is a marginal increase
in xi. I can state the following.
Proposition 7. If Var(Σ) is large enough, then (i) the expected income of the next
generation E(ws), (ii) the variance Var(ws,θ) and (iii) the coefficient of variation
CV (ws,θ) of the income distribution of the next generation are all weakly increasing in
xi. Moreover, if the expected marginal returns to public education are weakly decreasing
in parental income, then (iv) the total effect of a marginal increase in θ on Var(ws) and
CV (ws) is ambiguous.
Proof. See Appendix 5.7.3.2.
The interpretation of result (i) is simple. A marginal increase in the quality of public
education has two effects in this setting. On one hand, it causes an increase in the future
productivity of the individuals that choose public education for their children. On the
other hand, it implies that some individuals with ε close to the cutoff ε˜ may switch from
private to public education, reducing the future income of their children. If the marginal
density k of ε is sufficiently low, then the share of switching parents is low and the first
effect dominates. Results (ii), (iii), (iv) imply that if a society has sufficient income
inequality, then an exogenous shock that further increases such inequality is going to be
mitigated in its effects on future generations. The intuition is that a rise in current
income inequality has two opposite effects. On one hand, the mechanism of transmission
of human capital imply that the direct effect may increase the inequality of the next
generation. On the other hand, if marginal returns to education are higher - on average -
for children from poorer families, then the increase in the degree of public intervention
in education is going to cause a decrease in future income inequality.
5.4.2 Vouchers
Suppose that the government provides vouchers that cover the cost of education in public
institutions, but can be also spent to partially cover the fees of private schools if parents
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decide opt-out of the public service. This setting is similar to the one proposed by Ireland
(1990). In this case the indirect utility of an opting-out individual becomes vm(x,w) =w−
τ(x,w)−P(qˇ(w)− xi)1[qˇ(w)− xi ≥ 0] + d(xl,w)+ Hˇ(qˇ(w),w)+ s(xi,φ), while the one
of an individual that does not opt-out is unchanged. The government budget constraint is
now simplified in the form
´ z
z
´ ε
ε [−τ(x,z)+λ (x,z)]kdεr(z,θ)dz+Pixi+Plxl ≤ 0 because
the voucher is provided to everybody. Notice that in this case the presence of positive
spillovers s(xi,φ) is crucial to ensure a positive level of public provision. Specifically,
for any positive level of public provision xi, if (i) s(xi,φ) = 0 , (ii) the tax system allows
for uniform lump-sum transfers with no losses and if (iii) the same level of provision
is also available on the private market, i.e. q¯ ≥ xi, then each individual can be weakly
better off with a policy x′ such that x′i = 0 and τ(x′,w) = τ(x,w)− Pxi. This implies
in turn that no positive level of public intervention is chosen by voters in equilibrium6.
If uniform lump-sum transfers are not allowed, or they are costly, or the private market
does not provide all the quality levels that can be provided by the public sector, then the
equilibrium may exhibit positive xi even in absence of positive spillovers. This result
suggests that the introduction of a voucher system may have unexpected effects and lead
to a fall in public spending in education per capita. Regarding the comparative statics
induced by an increase in θ , it is easy to show that, if xi > 0 at the equilibrium, then the
sign of the comparative statics is the sign of −Eh [H12(xi,z+ ε)], as in the baseline case.
5.5 Comparison with other kinds of Publicly
Provided Goods
In this section I compare the results in section 4 with the ones that this voting framework
delivers if used to analyse other kinds of publicly provided goods. The aim is to show that
the way in which the good is provided and consumed plays a crucial role in determining
how income inequality affects the degree of public intervention in the provision of such
good.
5.5.1 Exclusive Public Provision (Pure Public Good)
Consider the case in which the provision of a certain good is exclusively public, either
because of legal restrictions or because of a market failure. A typical example is National
Defense. Following the structure of the previous section, one can model this case as
follows. The individual indirect utility v(x,w) is given by (a) v(x,w) = vn(x,w) = w−
6A small positive level equal to the lowest optimal private purchase at xi = 0 may still prevail only if rising
revenues does not imply net losses.
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τ(x,w)+u(xi,w)+d(xl,w) and ε˜(x,z) = ε¯ for all z,x. The government budget constraint
is simply linear in xi in the form Pixi+Plxl−Ew[τ(x,w)]≤ 0. Substitute (a) and (b) into
condition (ii) of Corollary 5. The condition for a positive sign for the comparative statics
of interest becomes (b) Eh[u12(xi,z+ ε¯)− u12(xi,z+ ε)] ≥ 0. Thus, one can state the
following result.
Proposition 8. The effect of a marginal increase in income inequality on the equilibrium
level of a publicly provided good with exclusive public provision is ambiguous. If
u(xi,w) = a(xi)c(w), then the effect is weakly positive if c is concave, and weakly
negative if c is convex.
Proof. Straightforward from Corollary 5.
Proposition 8 suggests that the strong relationship between income inequality and size
of public spending in public goods usually implied by traditional Downsian models may
not survive if one departs from the traditional deterministic framework. Moreover, it
shows that - differently from traditional models - imposing restrictions on the sign of the
cross derivative u12 is not sufficient to deliver a monotone comparative statics. As an
example, compare this result with the one of the correspondent unidimensional Downsian
prediction, and for simplicity set τ(x,z) = x jτˇ(w). It is easy to show that if τˇ is such
that an individual with median income is a positive taxpayer and u12(xi,w) ≤ 0 for all
xi,w, then v(x,w) satisfies the Spence-Mirrlees condition and the level of public provision
of the good would be weakly increasing in the median income, and strictly increasing if
x jτˇ(w) is not a lump-sum tax. This means that the skewness of the income distribution
increases (i.e. the median income decreases at constant mean), this would translate into
an increase in public spending in the good in equilibrium. Lastly, notice that the function
u may exhibit different features depending on the kind of public good considered. For
instance policing and other services that improve the protection of property rights may
be more desirable by individuals with high productivity, who are likely to accumulate
larger wealth. Conversely, for other public goods the direction of the relationship may be
reversed.
5.5.2 Top-up goods
Now consider the case of a good that is uniformly provided by the government and such
that consumers can supplement the public provision with private purchases from a set of
available market options Q. The set Q can have a discrete number of elements or it can
be a continuum. In the case of top-up goods, the interaction between the public provision
and private purchases of the good has a quantitative nature. Specifically, consumers care
only about the total quantity of the goods they can consume, independently on the source
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of provision. Because of this, I am going to assume in this section that the (direct) utility
from consuming the top-up good is solely a function of the quantity consumed. Thus,
the indirect utility of individuals that does not supplement the public provision is given
by vn(x,w) = w− τ(x,w)+ uˆ(xi,w)+ d(xl,w), while the one of an individual that does
supplement the public provision with a positive amount of public purchases is vm(x,w) =
maxq∈Qw− τ(x,w)−Pq+ uˆ(xi+q,w)+d(xl,w), for some twice differentiable function
uˆ that is increasing and concave in its first argument. Because no opting-out occurs, the
government budget constraint is linear in xi, in the form −Ew[τ(x,w)−λ (x,w)]+Pixi+
Plxl ≤ 0. Thus, the condition (ii) in Corollary 5 for a positive sign of the comparative
statics becomes Eh [uˆ12(xi+q,z+ ε¯)− uˆ12(xi,z+ ε)] ≥ 0. In the next subsections I will
analyse the consequences of top-up for the level of provision and the comparative statics
at the political equilibrium.
5.5.2.1 Pure Private Goods: undifferentiated consumption good
If the good of interest is a pure private good, then each consumer’s utility is affected
only by its own consumption. Denote with x¯i the maximum level of quality that can be
provided by the government and with q∗(xi,w) the optimal quantity purchased on the
private market by an individual with productivity w facing public provision xi. Define
q˘(w) = minw∈[z+ε,z¯+ε¯] q∗(0,w).
Proposition 9. If (i) [0, x¯i] ⊆ Q and (ii) the tax system allows for costless lump-sum
transfers, then in equilibrium xi ≤ q˘(w). Moreover, if (iii) rising tax revenues is costly, i.e.
Ew[λ (x,w)]> 0 whenever Ew[τ(x,w)]> 0 and Ew[λ (x,w)] = 0 whenever Ew[τ(x,w)] = 0,
then no positive public provision of a pure private good occurs.
Proof. Consider any level of spending Pxi that would emerge if a feasible policy vector
x ∈ X with xi > 0 is chosen. Under assumption (ii), a policy vector such that τ(x′,w) =
τ(x,w)−Pxi for all w and x′i = 0 is feasible. Such policy makes all voters weakly better
off relative to x because all of them can choose a bundle that implies the same amount of
consumption of both the numeraire and the pure private good. Thus all consumers are as
well off as under policy x′ only if xi ≤ q˘(w). This implies that if x is such that xi > q˘(w),
then V (x′,θ)>V (x,θ), thus x cannot be the policy chosen in a voting equilibrium. Lastly,
if (iii) also applies, then xi > 0 implies in equilibrium xi < q˘(w). Thus, V (x′,θ)>V (x,θ),
and therefore no positive provision occurs.
This result implies that in this setting a private good is provided by the government only
if the private market is not capable of providing all the the level of consumption per capita
that would be enjoyed if the good is provided by the public sector in some positive amount
and/or the tax system does not allow for costless lump-sum transfers. In other words, if the
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private market is effective in providing the good and the tax system is sufficiently flexible,
no pure private good should be publicly provided. If inefficiencies in the private provision
or an excessively restrictive tax system imply a positive level of provision, notice that the
sign of the comparative statics would be positive if and only if (a) Eh [uˆ12(xi,z+ ε)]≤ 0 in
the case in which a continuum of alternatives is available on the private market (i.e. Q =
[0, q¯] for sufficiently high q¯) and if and only if (b) Eh [uˆ12(xi+ qˇ,z+ ε¯)− uˆ12(xi,z+ ε)]≥ 0
in the case of a discrete number of alternatives on the private market. About case (a),
notice that the sign of the comparative statics is weakly negative if the publicly provided
private good is a normal good. Regarding case (b), because the sign of uˆ12(xi + qˇ,z+
ε¯)− uˆ12(xi,z+ε) does not have a straightforward economic interpretation. Thus, one can
conclude that the sign of the comparative statics is ambiguous. These results suggest that,
if there is governmental intervention in the provision of a pure private good, one should
not expect the size of this provision to be increasing in the degree of income inequality.
5.5.2.2 Imperfect Public Good with Supplementation: Public Health
Insurance
It is well known that a positive level of public intervention in the provision of a good
may be socially desirable if the good of interest exhibits positive externalities in
consumption or it is an imperfect public good. The reason is that in such cases the level
of consumption that is chosen by self-interested private agents tends to be suboptimally
low on a social welfare point of view. Thus, if the loss due to underprovision is large
relatively to the one induced by a uniform public provision, then a positive level of
public intervention in the provision of the good characterizes the political equilibrium. A
typical example of a good that is described in the literature as a top-up (see, Epple and
Romano 1996a and Gouveia, 1997) is health insurance. Typically, the government can
provide a certain level of service or insurance coverage, and consumer can purchase
additional insurance on the private market. In this case the availability on the private
market may influence the comparative statics, thus it is worth to analyse two cases. The
first possibility is that a discrete number of options is available on the private market, i.e.
Q ={q1,q2, ...,qn}. In such case, similarly to what shown for a opt-out good, the sign of
the comparative statics is the same as in the case in which only one private option is
available, provided that such option is selected from Q as the one that maximize the
objective function of an individual with income w = wˆ when the policy chosen is the
equilibrium policy (see Appendix C.1). In this case, I assume that individual utility is
given by U(c,xi,w) = c+ d(xl,w)+βE [Health(xi,w,φ)|w], where Health is a function
of the level of health insurance, of the individual parameter w, of the externality
produced by the health of other individuals and by an i.i.d shock. It has form:
Health(xi,w,φ) = I(xi + q,w) + s(xi,φ) + ν where q = 0 if an individual does not
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top-up. I is a function that captures the effect of insurance on voters’ health. The
interaction between the level of health insurance and the parameter capturing
productivity in the function I may be due to various reasons. For instance, individual
with higher productivity may have different costs of illness relative to low productivity
ones, or they may have a different probability of getting sick. Lastly, s(xi,φ) represents
the average level of health in the whole population, i.e. s(xi,ϕ) =
ϕ
1−ϕ
[´ z
z
´ ε˜(xi,z)
ε H(xi,z+ ε)kdεr(z,θ)dz+
´ z
z
´ ε
ε˜(xi,z)H(xi+ qˇ,z+ ε)kdεr(z,θ)dz
]
. The
indirect utilities of individuals that top-up and do not top-up the public provision are
given by:
vn(x,w) = w f − τ(x,w f )+ I(xi,w)+ s(xi,ϕ) (5.16)
and
vm(x,w) = max
q∈Q
w f − τ(x,w f )− pq+ I(xi+q,w)+ s(xi,ϕ) (5.17)
respectively. The condition (ii) in Corollary 5 for a weakly positive sign of the
comparative statics of interest reduces to Eh [I12(xi+q,z+ ε¯)− I12(xi,z+ ε)] ≥ 0 if a
discrete number of options is available on the private market (i.e. Q ={q1,q2, ...,qn})
and to Eh [I12(xi,z+ ε)] ≤ 0 if there is a continuum of of private insurance available (i.e.
Q =[0, q¯] for sufficiently large q¯).
Proposition 10. (a) (Continuum of choices on the private market). If (i) Q = [0, q¯] for
sufficiently large q¯ and (ii) health insurance is a normal good for all income levels, then
a marginal rise in income inequality has a weakly negative effect on the equilibrium
level of the public provision of health insurance. (b) (Discrete set of choices on the
private market). If (i) a marginal rise in income inequality has an ambiguous effect on
the equilibrium level of the public provision of health insurance. If (ii)
I(xi + q,w) = b(xi + q)c(w) for some monotone functions b,c then the effect is weakly
positive if c is concave, and weakly negative if c is convex.
Proof. (a): denote with q∗(xi,w) the demand of private health insurance of an individual
with productivity w given a level of public insurance xi. Using the F.O.C. of the
consumer’s optimization problem, an individual that purchases a positive amount on the
private market has income elasticity of demand
∂q∗(xi,w)
∂w
w
q∗(xi,w) = −
I12(xi+q∗(xi,w),w)
I11(xi+q∗(xi,w),w)
w
q∗(xi,w) . This is positive if I12(xi+q
∗,w) ≥ 0. Thus, if
q is a normal good for all w, then Eh [I12(xi,z+ ε)] ≥ 0 which implies a weakly negative
sign of the comparative statics. (b): (i), straightforward from the condition (ii) Theorem
5; (ii) notice that the condition becomes Eh[b′(xi + q)c′(z+ ε¯)− b′(xi)c′(z+ ε)] where b
must be concave by assumption. Thus the expectation is weakly negative if c is concave.
Proposition 10 implies that the sign of the relationship between income inequality and
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degree of public intervention in health insurance is ambiguous, and that under additional
restrictions it is negative. This results shows that, if voters’ preferences over a publicly
provided good are separated from redistributive motives, then the effect of a shock on
income inequality on the degree of public intervention depends solely on the
characteristics of the good. Moreover, this result has important consequences for the
traditional theoretical literature that analyses link between income inequality and size of
public intervention in redistributive policies (e.g. Meltzer and Richards, 1981). If the
marginal effect of an increase in income inequality may have different sign for different
kinds of public intervention, then the total effect on the size of public spending in
policies with redistributive effects may depends on various factors, including the relative
size of public intervention in different kinds of policies at the political equilibrium. For
instance, one may expect to observe a positive link between inequality and redistribution
- as implied by the traditional literature - if in-cash policies and public education absorb
a large share of the governmental budget, but this may not hold true if other form of
public spending - such as public health insurance - are substantial.
5.6 Concluding Remarks
This paper provides a theoretical framework to analyse the effects of marginal shocks in
income inequality on public spending on education in democratic countries. In order to
separate voters’ demand for public provision of education from their preferences for
redistribution I assume a multidimensional policy space that includes as choice variables
the quality of public education, the parameters of the tax system and the public spending
in other policies. Moreover, following the literature, I assume that education is a good
that is characterized by the possibility opting-out, which means that individuals can
either enjoy the quality of public education, or purchase private education at one of the
quality levels available on the market. The qualitative aspect of the consumer’s choice is
crucial, because the choice of opting-out implies the loss of the private benefits from the
public provision. This implies in turn that preferences may exhibit non-convexities and
that standard results in deterministic voting models may not hold. I adopt a probabilistic
voting model similar to the one in Lindbeck and Weibull (1987) and Banks and Duggan
(2005) to study how a marginal increase in income inequality - at constant mean - affects
the equilibrium quality of education. This choice allows one to tackle the problems of
existence of a political equilibrium induced both by the multidimensionality of the
policy space (Grandmont, 1975) and by the presence of non-convexities in the objective
function (Stiglitz, 1975), that are well-known in the theoretical literature. I show that the
sign of the effect of a marginal mean preserving spread of the income distribution on the
equilibrium quality of public education is positive if the expected marginal returns to
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public education are larger for children that have relatively low-income parents, which is
in line with the findings in the empirical literature. Such literature suggests that this may
be the case if public education can be partially supplemented by parental private
investment and low income parents face credit constraint. Moreover, this condition is
equivalent in the model to the case in which the degree at which income is transmitted
across generation is lower if better public education is provided. Unsurprisingly, I can
also show that, under the same conditions, better quality of public education implies
lower income inequality in the next generation. This result suggests that exogenous
shocks on income inequality may be mitigated in future generations by the endogenous
adjustment in the degree of public intervention in education. Such predictions rely on the
particular way in which this good is publicly provided and do not hold for other kinds of
publicly provided goods, such as pure public goods and top-up goods. Specifically, I
show that for a typical top-up good such as health insurance, a marginal increase in
income inequality has ambiguous effects on the level of insurance provided by the
government, and that under some mild additional assumption such effect is weakly
negative. This suggests that the direction of the relationship between income inequality
and total size of governmental intervention in redistributive policies may differ from the
one implied by traditional models, and may depend on the relative size of the public
spending on different kinds of public intervention. In other words, if one can write a
sufficiently flexible model, then voters choose to redistribute in the most effective way -
through the tax system - and redistribution motives do not strongly affect the size of the
public intervention in other policies. Public education is an exception in this framework,
because it is a policy that allows relatively low income voters to achieve income
redistribution in the generation of their children. Because this kind of redistribution
cannot be achieved through the tax system, relatively low income voters support high
levels of public education in order to ensure higher consumption levels to their children.
If that is the case, then the effects of a positive shock on income inequality are mitigated
by the endogenous political choices both in the short run - through the tax system - and
in the long run - through better public education, thus the consequences of shocks on
income inequality are less dramatic for the society.
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5.7 Appendix
5.7.1 Simple Downsian Model
Consider the following simple Downsian model with n voters. Agents differ only in a
unidimensional parameter w ∈W (income). There are two choice variables x1,x2 related
by a convex governmental budget set X such that
X ≡ {(x1,x2) |(x1,x2) ∈ R2+∩ B˜(x1,x2,E(w))≤ 0}. Individual preferences are
represented by the indirect utility function u(x1,x2,w), which continuous, increasing in
x1,x2,w and twice differentiable in each argument. The Spence-Mirrlees condition states
M(x1,x2, t) = ∂∂ t
(
u1(x1,x2,t)
u2(x1,x2,t)
)
> (<)0 ∀x1,x2, t. If such condition is satisfied, then the
voting game has a Condorcet Winner, which is the individual with median w. Thus the
social choice is given by (x1,x2) = argmax(x1,x2)∈X u(x1,x2,w
m) where wm is the median
of w. Because of the Spence-Mirrlees condition the preferred choice of an individual
with parameter w is such that x1 is increasing (decreasing) in w and x2 is decreasing
(increasing) in w. Hence the equilibrium social choice would also change in this way if
the distribution of w is changed in such a way that the median voter has higher t and E(t)
is unchanged. This implies a monotone link between a measure of the skewness of the
income distribution (in this case the difference the mean to median ratio). For instance,
suppose x2is a private good that in uniformly publicly provided (no private purchases are
allowed in this simple example) , after tax income is given by w− x1τˆ(w) and the
indirect utility function is u(x1,x2,w) = u(w− x1τˆ(w),x2)). The government budget
constraint is in the form −x1E(τˆ(w))+Px2 ≤ 0 where P2is the price of one unit of the
good. Notice that in an interior solution the budget constraint is binding hence the
problem is equivalent to maxx2∈X u(w− p(w,P)x2,x2) where p(w,P) is the tax-price of
the good defined as total amount of tax paid divided by the size of the provision, i.e.:
p(w,P) = x1τˆ(w)x1E[τˆ(w)]/P =
Pτˆ(w)
E[τˆ(w)] . The formula shows that the tax-price of the good is lower
than the market price for all individuals that pay less taxes than average. If this is the
case for the median income voter, this results in a positive level of public intervention in
equilibrium. Moreover, this suggest the provision has redistributive effects, in the sense
that after a positive provision is implemented, relatively lower income individuals can
afford new consumption bundles, while for relatively high income individuals some
bundles are not affordable anymore. The total effect of a marginal increase in income on
the demand for public provision is given by:
dx∗2(w,P)
dw
=
∂xM2 (w, P˜)
∂w
+
∂xM2 (w, P˜)
∂P
p′(w,P) (5.18)
where x∗2(w,P) is the demand for public provision of and individual with income w and
xM2 (w, P˜) is the private Marshallian demand of the same individual at price P˜ = p(w,P).
Denote with ηMw (w,P) the income elasticity of the Marshallian demand for an individual
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with income w at price P, and with ηHP (w,P) the corresponding price elasticity of the
Hicksian demand. Also, denote with η pubw (w,P) the income elasticity of the demand for
public provision of and individual with income w. Using Slutsky equation one gets:
dx∗2(w,P)
dw
w
x∗2(w,P)
=
∂xm2 (w, P˜)
∂w
w
xm2 (w, P˜)
[1− p′(w,P)xm2 (w, P˜)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
A
+
+
∂xh2(w, P˜)
∂P
p(w,P)
xm2 (w, P˜)
wp′(w, P˜)
p(w,P)︸ ︷︷ ︸
B
=
(5.19)
which rewrites η pubw (w,P) = ηMw (w, P˜)(1− p′(w,P)x∗2(w, P˜))+ηHP (w, P˜)wp
′(w,P)
p(w,P) . Because
ηHP (w,P)< 0 by the law of compensated demand, this implies that for any tax system in
which the tax paid is increasing in income (i.e. τˆ ′(w) > 0 which implies p′(w) >≥ 0),
the income elasticity of the demand for public provision of the good is strictly lower than
the income elasticity of the private demand at price P˜. Thus implies that the demand
for public provision is going to be decreasing in w unless the good has sufficiently high
income elasticity of private demand. Moreover, the higher is the progressivity of the
tax system, the larger p′(w,P). Hence if the tax system is progressive, η pubw (w,P) tends
to be negative implying that a decrease in the income of the median voter at constant
mean will lead to a higher level of public provision in equilibrium. This may lead to
paradoxical results. For instance, suppose that all individuals in the economy demand the
same amount on the private market, i.e. xM2 (w,P) = x¯
M
2 (P) for all w. Nevertheless, the
demand for public provision of the good will be decreasing in the income of the pivotal
voter. The intuition is that a larger public provision is desirable for low income voters
because implies more redistribution. Because such voters cannot achieve redistribution in
cash because of the restrictions in the tax system, they support a larger public provision.
5.7.2 Existence and Uniqueness with opting-out or top-up
Recall voters choose a n-dimensional policy vector and have indirect utility v(x,w) =
max{vn(x,w),v(x,w)} where vn(x,w),vm(x,w) are two differentiable functions of x,w
and concave in x. Suppose vnw(x,w)− vmw(x,w) ≤ 0∀x,w. Then for given x there is at
most one wˆ such that vn(x, wˆ) = vm(x, wˆ). This implies the existence of an endogenous
threshold in w such that Party A’s objective function becomes:
V (xA,xB,θ) =
´ wˆ(xA)
w [P(v
n(xA,w)− v(xB,w))]rˆ(θ ,w)dw+
+
´ w
wˆ(xB)[P(v
m(xA,w)− v(xB,w))]rˆ(θ ,w)dw
(5.20)
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5.7.2.1 Existence
Theorem 1. (Existence, uniqueness and policy convergence). If there exist r¯ and p¯′
such that if the distributions Rˆ(θ ,w) and P(d) is such that rˆ(θ ,w) ≤ r¯ for all w and
p′[v(xA,w,n)−v(xB,w)]≤ p¯′for some positive r¯, p¯′, then (i) there is a unique equilibrium
in pure strategies. The unique electoral equilibrium is such that (ii) the two parties choose
the same policy.
Proof. (i) Existence and uniqueness. Sufficient conditions for existence and uniqueness
imply V A(x,xB) being a (strictly) concave function of x and the inequality constraint
B(x,θ) ≤ 0 is a continuously differentiable convex function. Define V Ajk(xA,xB) an
element of the Hessian HV , i.e. HV ( j,k) ≡ V Ajk(xA,xB) = ∂
2V A(x,xB)
∂x j∂xk
. Denote with
dl(xA,xB,w)≡ vl(xA,w)− v(xB,w) with l ∈ {n,m}. Then one can show that:
V Ajk(x
A,xB,θ) = ∂ wˆ∂xk p(d(x
A,xB, wˆ))[dnj (x
A,xB)−dmj (xA,xB, wˆ)]rˆ(θ , wˆ)+
+
´ wˆ(xA)
w
∂ 2
∂x j∂xk
[P(dn(xA,xB,w)]rˆ(θ ,w)dw+
+
´ w
wˆ(xA)
∂ 2
∂x j∂xk
[P(dm(xA,xB,w)]rˆ(θ ,w)dw
(5.21)
Define a matrix M(xA,xB) such that each element is
M jk(xA,xB) = ∂ wˆ∂xk p(d(x
A,xB, wˆ))[dnj (x
A,xB) − dmj (xA,xB, wˆ)]ε˜ j(x,z)rˆ(θ , wˆ) and two
matrices H l(xA,xB,w) for l ∈ {n,m} such that each element is
H ljk(x
A,xB,w) = ∂
2P(d(xA,xB,w))
∂x j∂xk
. Recall that the sum of negative semidefinite matrices is
negative semidefinite. Hence one needs xT HV x ≤ 0 for negative semidefiniteness. Using
the matrices defined above can be written as:
xT HV x = xT M(xA,xB)x+
´ wˆ(x)
w
[
xT Hn(xA,xB,w)x
]
rˆ(θ ,w)dw+
+
´ w
wˆ(x)
[
xT Hm(xA,xB,w)x
]
rˆ(θ ,w)dw≤ 0
(5.22)
That can be written as xT [M(xA,xB) +Ew(Hn|w ≤ wˆ(x))pi(x) +Ew(Hm|w ≥ wˆ(x))(1−
pi(x))]x ≤ 0. Define H lv ≡ D2[dl(xA,xB,w)] as the Hessian of individual indirect utility
and ∇vn(xA,w) the gradient vector. Following Enelow, Hinrich (1989) for the second and
third component of xT HV x we need for any n×1 vector y:
yT Hny =
´ wˆ(xA)
w p
′(d(xA,xB,w))yT
[
∇vn(xA,w)
][
∇vn(xA,w)
]T y rˆ(θ ,w)dw+
+
´ wˆ(xA)
w p(d(x
A,xB,w))yT Hnv y rˆ(θ ,w)dw≤ 0
(5.23)
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And similarly one can derive yT Hny. Thus sufficient conditions for uniqueness are
p′(dl(xA,xB,w))
p(dl(xA,xB,w))
≤−yT H lvy
[[
∇dl(xA,xB,w)
][
∇dl(xA,xB,w)
]T]−2
(5.24)
for l = n,m and for all w and xT M(xA,xB)x ≤ 0. Notice that as P becomes close to
uniform this condition is equivalent to the matrix Hv(i) to be negative semidefinite,
which is equivalent to a concave utility function. But in comparison with Enelow,
Hinrich (1989) we have an additional element: M(xA,xB). The definition of wˆ(xA) in
formula (5.4) implies:
vm(xA, wˆ) = vn(xA, wˆ) (5.25)
Differentiate this w.r.t. xk and rearrange to get:
∂ wˆ(xA)
∂xk
=− v
m
k (x
A, wˆ)− vnk(xA, wˆ)
vmw(xA, wˆ)− vnw(xA, wˆ)
(5.26)
Substituting into M jk(xA,xB) one gets:
M jk(xA,xB) =
p(d(xA, tˆ,n))
[v j(xA,tˆ;n)−v j(xA,tˆ;m)]
vt(xA,tˆ;n)−vt(xA,tˆ;m) [vk(xA, tˆ;n)− vk(xA, tˆ;m)]rˆ(θ , wˆ)
(5.27)
Hence M(xA,xB) =
M(xA,xB) =
p(d(xA,xB,wˆ))rˆ(θ ,wˆ)
vnw(xA,wˆ)−vmw(xA,wˆ)
[
∇vn(xA, wˆ)−∇vm(xA, wˆ)][∇vn(xA, wˆ)−∇vm(xA, wˆ)]T (5.28)
Hence the sufficient conditions for existence of a Political Equilibrium are the same as in
Enelow, Hinrich (1989), plus the additional condition stated above. Given that[
∇vn(xA, wˆ)−∇vm(xA, wˆ)] [∇vn(xA, wˆ)−∇vm(xA, wˆ)]T is the product of the same vector
it is positive semidefinite, hence xT M(xA,xB)x ≤ 0 for all x is not satisfied under the
assumption vnw(x
A, wˆ)−vmw(xA, ˆ˜ j(x,z)wε)< 0 ∀x. i.e. if individuals with relatively high w
choose to enjoy the private provision. On the other hand, it is possible that even if
vnw(x
A, wˆ) − vmw(xA, wˆ) < 0 the second and the third elements of V Ajk(xA,xB,θ) are
sufficiently concave to guarantee concavity of the whole function. Specifically, notice
that as the variance of w increases (with w− w increasing), rˆ(θ , wˆ) → 0, thus the
conditions for existence become similar to the ones in Enelow, Hinich (1989).
Specifically, under the assumption of Section 4 that W = Z+Σ, with Σ being a uniformly
distributed random variable independent of Z, one can find a threshold k such that if
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ε¯− ε ≥ k then the conditions are satisfied.
(ii) Policy convergence. Notice that the game described above can be modeled as a zero
sum game because the expected plurality for Party B: is equal to 1−V (xA,xB). Suppose
(xA,xB) is an equilibrium strategy with xA 6= xB and delivering expected plurality
V (xA,xB) to party A. Party A can always achieve a certain value V A by playing xA = xB.
Hence if V (xA,xB)<V A (a) then xA cannot be a best response for Party A because it can
profitably deviate to xˆA = xB. If V A(xA,xB) > V A (b), then V B(xB,xA) = 1−V A(xA,xB).
Then xB cannot be a best response for Party B because it can deviate to xˆB = xA and get
V B(xˆB,xA) = 1−V A. Inequality (b) implies that this deviation is profitable. Hence in
equilibrium it must be true that V A(xA,xB) =V A and V B(xB,xA) = 1−V A and xA = xB.
5.7.2.2 Utilitarian outcome
Theorem 2. (Utilitarian outcome). The policy chosen by both parties in equilibrium is
the same as the policy that would be chosen by an omnipotent Benthamite government,
i.e. x∗ = argmaxx∈X V (x,θ) where V (x,w) =
´ w
w v(x,w)rˆ(w,θ)dw.
Proof. The Lagrangian for this problem is:
L =
´ wˆ
w [P(v
n(x,w)− v(xB,w))]r(θ ,w)dw+
+
´ w
wˆ [P(v
m(x,w)− v(xB, t))]rˆ(θ ,w)dw−µB(x)
(5.29)
First order conditions are:
[xi] :
´ wˆ
w p
[
dn(xA,w)
]
vnxi(x
A,w)r(θ ,w)dw+
+
´ w
wˆ p
[
dm(xA,w)
]
vmxi(x
A,w)rˆ(θ ,w)dw≤ µBxi(x)
(5.30)
with respect to each policy dimension xi and B(x) ≤ 0 with respect to µ . Hence for any
i 6= j such that Lxi = Lx j = 0 one gets:
´ wˆ
w p
[
dn(xA,w)
]
vnxi(x
A,w)r(θ ,w)dw+
´ w
wˆ p
[
dm(xA,w)
]
vmxi(x
A,w)rˆ(θ ,w)dw´ wˆ
w p [d
n(xA,w)]vnx j(x
A,w)r(θ ,w)dw+
´ w
wˆ p [d
m(xA,w)]vmx j(x
A,w)rˆ(θ ,w)dw
=
Bxi(x)
Bx j(x)
Notice that at an equilibrium point xA = xB (see proof to Theorem 1) hence dn(xA,w) =
dm(xA,w) = 0∀w and wˆ(xA) = wˆ(xB). Given that p(d(xA,w)) is independent of w in this
case, i.e. p(d(xA,w)) = p(0) 6= 0, then the previous equation becomes:
´ wˆ
w v
n
xi(x
A,w)r(θ ,w)dw+
´ w
wˆ v
m
xi(x
A,w)rˆ(θ ,w)dw´ wˆ
w v
n
x j(x
A,w)r(θ ,w)dw+
´ w
wˆ v
m
x j(x
A,w)rˆ(θ ,w)dw
=
Bxi(x)
Bx j(x)
(5.31)
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which is the same condition that one can derive for the problem:
max
x∈X ,G(x)≤0
wˆˆ
w
vn(x,w)rˆ(θ ,w)dw+
wˆ
wˆ
vm(x,w)rˆ(θ ,w)dw (5.32)
which is the Utilitarian Social Optimum. Notice that for this result to hold it is crucial
that the function P is the same for all income levels w.
5.7.2.3 Comparative Statics
Lemma 3. (Monotonicity): If there exists at least one x j with N ≥ j > L such that (i) the
solution of the maximization problem is interior for x j, (ii) b(x,θ) is such that ∂b(x,θ)∂x j =
α ∂a(x,θ)∂x j for some constant α , and if (iii)
∂ 2ei(xi,θ)
∂xi∂θ
≥ 0 (≤ 0), then xi is weakly increasing
(decreasing) in θ in a neighborhood of x∗(θ).
Proof. The Lagrangian for the maximization problem is L = a(x,θ) +∑i∈L ei(xi,θ)−
µ[κa(x,θ)+ b(x,θ)+∑i∈L δ (xi)]. The F.O.C.s with respect of each i ≤M are given by
the following: e1i(xi,θ)−µδ ′(xi)≤ 0 and for each j such that M < j≤ N, they are given
by ax j(x,θ)−µκax j(x,θ)−µb(x,θ)≤ 0. Lastly, κa(x,θ)+b(x,θ)+∑i∈L δi(xi)≤ 0. If
the solution is interior for at least one j, and bx j(x,θ) = 0, this implies µ = 1/κ , i.e. the
Lagrangian multiplier is a constant in a neighborhood of x∗. Now either one gets a corner
solution for the i policy dimension, in which case xi is unaffected by marginal changes in
θ , or the solution is interior for such dimension. In the latter case, one can differentiate
the F.O.C. with respect to θ to get:
dxi(0)
dθ
=− 1
Lx jx j(x,θ)
[
Lx jθ +∑
j
Lxix j
dxi(0)
dθ
+∑
j
Lxiµ
dµ
dθ
]
(5.33)
Notice that additive separability of xi in the indirect utility and in the budget constraint
implies Lxix j = 0 for all j 6= i. Moreover, because µ is constant in a neighborhood of
x∗, one gets dµdθ = 0. Lastly, strict concavity of V and convexity of the budget set B
imply Lx jx j(x,θ)< 0, and Lxiθ = exiθ (xi,θ) because B is a constant function of θ . Thus,
sign
(
dx∗i (0)
dθ
)
= sign
(
∂ 2e(xi,θ)
∂xi∂θ
)
.
5.7.3 Income Inequality and Public Education
This section presents the proofs about the comparative statics in presence of a discrete
set of choices on the private market with n > 1 elements and of the effects on changes in
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the level of public provision of education on the features of the income distribution of the
next generation.
5.7.3.1 Multiple Discrete Options on the Private Market
Suppose there is more than one option available on the private market
Q ={q1,q2, ...,qn} and that k ≥ 2 options are chosen with positive probability at an
equilibrium. Denote with υ( j)(xi,z+ ε) the indirect utility of an individual that purchase
option q j. Define new thresholds ε˜ j(x,z) such that
υ( j)(xi,z + ε˜ j(x,z)) = υ( j+1)(xi,z + ε˜ j(x,z)) for j = 1,2, ...,k. Assume
υ( j)(xi,w)−υ( j+1)(xi,w) to be decreasing in w, that is, individuals with higher income
choose higher levels of quality on the private market. Also, assume that the distribution
of ε has enough variance to ensure that for any z ∈ [z, z¯] there exists ε˜ j(x,z) defined as
above for all k ≤ j ≤ k, where k and k¯ are the lowest and the highest quality levels that
are chosen by a positive share of individuals. Then the objective function becomes:
V˜ (x,θ) =
´ z
z
´ ε˜0(x,z)
ε u(xi,z+ ε)kdεr(z,θ)dz+
+∑k¯i=k
´ ε˜ j(x,z)
ε˜ j−1(x,z)
υ( j)(xi,z+ ε)kdεr(z,θ)dz+
+
´ ε
ε˜k−1(x,z)υk(xi,z+ ε)kdεr(z,θ)dz+Ez,ε(z+ ε)+
+
´ z
z
´ ε
ε d(xl,w)kr(z,θ)dεdz+Ez,ε [y(z+ ε)− τ(x,z+ ε)]
(5.34)
And the government budget constraint is unchanged in comparison with the baseline
case. In the same way shown in the proof of Theorem 4, one can show that xi is weakly
increasing in θ in a neighborhood of x∗(θ) if
´ z
z
[
υ(k¯)122(xi,z+ ε¯)−u122(xi,z+ ε)
]
(´ z
z [G(s)−F(s)]ds
)
dz ≥ 0. Hence the comparative statics is not affected in the
proximity of the political equilibrium if one analyses a simpler problem in which
Q˜ ={q j} where q j ∈ argmaxq∈Q υ(k¯)(xi,z+ ε). Q.E.D.
5.7.3.2 Effects of policy changes on the next generation
Proposition 7. If Var(Σ) is large enough, then (i) the expected income of the next
generation E(ws), (ii) the variance Var(ws,θ) and (iii) the coefficient of variation
CV (ws,θ) of the income distribution of the next generation are all weakly increasing in
xi. Moreover, if the expected marginal returns to public education are weakly decreasing
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in parental income, then (iv) he total effect of a marginal increase in θ on Var(ws) and
CV (ws) is ambiguous.
Proof. (i) Differentiate E(ws) with respect to θ . ∂E[w
s(x,w)|w]
∂xi
=
ρt+1
{´ z
z
∂ ε˜(x,z)
∂xi
k
[
H(xi,z+ ε˜)− Hˇ(qˇ,z+ ε˜)
]
+
´ ε˜
ε [H1(xi,z+ ε)]kdεr(θ ,z)dz+ωs
′(xi)
}
which using the formula for ∂ ε˜(x,z)∂xi becomes
∂E[ws(x,w)|w]
∂xi
= ρt+1
[´ z
z −kH1(xi,z+ ε˜)
+
´ ε˜
ε H1(xi,z+ ε)kdεr(θ ,z)dz+ωs
′(xi)
]
. Notice that´ ε˜
ε [H1(xi,z+ ε)]kdεr(θ ,z)dz + ωs
′(xi) > 0 for all x if s′(xi) ≥ 0. Recall
Var(Σ) = (ε¯ − ε)2/12. As Var(Σ)→ ∞ it must be true that k = 1/(ε¯ − ε)→ 0. Thus,
because H1(xi,z+ ε˜) is finite by assumption, then there exists kˆ ∈ [0,∞) such that if
k ≤ kˆ then ∂E[ws(x,w)|w]∂xi ≥ 0. (ii) The derivative of the variance the income of the next
generation Var(ws,θ) is given by the following:
∂Var(ws)
∂xi
=
´ z
z
∂ ε˜
∂xi
k
[
H(xi,z+ ε˜)2− Hˇ(qˇ,z+ ε˜)2
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
A
+2
ε˜ˆ
ε
[
H(xi,z+ ε)H1(xi,z+ ε)−E(u)∂E(w
s)
∂xi
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
B
kdεg(z)dz =
(5.35)
which rewrites as follows:
∂Var(ws)
∂xi
=
∂ ε˜
∂xi
k
[
H(xi,z+ ε˜)2− Hˇ(qˇ,z+ ε˜)2
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
A[
H(xi,z+ ε˜)+ Hˇ(qˇ,z+ ε˜)−2E(ws)
]︸ ︷︷ ︸
A
+
+2
zˆ
z
ε˜ˆ
ε
H1(xi,z+ ε) [H(xi,z+ ε)−E(ws)]kdεg(z)dz
︸ ︷︷ ︸
B
(5.36)
Thus, B ≤ ´ zz
´ ε¯
ε H1(xi,z+ ε)] [H(xi,z+ ε)−E(ws)]kdεg(z)dz if z+ ε˜(xi,z) ≥ E(z+ ε)
and H is concave in w, because of Jensen’s inequality. Lastly, recall H1(xi,w) is
decreasing in w, which implies:
195
Chapter 5 The Political Economy of Public Education
´ z
z
´ ε¯
ε H1(xi,z+ ε)] [H(xi,z+ ε)−E(ws)]kdεg(z)dz≤
≤ Ez,ε [H1(xi,z+ ε)]
´ z
z
´ ε¯
ε [H(xi,z+ ε)−E(ws)]kdεg(z)dz = 0
(5.37)
Thus B is negative. The sign of A is ambiguous, but the magnitude tend to zero as k
becomes large (i.e. the variance increases). Thus the variance of the income distribution
of the next generation is decreasing in xi. (iii) Regarding the coefficient of variation notice
that it is defined as CV (ws) =
√
Var(ws)/E(ws). Recall from Proposition 5 that E(ws)
is increasing in xi for sufficiently small k. Thus it is decreasing in xi if Var(ws) is. (iv)
Notice that dVar(w
s)
dθ =
∂Var(ws)
∂θ +
∂Var(ws)
∂xi
dxi
dθ . The first part
∂Var(ws)
∂θ may be positive, but
as the second part has negative sign if MRE(x,w) is decreasing in w for all x,w, then the
sign of the total effect is ambiguous.
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Figures
Figure 5.1. Income Inequality vs Public Spending in Education in US States
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6 Conclusions
This thesis provides a number of important contributions to the theoretical analysis of
how electoral competition shapes public policy in democratic countries. The first
contribution is methodological. It consists of a simple theoretical tool that allows one to
characterize the policy outcome of an electoral process and to assess the relationship
between such outcome and some features of the populations of voters. Specifically, in
chapter 2 I propose a model of electoral competition in the spirit of the one proposed by
Levy (2004) and an equilibrium concept to tackle an important problem that affects the
traditional literature. That is, traditional models lack predictive power with respect to the
policy outcome if voters face a multidimensional choice domain, because a Condorcet
winner usually fails to exist in such case. The tool I propose can deal with such cases
and - under suitable restrictions - delivers a sharp characterization of the policy that is
implemented in equilibrium. The second contribution consists in employing the new
theoretical tool to address two popular questions in the literature. In detail, in chapter 3 I
study the relationship between income inequality and size of the government. I augment
the model proposed by Meltzer and Richard (1987) - in which the government
redistributes income uniquely through a lump-sum grant - introducing a second
endogenous spending policy. The second policy dimension is the amount of a public
good provided by the government. I show that the positive relationship between income
inequality and total size of the government that prevails in the traditional analysis does
not survive in this augmented model. Moreover, the prediction has opposite sign if - in
the proximity of an equilibrium - the degree of progression of the tax system is not too
strong. I also show that the degree of progression of the tax system - and not the total
size of the government - is increasing in income inequality in this economic
environment. Lastly, I show that the predictions of this augmented model are more
consistent with the result in the empirical literature, in comparison with the one in
Meltzer and Richard’s paper. In chapter 4 I study the effect of population ageing on
immigration policies and fiscal policies in a simple overlapping generation model.
Similar attempts in the literature abstract from the endogeneity of the fiscal policy in
order to avoid the problems induced by a multidimensional choice domain. Thus, such
studies overlook an important economic channel. That is, in modern democracies
citizens choose - with their voting behavior - not only the immigration policy, but also
how costs and benefits of immigration are divided up among the natives through taxes
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and public spending. Existing papers about the political economy of immigration
policies typically assume that fiscal policies are exogenous to the political process. As a
result, such papers derive predictions that are uniquely driven by the assumptions
regarding the exogenous structure of the fiscal system, which determines how the net
gains from immigration are allocated to different groups of voters. Unsurprisingly, these
analyses deliver predictions about the determinants of immigration policies that are often
empirically controversial. In my analysis I allow voters to choose both the immigration
policy - in the form of a quota - and the fiscal policy. I find that - in the model - the
elderly and the low income voters are relatively more hostile to immigration and
favorable to public spending relative to the young and the high income. The intuition is
simple. On one hand, the elderly and the poor have stronger preferences for large public
spending, because they are less affected by the high income taxes needed to finance such
policy. On the other hand, they are always better off by financing such public spending
through high tax rates - that affects mostly the young and high income individuals -
rather than by increasing the tax base by allowing more immigrants. Such preference
patterns are consistent with most empirical evidence based on survey data. Because of
this channel, population ageing - which implies an increase in the political power of the
elderly - translates into more restrictive immigration policies, more public spending and
higher tax rates. Lastly, in chapter 5 I analyse a problem that requires a different
theoretical approach. Specifically, I study the relationship between income inequality
and public spending in schooling, in a model of parental investment in education. I allow
voters to redistribute income directly - through a lump-sum grant - or indirectly -
investing in the future productivity of their children. Thus, the policy space is
two-dimensional. Moreover, I allow parents to opt-out of the public school system and
choose private education. The latter assumption is known to generate non-convexities in
voter preferences, which often imply problems of existence of a Condorcet winner in
traditional models (see Stiglitz, 1974). Because of such issue, the framework proposed in
chapter 2 of this thesis cannot be successful in characterizing the equilibrium policy
outcome. Thus, I employ a probabilistic model of electoral competition to derive the
direction of the relationship of interest. I find that, if a rise in the quality of public
education implies a reduction in the degree at which income is transmitted from parents
to children, then a mean-preserving spread in the income distribution translates into
higher public spending in education per pupil. This result suggests that, if public
education helps in reducing future income inequality, then public intervention in
education should be particularly large in economies that experience very high level of
inequality.
A common goal of chapters 3, 4 and 5 is to show that the interaction among multiple
endogenous policy dimensions is often crucial in shaping the trade-offs faced by voters.
Because of that, the theoretical approach proposed in chapter 2 and - to a certain extent -
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the one employed in chapter 5, may prove useful to revisit many other questions that
have been studied in the literature abstracting from such interaction. A typical example -
extensively mentioned in the previous chapters - is the question of whether wealth
inequality affects the relative tax rates on labour and capital income. The attempts in the
literature to answer such intrinsically two-dimensional question rely on very strong
restrictions on the policy space (Benhabib and Bassetto 2006), and because of that, such
attempts have delivered a very limited set of predictions. In other cases, the analysis of
two-dimensional policies is performed imposing very strong restrictions on voter
preferences (Borge and Ratsø 2004). The latter approach gives rise to questions about
the robustness of the results if a more flexible theoretical environment is assumed, and is
extremely difficult to apply to other similar questions. Thus, the theoretical tools
proposed in this thesis represent an opportunity to derive new testable predictions from
these existing models. Another interesting feature of the approach presented in chapter 2
is that it is based on a set of preference restrictions borrowed from the literature about
monotone comparative statics and supermodular games (Milgrom and Shannon 1994).
This implies that the model of electoral competition I propose may admit extensions to
analyse other interesting questions, such as the ones regarding the role played by the
interaction among different constituencies, or countries, or elective bodies in shaping
public policies. The attempt to extend the baseline framework to tackle such questions is
likely to be successful whenever the policy choices made by voters in different
constituencies are strategic complements. Because of that, it may prove useful to extend
the analysis of the determinants of immigration policies. Strategic complementarities
may emerge in such analysis if the choices of a community regarding the immigration
policy and the size of welfare spending affect voters’ trade-offs in neighbour countries.
In such case, the proposed extension of the theoretical framework may prove useful to
analyse the cross-country interdependencies in the choice of immigration policies, and to
assess the cost and benefits of policy coordination across different states.
On one hand this thesis represents an important contribution to the analysis of how
electoral processes shape public policies. On the other hand, several questions remain
open. On the theoretical side, my analysis focuses on two particular cases in which
traditional models of electoral competitions usually fail to deliver a sharp
characterization of the policy outcome. Specifically, I study Political Economy questions
that require the analysis of voting over multidimensional choice domains and/or in
presence of non-convexities in the voter objective function. Throughout this thesis, I
focus on cases in which voters can be ordered along a single preference dimension, such
as income, productivity, age, etc., or on cases in which multiple preference dimensions
can be shown to reduce to a single one. Conversely, several interesting cases studied in
the literature (e.g. Levy 2005, Lee and Roemer 2006) are characterized by voters that
differ in multiple orthogonal dimensions. In such cases it is not easy to derive a general
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analytical characterization of the policy outcome that prevails in equilibrium using the
tools available in the literature. Moreover, the framework proposed in this thesis does not
seem promising to achieve such goal, because of the strong ordinal preference
restrictions that underpin the monotone comparative statics result. Thus, further research
is needed in order to obtain a sufficiently general theoretical environment to study this
kind of questions. On the empirical side, the analysis in this thesis provides new testable
predictions about the determinants of some of the most important policies choices faced
by modern democratic countries, namely (i) fiscal policies, (ii) immigration policies and
(iii) public spending in education. These predictions represent a challenge for future
empirical research. On one hand there is a vast body of empirical evidence regarding the
determinants of fiscal policies and public spending, including specific studies about
public intervention in education (see chapter 3 and 5). Thus, the test of the new
predictions regarding these two types of policies can start from a solid base in terms of
data availability and methodology. On the other hand, an empirical analysis of the
relationship between population ageing and immigration policies may prove a difficult
task. The issue of measurement of the outcome variable and the many potential sources
of endogeneity described in chapter 4 represent a big challenge for future empirical
research. If successful, such analysis would help to shed light on one of the most
important - and somewhat controversial - objects of political debate in many democratic
countries.
In conclusion, this thesis provides both an important contribution to the literature in
Political Economy, and a set of promising inputs for future theoretical and empirical
research.
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